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Abstract
The theme of this PhD Thesis is mainly related to the areas of Game Theory
and Industrial Organization. This work develops concretely two problems re-
lated with the Hotelling model of spatial competition. The first one consists
in the introduction of incomplete information on the production costs of the
two firms in the Hotelling model. Under explicit conditions on the production
costs, we determine the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium prices for every probab-
ility distribution of the production costs. The second problem addresses an
extension of the Hotelling model from the line to a network. In this prob-
lem, we establish conditions, depending on the production cost of the firms
and in the network structure, that guarantee the existence of a Nash price
equilibrium for all kind of networks. Furthermore, the explicit formula of the
equilibrium prices is determined. Using an approach similar to the one used
in the first problem, the case of incomplete information on the production
costs of the firms in the network was also studied. Both problems analyse the
two classical variations of the Hotelling model: linear transportation costs
and quadratic transportation costs. Under linear transportation costs, we
also analysed the case when the transportation costs can vary according to
the firms.
v
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Resumo
O tema desta tese de doutoramento insere-se, principalmente, nas a´reas de
Teoria de Jogos e Organizac¸a˜o Industrial. Neste trabalho desenvolveram-se
concretamente dois problemas relacionados com o modelo de Hotelling de
competic¸a˜o espacial. O primeiro consiste na introduc¸a˜o de informac¸a˜o in-
completa nos custos de produc¸a˜o das duas firmas no modelo de Hotelling.
Com condic¸o˜es expl´ıcitas sobre os custos de produc¸a˜o, foram determinados os
equil´ıbrios Bayesianos de Nash em prec¸os para qualquer distribuic¸a˜o de prob-
abilidade dos custos de produc¸a˜o. O segundo problema aborda uma extensa˜o
do modelo de Hotelling na linha para uma rede (network). No aˆmbito deste
problema foram estabelecidas condic¸o˜es, dependendo dos custos de produc¸a˜o
de cada empresa e da estrutura da rede, que garantem a existeˆncia de um
equi´ıbrio de Nash em prec¸os para todos o tipos de redes. Para ale´m da
garantia de existeˆncia, a fo´rmula expl´ıcita dos prec¸os em equil´ıbrio e´ determ-
inada. Usando uma abordagem semelhante a` usada no primeiro problema foi
ainda estudado o caso de informac¸a˜o incompleta nos custos de produc¸a˜o das
firmas na rede. Em ambos os problemas foram analisadas as duas variac¸o˜es
cla´ssicas do modelo de Hotelling: custos de transporte lineares e custos de
transporte quadra´ticos. Para custos de transporte lineares foi ainda analisado
o caso em que os custos de transporte podem variar com a firma.
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Introduction
Since the seminal work of Hotelling [25], the model of spatial competition
has been seen by many researchers as an attractive framework for analyzing
oligopoly markets (see [9, 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38]).
In his model, Hotelling present a city represented by a line segment where
a uniformly distributed continuum of consumers have to buy a homogeneous
commodity. Consumers have to support linear transportation costs when
buying the commodity in one of the two firms of the city. The firms com-
pete in a two-staged location-price game, where simultaneously choose their
location and afterwards set their prices in order to maximize their profits.
Hotelling concluded that firms would agglomerate at the center of the line, an
observation referred as the “Principle of Minimum Differentiation”. In 1979,
D’Aspremont et al. [2] show that the “Principle of Minimum Differentiation”
is invalid, since there was no price equilibrium solution for all possible loca-
tions of the firms, in particular when they are not far enough from each other.
Moreover, in the same article, D’Aspremont et al. introduce a modification
in the Hotelling model, considering quadratic transportation costs instead of
linear. The introduction of this feature removed the discontinuities verified
in the profit and demand functions, which was a problem in Hotelling model
and they show that, under quadratic transportation costs, a price equilib-
rium exists for all locations and a location equilibrium exists and involves
maximum product differentiation, i.e. the firms opt to locate at the extremes
of the line.
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Hotelling and D’Aspremont et al. consider that the production costs of
both firms are equal to zero. Ziss [41] introduce a modification in the model
of D’Aspremont et al. by allowing for different production costs between the
two firms and examines the effect of heterogeneous production technologies
on the location problem. Ziss shows that a price equilibrium exists for all
locations and concludes that when the difference between the production
costs is small, a price and location equilibrium exists in which the firms
prefer to locate in different extremes of the line. However, if the difference
between the production costs is sufficiently large, a location equilibrium does
not exist.
Using linear transportation costs, Boyer et al. [5] study the case where
the firms choose sequentially their location and then compete in delivered
prices (see [26]) assuming that the first mover has perfect information, while
the second mover does not know if the opponent firm has a low or high
production cost. Using quadratic transportation costs, a similar model but
under mill pricing setting was studied by Boyer et al. [6] and by Biscaia and
Sarmento [4] in the case where firms simultaneously choose their locations.
However, Boyer et al. [6] and Biscaia and Sarmento [4] consider that the
uncertainty on the productions costs exists only during the first subgame
in location strategies. Then the production costs are revealed to the firms
before the firms have to choose their optimal price strategies and so the
second subgame has complete information.
In the first part of this work (Chapter 1) we study the Hotelling model
with incomplete information on the production costs of both firms. We do
not study the Hotelling models in which the location choice by the firms
plays a major rule, but models of price competition under spatial nature and
we study the linear and quadratic cases separately. With linear transport-
ation costs, we assume that the location of firms is fixed at the extremes
of the line, avoiding the problem of non existence of equilibrium pointed by
D’Aspremont et al. [2] and so we do not study the first subgame in loca-
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tion strategies. However, with quadratic transportation costs we consider all
possible locations for the firms in the line. With linear transportation costs,
we consider a more general model, where the transportation cost depends on
the firm.
Our main goal is to study the price formation in the second subgame
with incomplete information on the production costs of both firms. The
incomplete information consists on each firm knowing its production cost
but being uncertain about the competitor’s cost as usual in oligopoly theory
( see [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 28, 29]). We show that the first and
second moments of the probability distribution in the production costs are
the only relevant information for the price formation and all the other relevant
economic quantities.
We introduce the definition of local optimum price strategy that is char-
acterized by a local optimum property and by a duopoly property. We say
that a price strategy for both firms is a local optimum price strategy if (i)
any small deviation of a price of a firm provokes a decrease in its own ex-
ante profit (local optimum property); and (ii) both firms have non-empty
market for every pair of production costs (duopoly property). We observe
that a Nash price equilibrium satisfying the duopoly property has to be a
local optimum price strategy.
First, we introduce a bounded costs condition that defines a bound for
the production costs in terms only of the exogenous variables that are the
transportation cost and the road length of the segment line (and, in the
quadratic case, the localization of both firms). We prove that the second
subgame has a local optimum price strategy with the duopoly property if
and only if the condition holds and that the local optimum price strategy
for the firms is unique. Then, we introduce a mild additional bounded costs
condition and we prove that under these two conditions, the local optimum
price strategy is a Bayesian-Nash price strategy. Furthermore, we compute
explicitly the formula for the local optimum price strategy that is simple and
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leaves clear the influence of the relevant economic exogenous quantities in
the price formation. In particular, we observe that the local optimum price
strategy does not depend on the distributions of the production costs of the
firms, except on their first moments. We note that the novelty and elegance of
the proof consists in computing explicitly the expected prices of the optimal
strategies before computing the optimal strategies. Our techniques allowed
the results to be universal in the incomplete information scenario because
they apply to all probability distributions in the production costs.
We explicitly compare the ex-ante and ex-post profits, consumer surplus
and welfare. We prove that, under specific bounded costs conditions, the
ex-post profit of a firm is smaller than its ex-ante profit if and only if the
production cost of the other firm is greater than its expected cost. We do a
comparative analysis of profits, consumer surplus and welfare with complete
and incomplete information.
Other models have been developed where the line in the Hotelling model
is replaced by other topologies as for example in the Salop Model [37], where
the line is replaced by the circle, or in the Spokes model [9]. In the second
part of this work (Chapter 2) we introduce the Hotelling town model, ex-
tending the Hotelling model to a network, where the firms are located at
the neighbourhood of the nodes and the consumers are distributed along the
edges (roads), that can have different sizes. This part of the work is related
with the area of network games (see [8, 20, 19, 23]). However, these studies
locate firms and consumers at nodes, following the modeling methodology
common in social network analysis. In particular, the edges in these only
serve the purpose of connecting two nodes. The networks presented here are
fundamentally different because consumers are assumed uniformly distrib-
uted along the edges of the network.
Again, we study the linear and quadratic cases separately. Moreover, in
the linear case, we consider that transportation costs that consumers have
to support can be different for each firm of the network.
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We extend the definition of local optimum price strategy to the Hotelling
network and, similarly as in Chapter 1, we introduce (weak) bounded condi-
tions on production costs and road lengths that depend on the maximum and
minimum values of the production costs, on the road lengths in the network
and on the transportation costs. Under the (weak) bounded conditions, we
prove that the price competition game has a local optimum price strategy.
Under other (strong) bounded conditions that depend also on the maximum
node degree of the network, we prove that the local optimum price strategy
is a Nash price equilibrium strategy. We give an explicit series expansion
formula for the Nash price equilibrium that shows explicitly how the Nash
price equilibrium of a firm depends on the production costs, road market sizes
and firms locations. Furthermore, the influence of a firm in the Nash price
equilibrium of other firm decreases exponentially with the distance between
the firms.
Assuming that the firms could not know the entire network, we introduce
the idea of space bounded information (see Subsections 2.1.4 and 2.2.3), that
defines how deep a firm can see in the network from its location in terms of
the production costs, node degrees and road sizes and we show how a firm
can estimate its own local optimum price.
With linear transportation costs, we study the location game and we prove
that, if the firms are located at the neighbourhood of the nodes of degree
greater than 2, the local optimal localization strategy is achieved when the
firms are at the vertices of the network (see Subsection 2.1.3).
In Section 2.3, considering that the firms are located at the vertices of
the network, we extend the Hotelling model with linear transportation cost
allowing that the firms in the network can charge different transportation
costs. In Section 2.4 we deal with the problem of uncertainty on the Hotelling
network and we find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy in prices.
Finally, in the conclusions we discuss the results and we present some
possible directions of future works.
15
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Chapter 1
Hotelling model
This chapter contains a general presentation of the classical Hotelling model
where the firms have different production costs and introduces the price
competition in the Hotelling model with uncertainty in the production costs
of both firms. We consider the two usual approaches of the Hotelling model,
and we study separately the scenarios of linear and quadratic transportation
costs.
1.1 Linear transportation costs
In this section, we consider that the firms have associated different transport-
ation costs tA and tB and we study the Hotelling model [25] with uncertainty
in the production costs of both firms with linear transportation costs. For the
linear Hotelling model with firms located at the boundaries of the segment
line, we study the price competition in a scenario of incomplete information
in the production costs of both firms.
We introduce the bounded uncertain costs BUC1 condition that defines a
bound for the costs in terms of the transportation cost and the road length of
the line. Under the bounded costs BUC1 condition we compute the unique
local optimum price strategy for the firms with the property that the mar-
17
ket shares of both firms are not empty for any outcome of production costs.
We introduce a mild additional bounded uncertain costs BUC2 and, under
the BUC1 and BUC2 conditions, we prove that the local optimum price
strategy is a Bayesian-Nash price strategy. Finally, we do a complete ana-
lysis of profits, consumer surplus and welfare under complete and incomplete
information.
In the last subsection we present the results of the section where the
linear transportation costs are equal to both firms, tA = tB = t, as originally
presented by Hotelling.
1.1.1 Hotelling model under complete information
The buyers of a commodity will be supposed uniformly distributed along a
line with length l. In the two ends of the line there are two firms A and B,
located at positions 0 and l respectively, selling the same commodity with
unitary production costs cA and cB. No customer has any preference for
either seller except on the ground of price plus transportation cost tA or tB.
Denote A’s price by pA and B’s price by pB. The point of division
x = x(pA, pB) ∈]0, l[ between the regions served by the two entrepreneurs
is determined by the condition that at this place it is a matter of indifference
whether one buys from A or from B (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Hotelling’s linear city with different transportation costs
The point x is the location of the indifferent consumer to buy from firm
A or firm B, if
pA + tA x = pB + tB (l − x)
18
Solving for x, we obtain
x =
pB − pA + tB l
tA + tB
.
Both firms have a non-empty market share if and only if x ∈]0, l[ . Hence,
both firms have a non-empty market share if and only if the prices satisfy
−tB l < pB − pA < tA l (1.1)
We note that
|pA − pB| < min{tA, tB} l
implies inequality (1.1). Assuming inequality (1.1), both firms A and B have
a non-empty demand (x and l−x) and the profits of the two firms are defined
respectively by
piA = (pA − cA)x = (pA − cA) pB − pA + tB l
tA + tB
; (1.2)
and
piB = (pB − cB) (l − x) = (pB − cB) pA − pB + tA l
tA + tB
. (1.3)
Two of the fundamental economic quantities in oligopoly theory are the
consumer surplus CS and the welfare W . The consumer surplus is the gain
of the consumers community for given price strategies of both firms. The
welfare is the gain of the state that includes the gains of the consumers
community and the gains of the firms for given price strategies of both firms.
Let us denote by vT the total amount that consumers are willing to pay
for the commodity. The total amount v(y) that a consumer located at y pays
for the commodity is given by
v(y) =
{
pA + tA y if 0 < y < x;
pB + tB (l − y) if x < y < l.
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The consumer surplus CS is the difference between the total amount that a
consumer is willing to pay vT and the total amount that the consumer pays
v(y)
CS =
∫ l
0
vT − v(y)dy. (1.4)
The welfare W is given by adding the profits of firms A and B with the
consumer surplus
W = CS + piA + piB. (1.5)
Definition 1.1.1. A price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) for both firms is a local optimum
price strategy if (i) for every small deviation of the price p
A
the profit piA of
firm A decreases, and for every small deviation of the price p
B
the profit piB of
firm B decreases (local optimum property); and (ii) the indifferent consumer
exists, i.e. 0 < x < l (duopoly property).
Let us compute the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
). Differentiating
piA with respect to pA and piB with respect to pB and equalizing to zero, we
obtain the first order conditions (FOC). The FOC imply that
p
A
=
1
3
(2 cA + cB + (tA + 2 tB) l) (1.6)
and
p
B
=
1
3
(cA + 2 cB + (2 tA + tB) l). (1.7)
We note that the first order conditions refer to jointly optimizing the profit
function (1.2) with respect to the price pA and the profit function (1.3) with
respect to the price pB.
Since the profit functions (1.2) and (1.3) are concave, the second-order
conditions for this maximization problem are satisfied and so the prices (1.6)
and (1.7) are indeed maxima for the functions (1.2) and (1.3), respectively.
The corresponding equilibrium profits are given by
piA =
(cB − cA + (tA + 2 tB) l)2
9 (tA + tB)
(1.8)
20
and
piB =
(cA − cB + (2 tA + tB) l)2
9 (tA + tB)
. (1.9)
Furthermore, the indifferent consumer location corresponding to the maxim-
izers p
A
and p
B
of the profit functions piA and piB is
x =
cB − cA + (tA + 2 tB) l
3 (tA + tB)
.
Finally, for the pair of prices (p
A
, p
B
) to be a local optimum price strategy, we
need assumption (1.1) to be satisfied with respect to these pair of prices. We
observe that assumption (1.1) is satisfied with respect to the pair of prices
(p
A
, p
B
) if and only if the following condition with respect to the production
costs is satisfied.
Definition 1.1.2. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded costs (BC)
condition, if
−(tA + 2 tB) l < cB − cA < (2 tA + tB) l.
We note that
|cA − cB| < 3 min{tA, tB} l
implies the BC condition.
We note that under the BC condition the prices are higher than the
production costs p
A
> cA and pB > cB. Hence, there is a local optimum
price strategy if and only if the BC condition holds. Furthermore, under the
BC condition, the pair of prices (p
A
, p
B
) is the local optimum price strategy.
We note that, if a Nash price equilibrium satisfies the duopoly property
then it is a local optimum price strategy. However, a local optimum price
strategy is only a local strategic maximum. Hence, the local optimum price
strategy to be a Nash equilibrium must also be global strategic maximum.
We are going to show that this is the case.
Following D’Aspremont et al. [2], we note that the profits of the two
firms, valued at local optimum price strategy are globally optimal if they are
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at least as great as the payoffs that firms would earn by undercutting the
rivals’ price and supplying the whole market.
Firm A may gain the whole market, undercutting its rival by setting
pMA = pB − tA l − , with  > 0.
In this case the profit amounts to
piMA =
(
p
B
− tA l − − cA
)
l =
1
3
(2 cB − 2 cA + (tB − tA) l) l −  l.
A similar argument is valid for store B. Undercutting this rival, setting
pMB = pA − tB l − ,
it would earn
piMB =
(
p
A
− tB l − − cB
)
l =
1
3
(2 cA − 2 cB + (tA − tB) l) l −  l.
The conditions for such undercutting not to be profitable are piA ≥ piMA and
piB ≥ piMB . Hence, since  > 0, proving that
(cB − cA + (tA + 2 tB) l)2
9 (tA + tB)
≥ 1
3
(2 cB − 2 cA + (tB − tA) l) l (1.10)
is sufficient to prove that piA ≥ piMA . Similarly, proving that
(cA − cB + (tB + 2 tA) l)2
9 (tA + tB)
≥ 1
3
(2 cA − 2 cB + (tA − tB) l) l (1.11)
is sufficient to prove that piB ≥ piMB .
However, conditions (1.10) and (1.11) are satisfied because they are equi-
valent to
(cA − cB + (2 tA + tB) l)2 ≥ 0
22
and
(cB − cA + (tA + 2 tB) l)2 ≥ 0.
Therefore, if (p
A
, p
B
) is a local optimum price strategy then (p
A
, p
B
) is a
Nash price equilibrium.
By equation (1.4), the consumer surplus CS with respect to the local
optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is given by
CS =
∫ l
0
vT − v(x)dx
= vT l − 5 tB + 4 tA
6
l2 − cA + 2 cB
3
l +
(cB − cA + (tA + 2 tB) l)2
18(tA + tB)
.
(1.12)
By equation (1.5), the welfare W is given by
W = vT l − tA + tB
18
l2 − cA + 2 cB
3
l +
+
2 (cA − cB)(tA − 4 tB) l − 5 tA tB l2 + 5(cA − cB)2
18 (tA + tB)
.
1.1.2 Incomplete information on the production costs
The incomplete information consists in each firm to know its production
cost but to be uncertain about the competitor’s cost. In this subsection,
we introduce a simple notation that is fundamental for the elegance and
understanding of the results presented in this section.
Let the triples (IA,ΩA, qA) and (IB,ΩB, qB) represent (finite, countable
or uncountable) sets of types IA and IB with σ-algebras ΩA and ΩB and
probability measures qA and qB, over IA and IB, respectively.
We define the expected values EA(f), EB(f) and E(f) with respect to
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the probability measures qA and qB as follows:
EA(f) =
∫
IA
f(z, w) dqA(z); EB(f) =
∫
IB
f(z, w) dqB(w)
and
E(f) =
∫
IA
∫
IB
f(z, w) dqB(w)dqA(z).
Let cA : IA → R+0 and cB : IB → R+0 be measurable functions where czA =
cA(z) denotes the production cost of firm A when the type of firm A is z ∈ IA
and cwB = cB(w) denotes the production cost of firm B when the type of firm
B is w ∈ IB. Furthermore, we assume that the expected values of cA and cB
are finite
E(cA) = EA(cA) =
∫
IA
czA dqA(z) <∞;
E(cB) = EB(cB) =
∫
IB
cwB dqB(w) <∞.
We assume that dqA(z) denotes the probability of the belief of the firm B
on the production costs of the firm A to be czA. Similarly, we assume that
dqB(w) denotes the probability of the belief of the firm A on the production
costs of the firm B to be cwB.
The simplicity of the following cost deviation formulas is crucial to express
the main results of this section in a clear and understandable way. The cost
deviations of firm A and firm B
∆A : IA → R+0 and ∆B : IB → R+0
are given respectively by ∆A(z) = c
z
A−E(cA) and ∆B(w) = cwB−E(cB). The
cost deviation between the firms
∆C : IA × IB → R+0
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is given by ∆C(z, w) = c
z
A − cwB. Since the meaning is clear, we will use
through the section the following simplified notation:
∆A = ∆A(z); ∆B = ∆B(w) and ∆C = ∆C(z, w).
The expected cost deviation ∆E between the firms is given by ∆E = E(cA)−
E(cB). Hence,
∆C −∆E = ∆A −∆B.
Let VA and VB be the variances of the production costs cA and cB, respect-
ively. We observe that
E(∆C) = ∆E; E(∆
2
A) = EA(∆
2
A) = VA; E(∆
2
B) = EB(∆
2
B) = VB. (1.13)
Furthermore,
EA(∆
2
C) = ∆
2
B + VA + ∆E (∆E − 2 ∆B); (1.14)
EB(∆
2
C) = ∆
2
A + VB + ∆E (∆E + 2 ∆A); (1.15)
E(∆2C) = ∆
2
E + VA + VB. (1.16)
1.1.3 Local optimal price strategy under incomplete
information
In this section, we introduce incomplete information in the classical Hotelling
game and we find the local optimal price strategy. We introduce the bounded
uncertain costs condition that allows us to find the local optimum price
strategy.
A price strategy (pA, pB) is given by a pair of functions pA : IA → R+0 and
pB : IB → R+0 where pzA = pA(z) denotes the price of firm A when the type of
firm A is z ∈ IA and pwB = pB(w) denotes the price of firm B when the type
of firm B is w ∈ IB. We note that E(pA) = EA(pA) and E(pB) = EB(pB).
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The indifferent consumer x : IA × IB → (0, l) is given by
xz,w =
pwB − pzA + tB l
tA + tB
. (1.17)
The ex-post profit of the firms is the effective profit of the firms given a
realization of the production costs for both firm. Hence, it is the main
economic information for both firms. However, the incomplete information
prevents the firms to have access to their ex-post profits except after the
firms have already decided their price strategies. The ex-post profits piEPA :
IA × IB → R+0 and piEPB : IA × IB → R+0 are given by
piEPA (z, w) = piA(z, w) = (p
z
A − czA)xz,w
and
piEPB (z, w) = piB(z, w) = (p
w
B − cwB) (l − xz,w).
The ex-ante profit of the firms is the expected profit of the firm that knows
its production cost but are uncertain about the production cost of the com-
petitor firm. The ex-ante profits piEAA : IA → R+0 and piEAB : IB → R+0 are
given by
piEAA (z) = EB(pi
EP
A ) and pi
EA
B (w) = EA(pi
EP
B ). (1.18)
We note that, the expected profit E(piEPA ) of firm A is equal to EA(pi
EA
A ) and
the expected profit E(piEPB ) of firm B is equal to EB(pi
EA
B ).
The incomplete information forces the firms to have to choose their price
strategies using their knowledge of their ex-ante profits, to which they have
access, instead of the ex-post profits, to which they do not have access except
after the price strategies are decided.
Definition 1.1.3. A price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) for both firms is a local optimum
price strategy if (i) for every z ∈ IA and for every small deviation of the price
pz
A
the ex-ante profit piEAA (z) of firm A decreases, and for every w ∈ IB and
for every small deviation of the price pw
B
the ex-ante profit piEAB (w) of firm B
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decreases (local optimum property); and (ii) for every z ∈ IA and w ∈ IB the
indifferent consumer exists, i.e. 0 < xz,w < l (duopoly property).
We introduce the BUC1 condition that has the crucial economical in-
formation that can be extracted from the exogenous variables. The BUC1
condition allow us to know if there is, or not, a local optimum price strategy
in the presence of uncertainty for the production costs of both firms.
Definition 1.1.4. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded uncertain costs
(BUC1) condition, if
−2 (tA + 2 tB) l < ∆E − 3 ∆C < 2 (2 tA + tB) l,
for all z ∈ IA and for all w ∈ IB.
We note that
|3 ∆C −∆E| < 6 min{tA, tB} l
implies BUC condition.
For i ∈ {A,B}, we define
cmi = min
z∈Ii
{czi } and cMi = max
z∈Ii
{czi }.
Let
∆ = max
i,j∈{A,B}
{cMi − cmj }
Thus, the bounded uncertain costs and location BUC1 is implied by the
following stronger SBUC1 condition.
Definition 1.1.5. The Hotelling model satisfies the strong bounded uncer-
tain costs (SBUC1) condition, if
∆ < 3 min{tA, tB} l.
27
The following theorem is a key economical result in oligopoly theory.
First, it tells us about the existence, or not, of a local optimum price strategy
only by accessing a simple inequality in the exogenous variables and so avail-
able to both firms. Secondly, it gives us explicit and simple formulas that
allow the firms to know the relevance of the exogenous variables in their price
strategies and corresponding profits.
Theorem 1.1.1. There is a local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) if and only
if the BUC1 condition holds. Under the BUC1 condition, the expected prices
of the local optimum price strategy are given by
E(p
A
) =
tA + 2 tB
3
l + E(cA)− ∆E
3
; (1.19)
E(p
B
) =
2 tA + tB
3
l + E(cB) +
∆E
3
. (1.20)
Furthermore, the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is unique and it is
given by
pz
A
= E(p
A
) +
∆A
2
; pw
B
= E(p
B
) +
∆B
2
. (1.21)
We observe that the difference between the expected prices of both firms
has a very useful and clear economical interpretation in terms of the localiz-
ation and expected cost deviations.
E(p
A
)− E(p
B
) =
tB − tA
3
+
∆E
3
Furthermore, for different production costs, the differences between the op-
timal prices of a firm are proportional to the differences of the production
costs
pz1
A
− pz2
A
=
cz1A − cz2A
2
.
and
pw1
B
− pw2
B
=
cw1B − cw2B
2
.
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for all z1, z2 ∈ IA and w1, w2 ∈ IB. Hence, half of the production costs value
is incorporated in the price.
The ex-post profit of the firms is the effective profit of the firms given
a realization of the production costs for both firms. Hence it is the main
economic information for both firms. By equation (1.1.10), the ex-post profit
of firm A is
piEPA (z, w) =
(2 (tA + 2 tB)l − 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E) (2 (tA + 2 tB)l + ∆E − 3 ∆C)
36 (tA + tB)
and the ex-post profit of firm B is
piEPB (z, w) =
(2 (2 tA + tB)l − 3 ∆B + 2 ∆E) (2 (2 tA + tB)l −∆E + 3 ∆C)
36 (tA + tB)
.
The ex-ante profit of a firm is the expected profit of the firm that knows its
production cost but is uncertain about the production costs of the competitor
firm. Since the ex-post profit of firm A, piEPA (z, w), is given by
(2 (tA + 2 tB)l − 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E) (2 (tA + 2 tB)l + ∆E + 3 (cwB − czA))
36 (tA + tB)
,
the ex-ante profit of firm A, piEAA (z), is
(2 (tA + 2 tB)l − 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E) (2 (tA + 2 tB)l + ∆E + 3 (E(cB)− czA))
36 (tA + tB)
.
Hence,
piEAA (z) =
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E)2
36 (tA + tB)
. (1.22)
Similarly, the ex-ante profit of firm B is
piEAB (w) =
(2 (2 tA + tB) l − 3 ∆B + 2 ∆E)2
36 (tA + tB)
. (1.23)
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Let αA and αB be given by
αA = max{E(cB)− cwB : w ∈ IB} and αB = max{E(cA)− czA : z ∈ IA}.
The following corollary gives us the information of the market size of both
firms by giving the explicit localization of the indifferent consumer with re-
spect to the local optimum price strategy.
Corollary 1.1.1. Under the BUC1 condition, the indifferent consumer xz,w
is given by
xz,w =
tA + 2 tB
3 (tA + tB)
l +
∆E − 3 ∆C
6 (tA + tB)
. (1.24)
The pair of prices (p
A
, p
B
) satisfies
pz
A
− czA ≥ αA/2; pwB − cwB ≥ αB/2. (1.25)
Proof of Theorem 1.1.1 and Corollary 1.1.1.
Under incomplete information, each firm seeks to maximize its ex-ante profit.
From (1.18), the ex-ante profit for firm A is given by
piEAA (c
z
A) =
∫
IB
(pzA − czA)
(
pwB − pzA + tB l
tA + tB
)
dqB(w)
= (pzA − czA)
(
E(pB)− pzA + tB l
tA + tB
)
.
From the first order condition FOC applied to the ex-ante profit of firm A
we obtain
pzA =
czA + E(pB) + tB l
2
. (1.26)
Similarly,
piEAB (c
w
B) = (p
w
B − cwB)
(
E(pA)− pwB + tA l
tA + tB
)
, (1.27)
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and, by the FOC, we obtain
pwB =
cwB + E(pA) + tA l
2
. (1.28)
Then, from (1.26) and (1.28),
E(pA) =
E(cA) + E(pB) + tB l
2
;
E(pB) =
E(cB) + E(pA) + tA l
2
.
Solving the system of two equations, we obtain that
E(pA) =
tA + 2 tB
3
l +
2E(cA) + E(cB)
3
;
E(pB) =
2 tA + tB
3
l +
E(cA) + 2E(cB)
3
.
Hence, equalities (1.19) and (1.20) are satisfied. Replacing (1.20) in (1.26)
and replacing (1.19) in (1.28) we obtain that
pzA =
czA
2
+
tA + 2 tB
3
l +
E(cA) + 2E(cB)
6
;
pwB =
cwB
2
+
2 tA + tB
3
l +
2E(cA) + E(cB)
6
.
Hence, equation (1.21) is satisfied.
Replacing in equation (1.17) the values of p
A
and p
B
given by the equation
(1.21) we obtain that the indifferent consumer xz,w is given by
xz,w =
tA + 2 tB
3 (tA + tB)
l +
3 (cwB − czA) + E(cA)− E(cB)
6 (tA + tB)
Hence, equation (1.24) is satisfied. Therefore, (p
A
, p
B
) satisfies property (ii)
if and only if the BUC1 condition holds.
Since the ex-ante profit functions (1.26) and (1.27) are concave, the
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second-order conditions for this maximization problem are satisfied and so
the prices pz
A
and pw
B
are indeed maxima for the functions (1.26) and (1.27),
respectively. Therefore, the pair (pz
A
, pw
B
) satisfies property (i) and so (pz
A
, pw
B
)
is a local optimum price strategy.
Let us prove that pz
A
and pw
B
satisfy inequalities (1.25). By equation
(1.21),
pz
A
− czA =
tA + 2 tB
3
l − c
z
A
2
+
E(cA) + 2E(cB)
6
;
pw
B
− cwB =
2 tA + tB
3
l − c
w
B
2
+
2E(cA) + E(cB)
6
.
By the BUC1 condition, for every w ∈ IB, we obtain
6 (pz
A
− czA)− 2 (tA + 2 tB) l = −3 czA + E(cA) + 2E(cB)
= 3 (E(cB)− cwB)− 3 (czA − cwB) + E(cA)− E(cB)
> 3 (E(cB)− cwB)− 2 (tA + 2 tB) l.
Similarly, by the BUC1 condition, for every z ∈ IA, we obtain
6 (pw
B
− cwB)− 2 (2 tA + tB) l = −3 cwB + 2E(cA) + E(cB)
= 3 (E(cA)− czA)− 3 (cwB − czA)− E(cA) + E(cB)
> 3 (E(cA)− czA)− 2 (2 tA + tB) l.
Hence, inequalities (1.25) are satisfied.
1.1.4 Bayesian Nash equilibrium
We note that, if a Bayesian-Nash price equilibrium satisfies the duopoly
property then it is a local optimum price strategy. However, a local optimum
price strategy is only a local strategic maximum. Hence, the local optimum
price strategy to be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium must also be global strategic
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maximum. In this subsection, we are going to show that this is the case.
Following D’Aspremont et al. [2], we note that the profits of the two
firms, valued at local optimum price strategy are globally optimal if they are
at least as great as the payoffs that firms would earn by undercutting the
rivals’s price and supplying the whole market for all admissible subsets of
types IA and IB.
Definition 1.1.6. A price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) for both firms is a Bayesian-
Nash, if for every z ∈ IA and for every deviation of the price pzA the ex-
ante profit piEAA (z) of firm A decreases, and for every w ∈ IB and for every
deviation of the price pw
B
the ex-ante profit piEAB (w) of firm B decreases.
Let (p
A
, p
B
) be the local optimum price strategy. Given the type w0 of
firm B, firm A may gain the whole market, undercutting its rival by setting
pMA (w0) = p
w0
B
− tA l − , with  > 0
Hence, by BUC1 condition pMA (w0) ≤ pzA for all z ∈ IA. We observe that
if firm A chooses the price pMA (w0) then, by equalities (1.17) and (1.21), the
whole market belongs to Firm A for all types w of firm B with cw ≥ cw0 . Let
x(w;w0) = min
{
l,
pwB − pMA (w0) + tB l
tA + tB
}
.
Thus, the expected profit with respect to the price pMA (w0) for firm A is
piEA,MA (w0) =
∫
IB
(
pMA (w0)− czA
)
x(w;w0) dqB(w).
Let wM ∈ IB such that cwMB = cMB . Since cwM ≥ cw0 for every w0 ∈ IB, we
obtain
piEA,MA (w0) ≤
(
pMA (w0)− czA
)
l ≤ (pMA (wM)− czA) l (1.29)
Given the type z0 of firm A, firm B may gain the whole market, undercutting
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its rival by setting
pMB (z0) = p
z0
A
− tB l − , with  > 0.
Hence, by BUC1 condition pMB (z0) ≤ pwB for all w ∈ IB. We observe that
if firm B chooses the price pMB (z0) then, by equalities (1.17) and (1.21), the
whole market belongs to Firm B for all types z of firm A with cz ≥ cz0 . Let
x(z; z0) = max
{
0,
pMB (z0)− pzA + tB l
tA + tB
}
Thus, the expected profit with respect to the price pMB (z0) of firm B is
piEA,MB (z0) =
∫
IA
(
pMB (z0)− cwB
)
(l − x(z; z0)) dqA(z).
Let zM ∈ IA such that czMA = cMA . Since czM ≥ cz0 for every z0 ∈ IA, we
obtain
piEA,MB (z0) ≤
(
pMB (z0)− cwB
)
l ≤ (pMB (zM)− cwB) l. (1.30)
Remark 1.1.1. Under the BUC1 condition, the strategic equilibrium (p
A
, p
B
)
is the unique pure Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with the duopoly property if for
every z ∈ IA and every w ∈ IB,
piEA,MA (w) ≤ piEAA (z) and piEA,MB (z) ≤ piEAB (w). (1.31)
Let
Xi,j = 3 c
M
j + 2E(ci) + E(cj)− 6 cmi + 2 (tj − ti) l
and
Yi,j = 2 (ti + 2 tj) l + E(ci) + 2E(cj)− 3 cMi .
Definition 1.1.7. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded uncertain costs
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(BUC2) condition, if
6 (tA + tB)XA,B l ≤ Y 2A,B (1.32)
and
6 (tA + tB)XB,A l ≤ Y 2B,A. (1.33)
Thus, the bounded uncertain costs condition BUC2 is implied by the
following stronger SBUC2 condition.
Let
tm = min{tA, tB} and tM = max{tA, tB}.
Definition 1.1.8. The Hotelling model satisfies the strong bounded uncer-
tain costs (SBUC2) condition, if
9 ∆ <
(
3 t2m − 2 tM + 2 tm
tM
)
l
We observe that the SBUC2 condition implies SBUC1 condition and so
implies the BUC1 condition.
Theorem 1.1.2. If the Hotelling model satisfies the BUC1 and BUC2 con-
ditions the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is a Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium.
Corollary 1.1.2. If the Hotelling model satisfies SBUC2 condition the local
optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By equalities (1.22) and (1.23), we obtain that piEAA (zM) ≤ piEAA (z)
and piEAB (wM) ≤ piEAB (w) for all z ∈ IA and for all w ∈ IB. Hence, put-
ting conditions (1.29), (1.30) and (1.31) together, we obtain the following
sufficient condition for the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) to be a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium:
(pMA (wM)− cmA ) l ≤ piEAA (zM) and (pMB (zM)− cmB ) l ≤ piEAB (wM). (1.34)
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By equalities (1.22) and (1.23) we obtain that
piEAA (zM) =
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l + E(cA) + 2E(cB)− 3 cMA )2
36 (tA + tB)
=
Y 2A,B
36 (tA + tB)
and
piEAB (wM) =
(2 (2 tA + tB) l + 2E(cA) + E(cB)− 3 cMB )2
36 (tA + tB)
=
Y 2B,A
36 (tA + tB)
.
Also, from (1.1.10), we know that
pMA (wM)− cmA = pwMB − tA l − − cmA
=
1
6
(3 cMB + 2E(cA) + E(cB)− 6 cmA + 2 (tB − tA) l)− 
=
1
6
XA,B − .
and
pMB (zM)− cmB = pzMA − tB l − − cmB
=
1
6
(3 cMA + E(cA) + 2E(cB)− 6 cmB + 2 (tB − tA) l)− 
=
1
6
XB,A − .
Hence, condition (1.34) holds if inequalities (1.32) and (1.33) are satisfied.
1.1.5 Comparative profit analysis
From now on, we assume that the BUC1 condition holds and that the price
strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is the local optimum price strategy determined in Theorem
1.1.1.
We observe that the difference between the ex-post profits of both firms
has a very useful and clear economical interpretation in terms of the expected
cost deviations.
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Let X = ∆B (2 tA + tB) − ∆A (tA + 2 tB). The difference piEPA (z, w) −
piEPB (z, w) is given by
tB − tA
3
l2 +
2X + (∆E − 3 ∆C) (4 (tA + tB)−∆A −∆B)
12 (tA + tB)
.
Furthermore, for different production costs, the differences between the ex-
post profit of firm A, piEPA (z1, w)− piEPA (z2, w), is given by
(cz2A − cz1A ) (4 (tA + 2 tB) l −∆E + 3 (cwB + E(cA)− cz1A − cz2A ))
12 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post profit of firm B, piEPB (z, w1)−piEPB (z, w2),
is given by
(cw2B − cw1B ) (4 (2 tA + tB) l + ∆E + 3 (czA + E(cB)− cw1B − cw2B ))
12 (tA + tB)
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB.
We observe that the difference between the ex-ante profits of both firms
has a very useful and clear economical interpretation in terms of the expected
cost deviations.
The difference piEAA (z)− piEAB (w) is given by
tB − tA
3
l2 +
(∆A + ∆B) (3 (∆A −∆B) + 4 ∆E) + (4X − 8 ∆E (tA + tB)) l
12 (tA + tB)
.
Furthermore, for different production costs, the differences between the ex-
ante profits of firm A, piEAA (z1)− piEAA (z2) is given by
(cz2A − cz1A ) (4 (tA + 2 tB) l + 3 (2E(cA)− cz1A − cz2A )− 4 ∆E)
12 (tA + tB)
and the differences between the ex-ante profits of firm B, piEAB (w1)−piEAB (w2),
37
is given by
(cw2B − cw1B ) (4 (2 tA + tB) l + 3 (2E(cB)− cw1B − cw2B ) + 4 ∆E)
12 (tA + tB)
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB.
The difference between the ex-post and the ex-ante profit for a firm is
the real deviation from the realized gain of the firm and the expected gain
of the firm knowing its own production cost but being uncertain about the
production cost of the other firm. It is the best measure of the risk involved
for the firm given the uncertainty in the production costs of the other firm.
The difference between the ex-post profit and the ex-ante profit for firm A is
piEPA (z, w)− piEAA (z) =
∆B
12 (tA + tB)
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 2 ∆E − 3 ∆A) .
The difference between the ex-post profit and the ex-ante profit for firm B is
piEPB (z, w)− piEAB (w) =
∆A
12 (tA + tB)
(2 (2 tA + tB) l + 2 ∆E − 3 ∆B) .
Definition 1.1.9. The Hotelling model satisfies the A-bounded uncertain
costs (A−BUC) condition, if for all z ∈ IA
3 ∆A + 2 ∆E < 2 (tA + 2 tB) l.
The Hotelling model satisfies the B-bounded uncertain costs (B − BUC)
condition, if for all w ∈ IB
3 ∆B − 2 ∆E < 2 (2 tA + tB) l.
The following corollary tells us that the sign of the risk of a firm has the
opposite sign of the deviation of the competitor firm realized production cost
from its average. Hence, under incomplete information the sign of the risk
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of a firm is not accessible to the firm. However, the probability of the sign
of the risk of a firm to be positive or negative is accessible to the firm.
Corollary 1.1.3. Under the A-bounded uncertain costs (A − BUC) condi-
tion,
piEPA (z, w) < pi
EA
A (z) if and only if ∆B < 0. (1.35)
Under the B-bounded uncertain costs (B −BUC) condition,
piEPB (z, w) < pi
EA
B (w) if and only if ∆A < 0. (1.36)
The proof of the above corollary follows from a simple manipulation of
the previous formulas for the ex-post and ex-ante profits.
The expected profit of the firm is the expected gain of the firm. We
observe that the ex-ante and the ex-posts profits of both firms are strictly
positive with respect to the local optimum price strategy. Hence, the expec-
ted profits of both firms are also strictly positive. Since the ex-ante profit
piEAA (z) of firm A is equal to
9 ∆2A − 12 ∆A ((tA + 2 tB) l −∆E) + 4 ((tA + 2 tB) l −∆E)2
36 (tA + tB)
,
from (1.13), we obtain that the expected profit of firm A is given by
E(piEPA ) =
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆E)2
9 (tA + tB)
+
VA
4 (tA + tB)
.
Similarly, the expected profit of firm B is given by
E(piEPB ) =
((2 tA + tB) l + ∆E)
2
9 (tA + tB)
+
VB
4 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-ante and the expected profit of a firm is the
deviation from the expected realized gain of the firm given the realization
of its own production cost and the expected gain in average for different
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realizations of its own production cost, but being in both cases uncertain
about the production costs of the competitor firm. It is the best measure
of the quality of its realized production cost in terms of the expected profit
over its own production costs.
Corollary 1.1.4. The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected
profit for firm A is
E(piEPA )− piEAA (z) =
∆A (4 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆A − 4 ∆E) + 3VA
12 (tA + tB)
. (1.37)
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit for firm B
is
E(piEPB )− piEAB (w) =
∆B (4 (2 tA + tB) l − 3 ∆B + 4 ∆E) + 3VB
12 (tA + tB)
. (1.38)
Proof. Let X = (tA + 2 tB) l −∆E. Hence,
E(piEPA )− piEAA (z) =
4X2 − (2X − 3 ∆A)2 + 9VA
36 (tA + tB)
=
∆A (4X − 3 ∆A) + 3VA
12 (tA + tB)
and so equality (1.37) holds. The proof of equality (1.38) follows similarly.
1.1.6 Comparative consumer surplus and welfare ana-
lysis
The ex-post consumer surplus is the realized gain of the consumers com-
munity for given outcomes of the production costs of both firms. Under
incomplete information, by equation (1.4), the ex-post consumer surplus is
CSEP = vT l − 5 tB + 4 tA
6
l2 − 4E(cB) + 2E(cA) + 3 ∆B
6
l +K1, (1.39)
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where
K1 =
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆C + ∆E)2
72 (tA + tB)
.
The expected value of the consumer surplus is the expected gain of the
consumers community for all possible outcomes of the production costs of
both firms. The expected value of the consumer surplus E(CSEP ) is given
by
E(CSEP ) =
∫
IB
∫
IA
CSEPdqA(z) dqB(w)
= vT l − 5 tB + 4 tA
6
l2 − l
3
(2E(cB) + E(cA)) + U1
where
U1 =
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 2 ∆E)2 + 9 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
.
We note that, from equalities (1.13) and (1.16), the expected value of K1 is
U1 =
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l + ∆E)
2 − 6E(∆C) (2 (tA + 2 tB) l + ∆E) + 9E(∆2C)
72 (tA + tB)
=
(2(tA + 2tB)l + ∆E)
2 − 6∆E(2(tA + 2tB)l + ∆E) + 9(VA + VB + ∆2E)
72(tA + tB)
=
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 2 ∆E)2 + 9 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and the expected
value of the consumer surplus measures the difference between the gain of
the consumers for the realized outcomes of the production costs of both
firms and the expected gain of the consumers for all possible outcomes of
the production costs of both firms. Hence, it measures the risk taken by the
consumers for different outcomes of the production costs of both firms.
Corollary 1.1.5. The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and
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the expected value of the consumer surplus, CSEP − E(CSEP ), is
−∆B
2
l +
(tA + 2 tB) (∆B −∆A)
6 (tA + tB)
l +
(∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2E − 9 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
.
Proof. Let X = 2 (tA + 2 tB) l. Hence,
CSEP − E(CSEP ) =
= −∆B
2
l +
(X − 3 ∆C + ∆E)2 − (X − 2 ∆E)2 − 9 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
= −∆B
2
l +
6X (∆E −∆C) + (∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2E − 9 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
= −∆B
2
l +
X (∆B −∆A)
12 (tA + tB)
+
(∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2E − 9 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
The ex-post welfare is the realized gain of the state that includes the gains
of the consumers community and the gains of the firms for a given outcomes
of the production costs of both firms.
By equation (1.5), the ex-post welfare is
WEP = vT l− (tA + tB)
2 + 5 tA tB
18 (tA + tB)
l2− 4E(cB) + 2E(cA) + 3 ∆B
6
l+K2+K3,
(1.40)
where
K2 =
(4 tB − tA) (∆E − 3 ∆C)− 3 (∆A (2 tA + tB) + ∆B (tA + 2 tB))
18 (tA + tB)
l
and
K3 =
3 ∆C (9 ∆C − 2 ∆E)−∆2E
72 (tA + tB)
.
The expected value of the welfare is the expected gain of the state for all
possible outcomes of the production costs of both firms. The expected value
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of the welfare E(WEP ) is given by
E(WEP ) =
∫
IB
∫
IA
WEPdqA(z) dqB(w)
= vT l − (tA + tB)
2 + 5 tA tB
18 (tA + tB)
l2 − 2E(cB) + E(cA)
3
l − ∆E (4 tB − tA)
9 (tA + tB)
l + U2,
(1.41)
where
U2 =
27 (VA + VB) + 20 ∆
2
E
72 (tA + tB)
.
We note that, from equalities (1.13) and (1.16), the expected value of K3 is
U2 =
27E(∆2C)− 6E(∆C) ∆E −∆2E
72 (tA + tB)
=
27 (VA + VB + ∆
2
E)− 6 ∆2E −∆2E
72 (tA + tB)
=
27 (VA + VB) + 20 ∆
2
E
72 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post welfare and the expected value of the
welfare measures the difference in the gains of the state between the realized
outcomes of the production costs of both firms and the expected gain of the
state for all possible outcomes of the production costs of both firms. Hence, it
measures the risk taken by the state for different outcomes of the production
costs of both firms.
Corollary 1.1.6. The difference between the ex-post welfare and the expected
value of welfare, WEP − E(WEP ), is
−∆A (tA + 5 tB) + ∆B (5 tA + tB)
6 (tA + tB)
l +
9 (∆2C − VA − VB)− 2 ∆C ∆E − 7 ∆2E
24 (tA + tB)
Proof. From equalities (1.40) and (1.41) we obtain that
WEP − E(WEP ) = −∆B
2
l +K3 +K4 +
∆E (4 tB − tA)
9 (tA + tB)
l − U2.
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We note that
K5 = K4 − U2 = 3 ∆C (9 ∆C − 2 ∆E)− 21 ∆
2
E − 27 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
=
9 (∆2C − VA − VB)− 2 ∆C ∆E − 7 ∆2E
24 (tA + tB)
.
Hence,
WEP − E(WEP ) = −∆B
2
l +
2 ∆E (4 tB − tA)
18 (tA + tB)
+K5+
+
(4 tB − tA) (∆E − 3 ∆C)− 3 (∆A (2 tA + tB) + ∆B (tA + 2 tB))
18 (tA + tB)
l
= −∆B
2
l +K5+
+
(4 tB − tA) (∆E −∆C)− 3 (∆A (2 tA + tB) + ∆B (tA + 2 tB))
6 (tA + tB)
l
= −∆B
2
l +K5+
+
(4 tB − tA) (∆B −∆A)− 3 (tA (2 ∆A + ∆B) + tB (∆A + 2 ∆B))
6 (tA + tB)
l
= −∆B
2
l +
2 ∆B (tB − tA)−∆A (tA + 5 tB)
6 (tA + tB)
l +K5
= −∆B (5 tA + tB) + ∆A (tA + 5 tB)
6 (tA + tB)
l +K5.
1.1.7 Complete versus Incomplete information
Let us consider the case where the production costs are revealed to both
firms before they choose the prices. In this case, the competition between
the firms is under complete information.
A price strategy (pCIA , p
CI
B ) is given by a pair of functions p
CI
A : IA× IB →
R+0 and pCIB : IA× IB → R+0 where pCIA (z, w) denotes the price of firm A and
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pCIB (z, w) denotes the price of firm B when the type of firm A is z ∈ IA and
the type of firm B is w ∈ IB.
Under the BC condition, by equations (1.6) and (1.7), the Nash price
strategy (pCIA , p
CI
B ) is given by
pCI
A
(z, w) = cB +
2
3
(∆C) +
tA + 2 tB
3
l
and
pCI
B
(z, w) = cA − 2
3
(∆C) +
2 tA + tB
3
l.
By equation (1.8), the profit piCIA : IA × IB → R+0 of firm A is given by
piCIA (z, w) =
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆C)2
9 (tA + tB)
.
Similarly, by equation (1.9), the profit piCIB : IA× IB → R+0 of firm B is given
by
piCIB (z, w) =
((2 tA + tB) l + ∆C)
2
9 (tA + tB)
.
Using equality (1.15), the expected profit EB(pi
CI
A ) for firm A is given by
EB(pi
CI
A ) =
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆A −∆E)2 + VB
9 (tA + tB)
Similarly, using equality (1.14) the expected profit EA(pi
CI
B ) for firm B is
given by
EA(pi
CI
B ) =
((2 tA + tB) l −∆B + ∆E)2 + VA
9 (tA + tB)
The expected profit E(piCIA ) for firm A is given by
E(piCIA ) =
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆E)2 + VA + VB
9 (tA + tB)
.
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Similarly, the expected profit E(piCIB ) for firm B is given by
E(piCIB ) =
((2 tA + tB) l + ∆E)
2 + VA + VB
9 (tA + tB)
.
By equation (1.12), the consumer surplus is given by
CSCI(z, w) = vT l − 5 tB + 4 tA
6
l2 − ∆A + E(cA) + 2 ∆B + 2E(cB)
3
l + Z1,
(1.42)
where
Z1 =
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆C)2
18 (tA + tB)
.
The expected value of the consumer surplus E(CSCI) is
E(CSCI(z, w)) = vT l − 5 tB + 4 tA
6
l2 − E(cA) + 2E(cB)
3
l +W1
where
W1 =
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆E)2 + VA + VB
18 (tA + tB)
.
We note that, from equalities (1.13) and (1.16), the expected value of Z1 is
W1 =
(tA + 2 tB)
2 l2 − 2 (tA + 2 tB) l E(∆C) + E(∆2C)
18 (tA + tB)
=
(tA + 2 tB)
2 l2 − 2 ∆E (tA + 2 tB) l + ∆2E + VA + VB
18 (tA + tB)
=
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆E)2 + VA + VB
18 (tA + tB)
.
By equation (1.13), the welfare is given by
WCI(z, w) = vT l − tA + tB
18
l2 − ∆A + E(cA) + 2 ∆B + 2E(cB)
3
l + Z2,
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where
Z2 =
−5 tA tB l2 + 2 ∆C l (tA − 4 tB) + 5 ∆2C
18 (tA + tB)
The expected value of the welfare E(WCI) is given by
E(WCI(z, w)) = vT l − tA + tB
18
l2 − E(cA) + 2E(cB)
3
l +W2
where
W2 =
−5 tA tB l2 + 2 ∆E l (tA − 4 tB) + 5 (∆2E + VA + VB)
18 (tA + tB)
.
We note that, from equalities (1.13) and (1.16), the expected value of Z2 is
W2 =
−5 tA tB l2 + 2E(∆C) l (tA − 4 tB) + 5E(∆2C)
18 (tA + tB)
=
−5 tA tB l2 + 2 ∆E l (tA − 4 tB) + 5 (∆2E + VA + VB)
18 (tA + tB)
.
Corollary 1.1.7. The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit,
under complete information, for firm A, piEPA (z, w)− piCIA (z, w), is
(∆A −∆B)(∆A + 2 ∆B)− (2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 2 ∆C) (2∆A + ∆B)
36 (tA + tB)
. (1.43)
The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit, under complete in-
formation, for firm B, piEPB (z, w)− piCIB (z, w), is
(∆B −∆A)(∆B + 2 ∆A)− (2 (2 tA + tB) l + 2 ∆C) (2∆B + ∆A)
36 (tA + tB)
. (1.44)
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Proof. Let CI = (tA + 2 tB) l − ∆C . Hence,
piEPA (z, w)− piCIA (z, w) =
(2CI + ∆B −∆A)(2CI −∆A − 2 ∆B)− 4CI2
36 (tA + tB)
=
(∆B −∆A)(−∆A − 2 ∆B) + 2CI(−2∆A − ∆B)
36 (tA + tB)
and so equality (1.43) holds. The proof of equality (1.44) follows similarly.
Corollary 1.1.8. The difference between the ex-ante profit EB(pi
EP
A ) and
EB(pi
CI
A ) for firm A is
EB(pi
EP
A )− EB(piCIA ) =
∆A (5 ∆A − 4 ((tA + 2 tB) l −∆E))
36 (tA + tB)
− VB
9 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit EA(pi
EP
B ) and EA(pi
CI
B ) for firm B
is
EA(pi
EP
B )− EA(piCIB ) =
∆B (5 ∆B − 4 ((2 tA + tB) l + ∆E))
36 (tA + tB)
− VA
9 (tA + tB)
.
The proof of the above corollary follows from a simple manipulation of
the previous formulas for the ex-post and ex-ante profits.
The difference between the expected profits of firm A with complete and
incomplete information is given by
E(piEPA )− E(piCIA ) =
5VA − 4VB
36 (tA + tB)
. (1.45)
The difference between the expected profits of firm B with complete and
incomplete information is given by
E(piEPB )− E(piCIB ) =
5VB − 4VA
36 (tA + tB)
. (1.46)
Corollary 1.1.9. The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and
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the consumer surplus, under complete information, CSEP − CSCI , is
∆A (5 tA + 4 tB) + ∆B (4 tA + 5 tB)
18 (tA + tB)
l +
(∆B −∆A − 4 ∆C) (∆B −∆A)
72 (tA + tB)
.
(1.47)
Therefore, equation (1.47) determines in which cases it is better to have
uncertainty in the production costs instead of complete information in terms
of consumer surplus CSEP > CSCI .
Proof. From equalities (1.39) and (1.42), we obtain that
CSEP − CSCI = 2 ∆A + ∆B
6
l +K1 −K2,
where
K1 =
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆C + ∆E)2
72 (tA + tB)
.
and
K2 =
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆C)2
18 (tA + tB)
.
Let X = (tA + 2 tB) l. We note that
K1 −K2 = (2X − 3 ∆C + ∆E)
2 − 4 (X −∆C)2
72 (tA + tB)
=
4X (∆E −∆C) + (∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2C
72 (tA + tB)
=
4X (∆B −∆A) + (∆B −∆A − 2 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2C
72 (tA + tB)
=
(tA + 2 tB) (∆B −∆A)
18 (tA + tB)
l +
(∆B −∆A − 4 ∆C) (∆B −∆A)
72 (tA + tB)
.
Hence, CSEP − CSCI is given by expression (1.47).
The difference between expected value of the consumer surplus and the
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expected value of the consumer surplus under complete information, is
E(CSEP )− E(CSCI) = 5 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
. (1.48)
Therefore, in expected value the consumer surplus is greater with incomplete
information than with complete information.
The difference between the ex-post welfare and the welfare, under com-
plete information, is given by
WEP −WCI = 2∆A + ∆B
6
l − 2 ∆C l (tA − 4 tB) + 5 ∆
2
C
18 (tA + tB)
+K3 +K4,
where
K3 =
(4 tB − tA) (∆E − 3 ∆C)− 3 (∆A (2 tA + tB) + ∆B (tA + 2 tB))
18 (tA + tB)
l
and
K4 =
3 ∆C (9 ∆C − 2 ∆E)−∆2E
72 (tA + tB)
.
Hence,
WEP −WCI = ∆A (tA − tB) + ∆B (tB − tA)
18 (tA + tB)
l +
7 ∆2C − 6 ∆C ∆E −∆2E
72 (tA + tB)
(1.49)
Therefore, equation (1.49) determines in which cases it is better to have
uncertainty in the production costs instead of complete information in terms
of welfare WEP > WCI .
The difference between expected value of the welfare and the expected
value of the welfare under complete information, is
E(WEP )− E(WCI) = 7 (VA + VB)
72 (tA + tB)
. (1.50)
Therefore, in expected value the welfare is greater with incomplete informa-
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tion than with complete information.
1.1.8 Example: Symmetric Hotelling
A Hotelling game is symmetric, if (IA,ΩA, qA) = (IB,ΩB, qB) and c = cA =
cB. Hence, we observe that all the formulas of this section hold with the
following simplifications
∆E = 0; E(c) = E(cA) = E(cB) and V = VA = VB.
The bounded uncertain costs in the symmetric case can be written in the
following simple way.
Definition 1.1.10. The symmetric Hotelling model satisfies the bounded
uncertain costs (BUC1) condition, if
−2 (2 tA + tB) l < 3 ∆C < 2 (tA + 2 tB) l
for all z ∈ IA and for all w ∈ IB.
Definition 1.1.11. The symmetric Hotelling model satisfies the bounded
uncertain costs (BUC2) condition, if
(3 cM + 3E(c)− 6 cm + 2 (tB − tA) l) l ≤ (2 (tA + 2 tB) l + 3E(c)− 3 cM)
2
6 (tA + tB)
and
(3 cM + 3E(c)− 6 cm + 2 (tA − tB) l) l ≤ (2 (tB + 2 tA) l + 3E(c)− 3 cM)
2
6 (tA + tB)
.
Under the BUC1 condition, the expected prices of the local optimum
price strategy have the simple expression
E(p
A
) =
tA + 2 tB
3
l + E(c) and E(p
B
) =
2 tA + tB
3
l + E(c).
51
By Proposition 1.1.1, for the Hotelling game with incomplete symmetric
information, the local optimum price strategy (pA, pB) has the form
pz
A
=
tA + 2 tB
3
l + E(c) +
∆A
2
; pw
B
=
2 tA + tB
3
l + E(c) +
∆B
2
.
The ex-post profit of firm A and firm B are, respectively
piEPA (z, w) =
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆A) (2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆C)
36 (tA + tB)
and
piEPB (z, w) =
(2 (2 tA + tB) l − 3 ∆B) (2 (2 tA + tB) l + 3 ∆C)
36 (tA + tB)
.
Let X = ∆B (2 tA + tB)−∆A (tA + 2 tB). The difference between the ex-post
profits of both firms is given by
piEPA (z, w)− piEPB (z, w) =
tB − tA
3
l2 +
2X + 3 ∆C (∆A + ∆B − 4 (tA + tB))
12 (tA + tB)
Furthermore, for different production costs, the difference between the ex-
post profit of firm A, piEPA (z1, w)− piEPA (z2, w), is given by
(cz2A − cz1A ) (4 (tA + 2 tB) l + 3 (cwB + E(c)− cz1A − cz2A ))
12 (tA + tB)
and the difference between the ex-post profit of firmB, piEPB (z, w1)−piEPB (z, w2),
is given by
(cw2B − cw1B ) (4 (2 tA + tB) l + 3 (czA + E(c)− cw1B − cw2B ))
12 (tA + tB)
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB.
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The ex-ante profit profit of firm A and firm B are, respectively
piEAA (z) =
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆A)2
36 (tA + tB)
and
piEAB (w) =
(2 (2 tA + tB) l − 3 ∆B)2
36 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-ante profits of both firms is given by
piEAA (z)− piEAB (w) =
tB − tA
3
l2 +
3 ∆C (∆A + ∆B) + 4X l
12 (tA + tB)
Furthermore, for different production costs, the difference between the ex-
ante profits of firm A, piEAA (z1)− piEAA (z2), is given by
(cz2A − cz1A ) (4 (tA + 2 tB) l + 3 (2E(c)− cz1A − cz2A ))
12 (tA + tB)
.
Similarly, piEAB (w1)− piEAB (w2) is given by
(cw2B − cw1B ) (4 (2 tA + tB) l + 3 (2E(c)− cw1B − cw2B ))
12 (tA + tB)
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB.
The difference between the ex-post profit and the ex-ante profit for firm
A is
piEPA (z, w)− piEAA (z) =
∆B
12 (tA + tB)
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆A) .
The difference between the ex-post profit and the ex-ante profit for firm B is
piEPB (z, w)− piEAB (w) =
∆A
12 (tA + tB)
(2 (2 tA + tB) l − 3 ∆B) .
We observe that that the A−BUC and B−BUC conditions are implied by
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the BUC1 condition. Hence, Corollary 1.1.3 can be rewritten without any
restriction, i.e.
piEPA (z, w) < pi
EA
A (z) if and only if ∆B < 0;
and
piEPB (z, w) < pi
EA
B (w) if and only if ∆A < 0.
The expected profit of firm A and firm B are, respectively,
E(piA) =
((tA + 2 tB) l)
2
9 (tA + tB)
+
V
4 (tA + tB)
.
and
E(piB) =
((2 tA + tB) l)
2
9 (tA + tB)
+
V
4 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit for firm A
is
E(piEPA )− piEAA (z) =
∆A (4 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆A) + 3V
12 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit for firm B
is
E(piEPB )− piEAB (w) =
∆B (4 (2 tA + tB) l − 3 ∆B) + 3V
12 (tA + tB)
.
The ex-post consumer surplus is
CSEP = v l − 5 tB + 4 tA
6
l2 − 2E(c) + ∆B
2
l +
(2 (tA + 2 tB) l − 3 ∆C)2
72 (tA + tB)
.
The expected value of the consumer surplus is
E(CSEP ) = vT l − 5 tB + 4 tA
6
l2 − E(c) l + 4 (tA + 2 tB)
2 l2 + 18V
72 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and the expected value
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of the consumer surplus is
CSEP − E(CSEP ) = −∆A (tA + 2 tB) + ∆B (2 tA + tB)
6 (tA + tB)
l +
∆2C − 2V
8 (tA + tB)
.
The ex-post welfare is
WEP = vT l − (tA + tB)
2 + 5 tA tB
18 (tA + tB)
l2 − E(c) + 3 ∆
2
C
8 (tA + tB)
−W1,
where
W1 =
∆A (tA + 5 tB) + ∆B (tB + 5 tA)
6 (tA + tB)
l.
The expected value of the welfare E(WEP ) is given by
E(WEP ) = vT l − (tA + tB)
2 + 5 tA tB
18 (tA + tB)
l2 − E(c) l − 3V
4 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post welfare and the expected value of welfare
is
WEP − E(WEP ) = −∆A (tA + 5 tB) + ∆B (5 tA + tB)
6 (tA + tB)
l +
3 (∆2C − 2V )
8 (tA + tB)
The expected profits EB(pi
CI
A ) for firm A and EA(pi
CI
B ) for firm B are
given by
EB(pi
CI
A ) =
((tA + 2 tB) l −∆A)2 + V
9 (tA + tB)
and
EA(pi
CI
B ) =
((2 tA + tB) l −∆B)2 + V
9 (tA + tB)
The expected profits for firm A and B are given, respectively by
E(piCIA ) =
(tA + 2 tB)
2 l2 + 2V
9 (tA + tB)
.
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and
E(piCIB ) =
(2 tA + tB)
2 l2 + 2V
9 (tA + tB)
.
The expected value of the consumer surplus E(CSCI) is
E(CSCI(z, w)) = vT l − 5 tB + 4 tA
6
l2 − E(c) l + (tA + 2 tB)
2 l2 + 2V
18 (tA + tB)
.
The expected value of the welfare E(WCI) is given by
E(WCI(z, w)) = vT l − tA + tB
18
l2 − E(c) l + 10V − 5 tA tB l
2
18 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit, under complete
information, for firm A, is
piEPA (z, w)− piCIA (z, w) =
∆C (5 ∆A + 4 ∆B)− 2 (tA + 2 tB) l (2∆A + ∆B)
36 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit, under complete
information, for firm B, is
piEPB (z, w)− piCIB (z, w) =
−∆C(5 ∆B + 4 ∆A)− 2 (2 tA + tB) l (2∆B + ∆A)
36 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit, under
complete information, for firm A is
EB(pi
EP
A )− EB(piCIA ) =
∆A (5 ∆A − 4 (tA + 2 tB) l)
36 (tA + tB)
− V
9 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit, under
complete information, for firm B is
EA(pi
EP
B )− EA(piCIB ) =
∆B (5 ∆B − 4 (2 tA + tB) l)
36 (tA + tB)
− V
9 (tA + tB)
.
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The differences between the expected profits with complete and incomplete
information for firm A and firm B are given by
E(piEPA )− E(piCIA ) = E(piEPB )− E(piCIB ) =
V
36 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and the consumer sur-
plus, under complete information, is
CSEP − CSCI = ∆A (5 tA + 4 tB) + ∆B (4 tA + 5 tB)
18 (tA + tB)
l +
5 ∆2C
72 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between expected value of the consumer surplus and the ex-
pected value of the consumer surplus under complete information, is
E(CSEP )− E(CSCI) = 10V
72 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between the ex-post welfare and the welfare, under complete
information, is
WEP −WCI = ∆A (tA − tB) + ∆B (tB − tA)
18 (tA + tB)
l +
7 ∆2C
72 (tA + tB)
.
The difference between expected value of the welfare and the expected value
of the welfare under complete information, is
E(WEP )− E(WCI) = 7V
36 (tA + tB)
.
1.1.9 Firms with the same transportation cost
In this subsection we present the results of the section where the linear trans-
portation costs are equal to both firms, tA = tB = t, as originally presented
by Hotelling.
The point x is the location of the indifferent consumer to buy from firm
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A or firm B, and it is given by
x =
pB − pA + t l
2 t
.
Definition 1.1.12. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded costs (BC)
condition, if
|cA − cB| < 3 t l.
Under the BC condition, the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is
given by
p
A
= t l +
1
3
(2 cA + cB) and pB = t l +
1
3
(cA + 2 cB).
and the corresponding equilibrium profits are given by
piA =
(3 t l + cB − cA)2
18 t
and piB =
(3 t l + cA − cB)2
18 t
.
We note that if (p
A
, p
B
) is a local optimum price strategy then (p
A
, p
B
) is a
Nash price equilibrium.
The consumer surplus CS with respect to the local optimum price strategy
(p
A
, p
B
) is given by
CS = vT l − 3
2
t l2 − cA + 2 cB
3
l +
(cB − cA + 3 t l)2
36 t
and the welfare W is given by
W = vT l − 1
4
t l2 − cA + cB
2
l +
5 (cA − cB)2
36t
.
Definition 1.1.13. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded uncertain
costs (BUC1) condition, if
|3 ∆C −∆E| < 6 t l,
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for all z ∈ IA and for all w ∈ IB.
Definition 1.1.14. The Hotelling model satisfies the strong bounded uncer-
tain costs (SBUC1) condition, if
∆ < 3 t l.
Corollary 1.1.10. There is a local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) if and
only if the BUC1 condition holds. Under the BUC1 condition, the expected
prices of the local optimum price strategy are given by
E(p
A
) = t l + E(cA)− ∆E
3
;
E(p
B
) = t l + E(cB) +
∆E
3
.
Furthermore, the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is unique and it is
given by
pz
A
= E(p
A
) +
∆A
2
; pw
B
= E(p
B
) +
∆B
2
.
The ex-post profit of firm A is
piEPA (z, w) =
(6 t l + ∆E − 3 ∆C)(6 t l + ∆E − 3 ∆C − 3 ∆B)
72 t
and the ex-post profit of firm B is
piEPB (z, w) =
(6 t l −∆E + 3 ∆C)(6 t l −∆E + 3 ∆C − 3 ∆A)
72 t
.
The ex-ante profit of firm A is
piEAA (z) =
(6 t l − 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E)2
72 t
.
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and the ex-ante profit of firm B is
piEAB (w) =
(6 t l − 3 ∆B + 2 ∆E)2
72 t
.
Definition 1.1.15. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded uncertain
costs (BUC2) condition, if
3
(
cMA + c
M
B − 2 cmA
)
+ E(cA)− E(cB) ≤ 3 t l +
(
E(cA) + 2E(cB)− 3 cMA
)2
12 t l
and
3
(
cMA + c
M
B − 2 cmB
)
+ E(cB)− E(cA) ≤ 3 t l +
(
2E(cA) + E(cB)− 3 cMB
)2
12 t l
.
Definition 1.1.16. The Hotelling model satisfies the strong bounded uncer-
tain costs (SBUC2) condition, if
7 ∆ < 3 t l
Theorem 1.1.3. If the Hotelling model satisfies the BUC1 and BUC2 con-
ditions the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is a Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium.
Corollary 1.1.11. If the Hotelling model satisfies SBUC2 condition the
local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Now, we present some results of comparative analysis of profits, consumer
surplus and welfare.
The difference between the ex-post profits of both firms is given by
piEPA (z, w)− piEPB (z, w) =
6 t l (∆A −∆B) + (∆E − 3 ∆C) (8 t l −∆A −∆B)
24 t
.
Furthermore, for different production costs, the difference between the ex-
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post profit of firm A, piEPA (z1, w)− piEPA (z2, w) is given by
(cz2A − cz1A ) (12 t l −∆E + 3 (cwB + E(cA)− cz1A − cz2A ))
24 t
.
The difference between the ex-post profit of firm B, piEPB (z, w1)−piEPB (z, w2),
is given by
(cw2B − cw1B ) (12 t l + ∆E + 3 (czA + E(cB)− cw1B − cw2B ))
24 t
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB. The difference between the ex-ante
profits of both firms is given by
piEAA (z)− piEAB (w) =
(4 t l −∆A −∆B) (3 (∆B −∆A)− 4 ∆E)
24 t
.
Furthermore, for different production costs, the differences between the ex-
ante profits of a firm are given by
piEAA (z1)− piEAA (z2) =
(cz2A − cz1A ) (3 (4 t l + 2E(cA)− cz1A − cz2A )− 4 ∆E)
24 t
and
piEAB (w1)− piEAB (w2) =
(cw2B − cw1B ) (3 (4 t l + 2E(cB)− cw1B − cw2B ) + 4 ∆E)
24 t
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB. The difference between the ex-post
profit and the ex-ante profit for firm A is
piEPA (z, w)− piEAA (z) =
∆B
24 t
(6 t l − 2 ∆E − 3 ∆A)
and the difference between the ex-post profit and the ex-ante profit for firm
B is
piEPB (z, w)− piEAB (w) =
∆A
24 t
(6 t l + 2 ∆E − 3 ∆B) .
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Definition 1.1.17. The Hotelling model satisfies the A-bounded uncertain
costs (A−BUC) condition, if for all z ∈ IA
3 ∆A + 2 ∆E < 6 t l.
The Hotelling model satisfies the B-bounded uncertain costs (B − BUC)
condition, if for all w ∈ IB
3 ∆B − 2 ∆E < 6 t l.
Under the A-bounded uncertain costs (A−BUC) condition,
piEPA (z, w) < pi
EA
A (z) if and only if ∆B < 0.
Under the B-bounded uncertain costs (B −BUC) condition,
piEPB (z, w) < pi
EA
B (w) if and only if ∆A < 0.
The expected profit of firm A is given by
E(piEPA ) =
(3 t l −∆E)2
18 t
+
VA
8 t
and the expected profit of firm B is given by
E(piEPB ) =
(3 t l + ∆E)
2
18 t
+
VB
8 t
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit for firm A
is
E(piEPA )− piEAA (z) =
∆A (12 t l − 3 ∆A − 4 ∆E) + 3VA
24 t
and the difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit for firm
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B is
E(piEPB )− piEAB (w) =
∆B (12 t l − 3 ∆B + 4 ∆E) + 3VB
24 t
.
Under incomplete information, the ex-post consumer surplus is
CSEP = vT l − 3
2
t l2 − l
3
(2E(cB) + E(cA))− ∆B l
2
+
(6 t l − 3 ∆C + ∆E)2
144 t
,
and the expected value of the consumer surplus is given by
E(CSEP ) = vT l− 3
2
t l2− l
3
(2E(cB)+E(cA))+
(6 t l − 2 ∆E)2 + 9 (VA + VB)
144 t
and the difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and the expected
value of the consumer surplus is
CSEP − E(CSEP ) = −∆A + ∆B
4
l +
(∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2E − 9 (VA + VB)
144 t
.
The ex-post welfare, WEP , is
vT l − 1
4
t l2 − E(cA) + E(cB) + ∆A + ∆B
2
l − 3 ∆C(2 ∆E − 9 ∆C) + (∆E)
2
144 t
,
the expected value of the welfare is given by
E(WEP ) = vT l − 1
4
t l2 − E(cA) + E(cB)
2
l +
27 (VA + VB) + 20 ∆
2
E
144 t
and the difference between the ex-post welfare and the expected value of
welfare is
WEP − E(WEP ) = −∆A + ∆B
2
l +
9 (∆2C − VA − VB)− 2 ∆C ∆E − 7 ∆2E
48 t
.
Under complete information, the expected profit, EB(pi
CI
A ), for firm A is
given by
EB(pi
CI
A ) =
(3 t l −∆A −∆E)2 + VB
18 t
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and the expected profit, EA(pi
CI
B ), for firm B is given by
EA(pi
CI
B ) =
(3 t l −∆B + ∆E)2 + VA
18 t
.
The expected profit E(piCIA ) for firm A is given by
E(piCIA ) =
(3 t l −∆E)2 + VA + VB
18 t
and the expected profit E(piCIB ) for firm B is given by
E(piCIB ) =
(3 t l + ∆E)
2 + VA + VB
18 t
.
Under complete information, the consumer surplus is given by
CSCI(z, w) = vT l − 3
2
t l2 − E(cA) + 2E(cB) + ∆A + 2∆B
3
l +
(3 t l −∆C)2
36 t
and expected value of the consumer surplus E(CSCI) is
E(CSCI(z, w)) = vT l− 3
2
t l2− E(cA) + 2E(cB)
3
l+
(3 t l −∆E)2 + VA + VB
36 t
.
The welfare is given by
WCI(z, w) = vT l − 1
4
t l2 − E(cA) + E(cB) + ∆A + ∆B
2
l +
5 ∆2C
36t
and the expected value of the welfare E(WCI) is
E(WCI(z, w)) = vT l − 1
4
t l2 − E(cA) + E(cB)
2
l +
5 (VA + VB + ∆
2
E)
36t
.
The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit, under complete
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information, for firm A, piEPA (z, w)− piCIA (z, w), is
(∆A −∆B)(∆A + 2 ∆B)− 2 (3 t l −∆C) (2∆A + ∆B)
72 t
and the difference between the ex-post profit and the profit, under complete
information, for firm B, piEPB (z, w)− piCIB (z, w), is
(∆B −∆A)(∆B + 2 ∆A)− 2 (3 t l + ∆C) (2∆B + ∆A)
72 t
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit EB(pi
EP
A ) and EB(pi
CI
A ) for firm A
is
EB(pi
EP
A )− EB(piCIA ) =
∆A (5 ∆A − 4 (3 t l −∆E))
72 t
− VB
18 t
and the difference between the ex-ante profit EA(pi
EP
B ) and EA(pi
CI
B ) for firm
B is
EA(pi
EP
B )− EA(piCIB ) =
∆B (5 ∆B − 4 (3 t l + ∆E))
72 t
− VA
18 t
.
The differences between the expected profits of the firms with complete and
incomplete information are given by
E(piEPA )−E(piCIA ) =
5VA − 4VB
72 t
; and E(piEPB )−E(piCIB ) =
5VB − 4VA
72 t
.
The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and the consumer sur-
plus, under complete information, is
CSEP − CSCI = (∆A + ∆B) l
4
+
(∆B −∆A)(∆B −∆A − 4 ∆C)
144 t
and the difference between expected value of the consumer surplus and the
expected value of the consumer surplus under complete information, is
E(CSEP )− E(CSCI) = 5 (VA + VB)
144 t
.
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The difference between the ex-post welfare and the welfare, under complete
information, is
WEP −WCI = 7 (∆C)
2 − 6 ∆C∆E − (∆E)2
144 t
and the difference between expected value of the welfare and the expected
value of the welfare under complete information, is
E(WEP )− E(WCI) = 7 (VA + VB)
144 t
.
1.2 Quadratic transportation costs
In this section, we study the Hotelling model [25] with uncertainty in the pro-
duction costs of both firms with quadratic transportation costs as presented
by d’Aspremont el at. [2].
We introduce the bounded uncertain costs and location BUCL1 condi-
tion that defines a bound for the costs in terms of the transportation cost,
the road length of the line and the location of the firms. Under the bounded
costs BUCL1 condition we compute the unique local optimum price strategy
for the firms with the property that the market shares of both firms are not
empty for any outcome of production costs. We introduce a mild additional
bounded uncertain costs BUCL2 and, under the BUCL1 and BUCL2 con-
ditions, we prove that the local optimum price strategy is a Bayesian-Nash
price strategy.
We introduce the BUCL3 condition and we study the optimal localization
and price strategies under incomplete information on the production costs of
the firms and. Under the BUCL3, and assuming that the firms choose the
Bayesian-Nash price strategy, we show that the maximal differentiation is a
local optimum for the localization strategy of both firms. Finally, we do a
complete analysis of profits, consumer surplus and welfare under complete
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Figure 1.2: Hotelling’s linear city with quadratic transportation costs
and incomplete information.
1.2.1 Hotelling model under complete information
The buyers of a commodity will be supposed uniformly distributed along a
line with length l, where two firms A and B located at respective distances
a and b from the endpoints of the line sell the same commodity with unitary
production costs cA and cB. We assume without loss of generality that a ≥ 0,
b ≥ 0 and l − a − b ≥ 0. No customer has any preference for either seller
except on the ground of price plus transportation cost t.
Denote A’s price by pA and B’s price by pB. The point of division
x = x(pA, pB) ∈]0, l[ between the regions served by the two entrepreneurs
is determined by the condition that at this place it is a matter of indifference
whether one buys from A or from B (see Figure 1.2). The point x is the
location of the indifferent consumer to buy from firm A or firm B, if
pA + t (x− a)2 = pB + t (l − b− x)2
Let
m = l − a− b and ∆l = a− b.
Solving for x, we obtain
x =
pB − pA
2 tm
+
l + ∆l
2
.
Both firms have a non-empty market share if, and only if, x ∈]0, l[ . Hence,
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the prices will have to satisfy
|pA − pB − tm∆l| < tm l (1.51)
Assuming inequality (1.51), both firms A and B have a non-empty demand
(x and l − x) and the profits of the two firms are defined respectively by
piA = (pA − cA)x = (pA − cA)
(
pB − pA
2 tm
+
l + ∆l
2
)
(1.52)
and
piB = (pB − cB) (l − x) = (pB − cB)
(
pA − pB
2 tm
+
l −∆l
2
)
. (1.53)
Two of the fundamental economic quantities in oligopoly theory are the
consumer surplus CS and the welfare W . The consumer surplus is the gain
of the consumers community for given price strategies of both firms. The
welfare is the gain of the state that includes the gains of the consumers
community and the gains of the firms for given price strategies of both firms.
Let us denote by vT the total amount that consumers are willing to pay
for the commodity. The total amount v(y) that a consumer located at y pays
for the commodity is given by
v(y) =
{
pA + t (y − a)2 if 0 < y < x;
pB + t (l − b− y)2 if x < y < l.
The consumer surplus CS is the difference between the total amount that a
consumer is willing to pay vT and the total amount that the consumer pays
v(y)
CS =
∫ l
0
vT − v(y)dy. (1.54)
The welfare W is given by adding the profits of firms A and B with the
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consumer surplus
W = CS + piA + piB. (1.55)
Definition 1.2.1. A price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) for both firms is a local optimum
price strategy if (i) for every small deviation of the price p
A
the profit piA of
firm A decreases, and for every small deviation of the price pB the profit piB of
firm B decreases (local optimum property); and (ii) the indifferent consumer
exists, i.e. 0 < x < l (duopoly property).
Let us compute the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
). Differentiating
piA with respect to pA and piB with respect to pB and equalizing to zero, we
obtain the first order conditions (FOC). The FOC imply that
p
A
= tm
(
l +
∆l
3
)
+
1
3
(2 cA + cB) (1.56)
and
p
B
= tm
(
l − ∆l
3
)
+
1
3
(cA + 2 cB). (1.57)
We note that the first order conditions refer to jointly optimizing the profit
function (1.52) with respect to the price pA and the profit function (1.53)
with respect to the price pB.
Since the profit functions (1.52) and (1.53) are concave, the second-order
conditions for this maximization problem are satisfied and so the prices (1.56)
and (1.57) are indeed maxima for the functions (1.52) and (1.53), respectively.
The corresponding equilibrium profits are given by
piA =
(m (3 l + ∆l) t+ cB − cA)2
18 tm
(1.58)
and
piB =
(m (3 l −∆l) t+ cA − cB)2
18 tm
. (1.59)
Furthermore, the indifferent consumer location corresponding to the maxim-
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izers p
A
and p
B
of the profit functions piA and piB is
x =
l
2
+
∆l
6
+
cB − cA
6 tm
.
Finally, for the pair of prices (p
A
, p
B
) to be a local optimum price strategy, we
need assumption (1.51) to be satisfied with respect to these pair of prices. We
observe that assumption (1.51) is satisfied with respect to the pair of prices
(p
A
, p
B
) if and only if the following condition with respect to the production
costs is satisfied.
Definition 1.2.2. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded costs and loc-
ation (BCL) condition, if
|cA − cB − tm∆l| < 3 tm l.
We note that under the BCL condition the prices are higher than the
production costs p
A
> cA and pB > cB. Hence, there is a local optimum
price strategy if and only if the BCL condition holds. Furthermore, under
the BCL condition, the pair of prices (p
A
, p
B
) is the local optimum price
strategy.
A strong restriction that the BCL condition imposes is that ∆C converges
to 0 when m tends to 0, i.e. when the differentiation in the localization tends
to vanish.
We note that, if a Nash price equilibrium satisfies the duopoly property
then it is a local optimum price strategy. However, a local optimum price
strategy is only a local strategic maximum. Hence, the local optimum price
strategy to be a Nash equilibrium must also be global strategic maximum.
In this section, we are going to show that this is the case.
Following D’Aspremont et al. [2], we note that the profits of the two
firms, valued at local optimum price strategy are globally optimal if they are
at least as great as the payoffs that firms would earn by undercutting the
rivals’ price and supplying the whole market.
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Let (pA, pB) be the local optimum price strategy. Firm A may gain the
whole market, undercutting its rival by setting
pMA = pB − tm (l −∆l).
In this case the profit amounts to
piMA =
2
3
(cB − cA + tm∆l) l.
A similar argument is valid for store B. Undercutting this rival, setting
pMB = pA − tm (l + ∆l),
it would earn
piMB =
2
3
(cA − cB − tm∆l) l.
The conditions for such undercutting not to be profitable are piA ≥ piMA and
piB ≥ piMB . Hence, proving that
(m (3 l + ∆l) t+ cB − cA)2
18 tm
≥ 2
3
(tm∆l −∆C) l (1.60)
is sufficient to prove that piA ≥ piMA . Similarly, proving that
(m (3 l −∆l) t+ cA − cB)2
18 tm
≥ 2
3
(∆C − tm∆l) l (1.61)
is sufficient to prove that piB ≥ piMB .
However, conditions (1.60) and (1.61) are satisfied because they are equi-
valent to
(m (3 l −∆l) t+ cA − cB)2 ≥ 0
and
(m (3 l + ∆l) t+ cB − cA)2 ≥ 0.
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Therefore, if (p
A
, p
B
) is a local optimum price strategy then (p
A
, p
B
) is a
Nash price equilibrium.
We are going to find when the maximal differentiation is a local optimum
strategy assuming that the firms in second subgame choose the Nash price
equilibrium strategy. For a complete discussion see Ziss [41].
We note that from (1.56) and (1.58), we can write the profit of firm A as
piA =
(p
A
− cA)2
2 t (l − a− b) .
Since
∂p
A
∂a
= −2
3
t (l + a),
we obtain that
∂piA
∂a
= − pA − cA
6 t (l − a− b)2 (cA − cB + t (l − a− b) (l + 3 a+ b)) .
Similarly, we obtain that
∂piB
∂b
=
p
B
− cB
6 t (l − a− b)2 (cA − cB − t (l − a− b) (l + a+ 3 b)) .
Therefore, the maximal differentiation (a, b) = (0, 0) is a local optimum
strategy if and only if
∂piA
∂a
(0, 0) = −pA − cA
6 t l2
(
cA − cB + t l2
)
< 0
and
∂piB
∂b
(0, 0) =
p
B
− cB
6 t l2
(
cA − cB − t l2
)
< 0
Since
p
A
− cA
6 t l2
> 0 and
p
B
− cB
6 t l2
> 0
the maximal differentiation (a, b) = (0, 0) is a local optimum strategy if and
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only if
|cA − cB| < t l2.
Throughout this section, consider
X1 = vT l − t
3
l3 + t l b (l − b)− tm l
(
l − ∆l
3
)
and
X2 =
mt
36
(45 l2 + 6 l∆l + 5 ∆
2
l ).
By equation (1.54), the consumer surplus CS with respect to the local op-
timum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is given by
CS =
∫ x
0
vT − pA − t (y − a)2 dy +
∫ l
x
v − p
B
− t (l − b− y)2 dy
= vT l + x
2 (l − a− b) t+ (b (l − b) t− pB) l − t
3
l3
Hence,
CS = X1 − cA + 2 cB
3
l +
(tm (3 l + ∆l) + cB − cA)2
36 tm
. (1.62)
Adding (1.58), (1.59) and (1.62), we obtain the welfare
W = X1 − cA + cB
2
l − 5 (cA − cB)
18
∆l +
5 (cA − cB)2
36 tm
+X2. (1.63)
1.2.2 Incomplete information on the production costs
The incomplete information consists in each firm to know its production
cost but to be uncertain about the competitor’s cost. In this subsection, we
introduce a simple notation that is fundamental for the elegance and under-
standing of the results presented in this section. This notation has already
been introduced in subsection 1.1.2. However, we duplicate the information
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in order to guarantee the independence of the sections.
Let the triples (IA,ΩA, qA) and (IB,ΩB, qB) represent (finite, countable
or uncountable) sets of types IA and IB with σ-algebras ΩA and ΩB and
probability measures qA and qB, over IA and IB, respectively.
We define the expected values EA(f), EB(f) and E(f) with respect to
the probability measures qA and qB as follows:
EA(f) =
∫
IA
f(z, w) dqA(z); EB(f) =
∫
IB
f(z, w) dqB(w)
and
E(f) =
∫
IA
∫
IB
f(z, w) dqB(w)dqA(z).
Let cA : IA → R+0 and cB : IB → R+0 be measurable functions where czA =
cA(z) denotes the production cost of firm A when the type of firm A is z ∈ IA
and cwB = cB(w) denotes the production cost of firm B when the type of firm
B is w ∈ IB. Furthermore, we assume that the expected values of cA and cB
are finite
E(cA) = EA(cA) =
∫
IA
czA dqA(z) <∞;
E(cB) = EB(cB) =
∫
IB
cwB dqB(w) <∞.
We assume that dqA(z) denotes the probability of the belief of the firm B
on the production costs of the firm A to be czA. Similarly, we assume that
dqB(w) denotes the probability of the belief of the firm A on the production
costs of the firm B to be cwB.
The simplicity of the following cost deviation formulas is crucial to express
the main results of this section in a clear and understandable way. The cost
deviations of firm A and firm B
∆A : IA → R+0 and ∆B : IB → R+0
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are given respectively by ∆A(z) = c
z
A−E(cA) and ∆B(w) = cwB−E(cB). The
cost deviation between the firms
∆C : IA × IB → R+0
is given by ∆C(z, w) = c
z
A − cwB. Since the meaning is clear, we will use
through the section the following simplified notation:
∆A = ∆A(z); ∆B = ∆B(w) and ∆C = ∆C(z, w).
The expected cost deviation ∆E between the firms is given by ∆E = E(cA)−
E(cB). Hence,
∆C −∆E = ∆A −∆B.
Let VA and VB be the variances of the production costs cA and cB, respect-
ively. We observe that
E(∆C) = ∆E; E(∆
2
A) = EA(∆
2
A) = VA; E(∆
2
B) = EB(∆
2
B) = VB. (1.64)
Furthermore,
EA(∆
2
C) = ∆
2
B + VA + ∆E (∆E − 2 ∆B); (1.65)
EB(∆
2
C) = ∆
2
A + VB + ∆E (∆E + 2 ∆A); (1.66)
E(∆2C) = ∆
2
E + VA + VB. (1.67)
1.2.3 Local optimal price strategy under incomplete
information
In this section, we introduce incomplete information in the classical Hotelling
game and we find the local optimal price strategy. We introduce the bounded
uncertain costs condition that allows us to find the local optimum price
strategy.
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A price strategy (pA, pB) is given by a pair of functions pA : IA → R+0 and
pB : IB → R+0 where pzA = pA(z) denotes the price of firm A when the type of
firm A is z ∈ IA and pwB = pB(w) denotes the price of firm B when the type
of firm B is w ∈ IB. We note that E(pA) = EA(pA) and E(pB) = EB(pB).
The indifferent consumer x : IA × IB → (0, l) is given by
xz,w =
pwB − pzA + tm (l + ∆l)
2 tm
. (1.68)
The ex-post profit of the firms is the effective profit of the firms given a
realization of the production costs for both firm. Hence, it is the main
economic information for both firms. However, the incomplete information
prevents the firms to have access to their ex-post profits except after the
firms have already decided their price strategies. The ex-post profits piEPA :
IA × IB → R+0 and piEPB : IA × IB → R+0 are given by
piEPA (z, w) = piA(z, w) = (p
z
A − czA)xz,w
and
piEPB (z, w) = piB(z, w) = (p
w
B − cwB) (l − xz,w).
The ex-ante profit of the firms is the expected profit of the firm that knows
its production cost but are uncertain about the production cost of the com-
petitor firm. The ex-ante profits piEAA : IA → R+0 and piEAB : IB → R+0 are
given by
piEAA (z) = EB(pi
EP
A ) and pi
EA
B (w) = EA(pi
EP
B ). (1.69)
We note that, the expected profit E(piEPA ) of firm A is equal to EA(pi
EA
A ) and
the expected profit E(piEPB ) of firm B is equal to EB(pi
EA
B ).
The incomplete information forces the firms to have to choose their price
strategies using their knowledge of their ex-ante profits, to which they have
access, instead of the ex-post profits, to which they do not have access except
after the price strategies are decided.
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Definition 1.2.3. A price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) for both firms is a local optimum
price strategy if (i) for every z ∈ IA and for every small deviation of the price
pz
A
the ex-ante profit piEAA (z) of firm A decreases, and for every w ∈ IB and
for every small deviation of the price pw
B
the ex-ante profit piEAB (w) of firm B
decreases (local optimum property); and (ii) for every z ∈ IA and w ∈ IB the
indifferent consumer exists, i.e. 0 < xz,w < l (duopoly property).
We introduce the BUCL1 condition that has the crucial economical in-
formation that can be extracted from the exogenous variables. The BUCL1
condition allow us to know if there is, or not, a local optimum price strategy
in the presence of uncertainty for the production costs of both firms.
Definition 1.2.4. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded uncertain costs
and location (BUCL1) condition, if
|∆E − 3 ∆C + 2 ∆l tm| < 6 tm l.
for all z ∈ IA and for all w ∈ IB.
A strong restriction that the BUCL1 condition imposes is that ∆C con-
verges to 0 when m tends to 0, i.e. when the differentiation in the localization
tends to vanish.
For i ∈ {A,B}, we define
cmi = min
z∈Ii
{czi } and cMi = max
z∈Ii
{czi }.
Let
∆ = max
i,j∈{A,B}
{cMi − cmj }
Thus, the bounded uncertain costs and location BUCL1 is implied by the
following stronger SBUCL1 condition.
Definition 1.2.5. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded uncertain costs
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and location (SBUCL1) condition, if
∆ < t lm.
The following theorem is a key economical result in oligopoly theory.
First, it tells us about the existence, or not, of a local optimum price strategy
only by accessing a simple inequality in the exogenous variables and so avail-
able to both firms. Secondly, it gives us explicit and simple formulas that
allow the firms to know the relevance of the exogenous variables in their price
strategies and corresponding profits.
Theorem 1.2.1. There is a local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) if and only
if the BUCL1 condition holds. Under the BUCL1 condition, the expected
prices of the local optimum price strategy are given by
E(p
A
) = tm
(
l +
∆l
3
)
+ E(cA)− ∆E
3
; (1.70)
E(p
B
) = tm
(
l − ∆l
3
)
+ E(cB) +
∆E
3
. (1.71)
Furthermore, the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is unique and it is
given by
pz
A
= E(p
A
) +
∆A
2
; pw
B
= E(p
B
) +
∆B
2
. (1.72)
We observe that the difference between the expected prices of both firms
has a very useful and clear economical interpretation in terms of the localiz-
ation and expected cost deviations.
E(p
A
)− E(p
B
) =
2 tm∆l + ∆E
3
.
Furthermore, for different production costs, the differences between the op-
timal prices of a firm are proportional to the differences of the production
78
costs
pz1
A
− pz2
A
=
cz1A − cz2A
2
.
and
pw1
B
− pw2
B
=
cw1B − cw2B
2
.
for all z1, z2 ∈ IA and w1, w2 ∈ IB. Hence, half of the production costs value
is incorporated in the price.
The ex-post profit of the firms is the effective profit of the firms given
a realization of the production costs for both firms. Hence it is the main
economic information for both firms. By equation (1.72), the ex-post profit
of firm A is
piEPA (z, w) =
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E) (2 tm (3 l + ∆l) + ∆E − 3 ∆C)
72 tm
and the ex-post profit of firm B is
piEPB (z, w) =
(2 tm (3 l −∆l)− 3 ∆B + 2 ∆E) (2 tm (3 l −∆l)−∆E + 3 ∆C)
72 tm
.
The ex-ante profit of a firm is the expected profit of the firm that knows its
production cost but is uncertain about the production costs of the competitor
firm. Since piEPA (z, w) is given by
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E) (2 tm (3 l + ∆l) + ∆E + 3 (cwB − czA))
72 tm
,
the ex-ante profit of firm A, piEAA (z), is
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E) (2 tm (3 l + ∆l) + ∆E + 3 (E(cB)− czA))
72 tm
Hence,
piEAA (z) =
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E)2
72 tm
. (1.73)
79
Similarly, the ex-ante profit of firm B is
piEAB (w) =
(2 tm (3 l −∆l)− 3 ∆B + 2 ∆E)2
72 tm
. (1.74)
Let αA and αB be given by
αA = max{E(cB)− cwB : w ∈ IB} and αB = max{E(cA)− czA : z ∈ IA}.
The following corollary gives us the information of the market size of both
firms by giving the explicit localization of the indifferent consumer with re-
spect to the local optimum price strategy.
Corollary 1.2.1. Under the BUCL1 condition, the indifferent consumer
xz,w is given by
xz,w =
1
2
(
l +
∆l
3
)
+
∆E − 3 ∆C
12 tm
. (1.75)
The pair of prices (p
A
, p
B
) satisfies
pz
A
− czA ≥ αA/2; pwB − cwB ≥ αB/2. (1.76)
Proof of Theorem 1.2.1 and Corollary 1.2.1.
Under incomplete information, each firm seeks to maximize its ex-ante profit.
From (1.69), the ex-ante profit for firm A is given by
piEAA (z) =
∫
IB
(pzA − czA)
(
pwB − pzA
2 tm
+
l + ∆l
2
)
dqB(w)
= (pzA − czA)
(
E(pB)− pzA
2 tm
+
l + ∆l
2
)
. (1.77)
From the first order condition FOC applied to the ex-ante profit of firm A
we obtain
pzA =
czA + E(pB) + tm (l + ∆l)
2
. (1.78)
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Similarly,
piEAB (w) = (p
w
B − cwB)
(
E(pA)− pwB
2 tm
+
l −∆l
2
)
,
and, by the FOC, we obtain
pwB =
cwB + E(pA) + tm (l −∆l)
2
. (1.79)
Then, from (1.78) and (1.79),
E(pA) =
E(cA) + E(pB) + tm (l + ∆l)
2
;
E(pB) =
E(cB) + E(pA) + tm (l −∆l)
2
.
Solving the system of two equations, we obtain that
E(pA) = tm
(
l +
∆l
3
)
+
E(cB) + 2E(cA)
3
;
E(pB) = tm
(
l − ∆l
3
)
+
E(cA) + 2E(cB)
3
.
Hence, equalities (1.70) and (1.71) are satisfied. Replacing (1.71) in (1.78)
and replacing (1.70) in (1.79) we obtain that
pzA = tm
(
l +
∆l
3
)
+
czA
2
+
E(cA) + 2E(cB)
6
;
pwB = tm
(
l − ∆l
3
)
+
cwB
2
+
2E(cA) + E(cB)
6
.
Hence, equation (1.72) is satisfied.
Replacing in equation (1.68) the values of p
A
and p
B
given by the equation
(1.72) we obtain that the indifferent consumer xz,w is given by
xz,w =
1
2
(
l +
∆l
3
)
+
3(cwB − czA) + E(cA)− E(cB)
12 tm
.
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Hence, equation (1.75) is satisfied. Therefore, (p
A
, p
B
) satisfies property (ii)
if and only if the BUCL1 condition holds.
Since the ex-ante profit functions (1.77) and (1.2.3) are concave, the
second-order conditions for this maximization problem are satisfied and so
the prices pz
A
and pw
B
are indeed maxima for the functions (1.77) and (1.2.3),
respectively. Therefore, the pair (pz
A
, pw
B
) satisfies property (i) and so (pz
A
, pw
B
)
is a local optimum price strategy.
Let us prove that pz
A
and pw
B
satisfy inequalities (1.76). By equation
(1.72),
pz
A
− czA = tm
(
l +
∆l
3
)
− c
z
A
2
+
E(cA) + 2E(cB)
6
;
pw
B
− cwB = tm
(
l − ∆l
3
)
− c
w
B
2
+
2E(cA) + E(cB)
6
.
By the BUCL1 condition, for every w ∈ IB, we obtain
6
(
pz
A
− czA − tm
(
l +
∆l
3
))
= −3 czA + E(cA) + 2E(cB)
= 3 (E(cB)− cwB)− 3 (czA − cwB) + E(cA)− E(cB)
> 3 (E(cB)− cwB)− 6 t l − 2 ∆l tm.
Similarly, by the BUCL1 condition, for every z ∈ IA, we obtain
6
(
pw
B
− cwB − tm
(
l − ∆l
3
))
= −3 cwB + 2E(cA) + E(cB)
= 3 (E(cA)− czA)− 3 (cwB − czA)− E(cA) + E(cB)
> 3 (E(cA)− czA)− 6 t l + 2 ∆l tm.
Hence, inequalities (1.76) are satisfied.
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1.2.4 Bayesian Nash equilibrium
We note that, if a Bayesian-Nash price equilibrium satisfies the duopoly
property then it is a local optimum price strategy. However, a local optimum
price strategy is only a local strategic maximum. Hence, the local optimum
price strategy to be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium must also be global strategic
maximum. In this subsection, we are going to show that this is the case.
Following D’Aspremont et al. [2], we note that the profits of the two
firms, valued at local optimum price strategy are globally optimal if they are
at least as great as the payoffs that firms would earn by undercutting the
rivals’s price and supplying the whole market for all admissible subsets of
types IA and IB.
Definition 1.2.6. A price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) for both firms is a Bayesian-
Nash, if for every z ∈ IA and for every deviation of the price pzA the ex-
ante profit piEAA (z) of firm A decreases, and for every w ∈ IB and for every
deviation of the price pw
B
the ex-ante profit piEAB (w) of firm B decreases.
Let (p
A
, p
B
) be the local optimum price strategy. Given the type w0 of
firm B, firm A may gain the whole market, undercutting its rival by setting
pMA (w0) = p
w0
B
− tm (l −∆l)− , with  > 0.
Hence, by BUCL1 condition pMA (w0) ≤ pzA for all z ∈ IA. We observe that
if firm A chooses the price pMA (w0) then by equalities (1.68) and (1.72) the
whole market belongs to Firm A for all types w of firm B with cw ≥ cw0 . Let
x(w;w0) = min
{
l,
pwB − pMA (w0)
2 tm
+
l + ∆l
2
}
.
Thus, the expected profit with respect to the price pMA (w0) for firm A is
piEA,MA (w0) =
∫
IB
(
pMA (w0)− czA
)
x(w;w0) dqB(w).
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Let wM ∈ IB such that cwM = cMB . Since cwM ≥ cw0B for every w0 ∈ IB, we
obtain
piEA,MA (w0) ≤
(
pMA (w0)− czA
)
l ≤ (pMA (wM)− czA) l (1.80)
Given the type z0 of firm A, firm B may gain the whole market, undercutting
its rival by setting
pMB (z0) = p
z0
A
− tm (l + ∆l)− , with  > 0.
Hence, by BUCL1 condition pMB (z0) ≤ pwB for all w ∈ IB. We observe that
if firm B chooses the price pMB (z0) then by equalities (1.68) and (1.72) the
whole market belongs to Firm B for all types z of firm A with cz ≥ cz0 . Let
x(z; z0) = max
{
0,
pMB (z0)− pzA
2 tm
+
l + ∆l
2
}
.
Thus, the expected profit with respect to the price pMB (z0) of firm B is
piEA,MB (z0) =
∫
IA
(
pMB (z0)− cwB
)
(l − x(z; z0)) dqA(z).
Let zM ∈ IA such that czMA = cMA . Since czM ≥ cz0 for every z0 ∈ IA, we
obtain
piEA,MB (z0) ≤
(
pMB (z0)− cwB
)
l ≤ (pMB (zM)− cwB) l. (1.81)
Remark 1.2.1. Under the BUCL1 condition, the strategic equilibrium (p
A
, p
B
)
is the unique pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium with the duopoly property if for
every z ∈ IA and every w ∈ IB,
piEA,MA (w) ≤ piEAA (z) and piEA,MB (z) ≤ piEAB (w). (1.82)
Definition 1.2.7. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded uncertain costs
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and location (BUCL2) condition, if
∆E + 3
(
cMA + c
M
B − 2 cmA
)
+
∆l (3 c
M
A − E(cA)− 2E(cB))
3 l
≤
≤ tm (3 l −∆l)
2
3 l
+
(
3 cMA − E(cA)− 2E(cB)
)2
12 tm l
(1.83)
and
−∆E + 3
(
cMA + c
M
B − 2 cmB
)− ∆l (3 cMB − E(cB)− 2E(cA))
3 l
≤
≤ tm (3 l + ∆l)
2
3 l
+
(
3 cMB − E(cB)− 2E(cA)
)2
12 tm l
. (1.84)
Thus, the bounded uncertain costs condition BUCL2 is implied by the
following stronger SBUCL2 condition.
Definition 1.2.8. The Hotelling model satisfies the strong bounded uncer-
tain costs and location (SBUCL2) condition, if
6 ∆ < l tm
We observe that the SBUCL2 condition implies SBUCL1 condition and
so implies the BUCL1 condition.
Theorem 1.2.2. If the Hotelling model satisfies the BUCL1 and BUCL2
conditions the local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium.
Corollary 1.2.2. If the Hotelling model satisfies SBUCL2 condition the
local optimum price strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By equalities (1.73) and (1.74), we obtain that piEAA (zM) ≤ piEAA (z)
and piEAB (wM) ≤ piEAB (w) for all z ∈ IA and for all w ∈ IB. Hence, putting
conditions (1.80), (1.81) and (1.82) together, we obtain the following suffi-
cient condition for the local optimal strategic prices (p
A
, p
B
) to be a Bayesian
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Nash equilibrium:
(pMA (wM)− cmA ) l ≤ piEAA (zM) and (pMB (zM)− cmB ) l ≤ piEAB (wM). (1.85)
By equalities (1.73) and (1.74) we obtain that
piEAA (zM) =
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l) + E(cA) + 2E(cB)− 3 cMA )2
72 tm
and
piEAB (wM) =
(2 tm (3 l −∆l) + 2E(cA) + E(cB)− 3 cMB )2
72 tm
.
Also, from (1.72), we know that
pMA (wM)− cmA = pwMB − tm (l −∆l)− − cmA
=
1
6
(4 tm∆l + 3 c
M
B + 2E(cA) + E(cB)− 6 cmA )− .
and
pMB (zM)− cmB = pzMA − tm (l + ∆l)− − cmB
=
1
6
(−4 tm∆l + 3 cMA + E(cA) + 2E(cB)− 6 cmB )− .
Hence, condition (1.85) holds if
12 tm l (4 tm∆l + 3 c
M
B + 2E(cA) + E(cB)− 6 cmA ) ≤
≤ (2 tm (3 l + ∆l) + E(cA) + 2E(cB)− 3 cMA )2 (1.86)
and
12 tm l (−4 tm∆l + 3 cMA + E(cA) + 2E(cB)− 6 cmB ) ≤
(2 tm (3 l −∆l) + 2E(cA) + E(cB)− 3 cMB )2. (1.87)
Finally, we note that inequality (1.86) is equivalent to inequality (1.83) and
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that inequality (1.87) is equivalent to inequality (1.84).
1.2.5 Optimum localization equilibrium under incom-
plete information
We note that from (1.72) and (1.73), we can write the profit of firm A as
piEAA (z) =
(pz
A
− cA)2
2 t (l − a− b) .
Since
∂pz
A
∂a
= −2
3
t (l + a)
we have
∂piEAA
∂a
=
p
A
− cA
12 t (l − a− b)2 (−2 t (l − a− b) (l + 3 a+ b)− 3 ∆A − 2 ∆E) .
Similarly, we obtain that
∂piEAB
∂b
=
p
B
− cB
12 t (l − a− b)2 (−2 t (l − a− b) (l + 3 b+ a)− 3 ∆B + 2 ∆E) .
Therefore, the maximal differentiation (a, b) = (0, 0) is a local optimum
strategy if and only if
∂piEAA
∂a
(0, 0) = −pA − cA
12 t l2
(
2 t l2 + 3 ∆A + 2 ∆E
)
< 0
and
∂piEAB
∂b
(0, 0) = −pB − cB
12 t l2
(
2 t l2 + 3 ∆B − 2 ∆E
)
< 0
Since
p
A
− cA
6 t l2
> 0 and
p
B
− cB
6 t l2
> 0
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the maximal differentiation (a, b) = (0, 0) is a local optimum strategy if and
only if the following condition holds.
Definition 1.2.9. The Hotelling model satisfies the bounded uncertain costs
and location (BUCL3) condition, if
2 t l2 + 3 ∆A + 2 ∆E > 0
for all z ∈ IA and
2 t l2 + 3 ∆B − 2 ∆E > 0
for all w ∈ IB .
1.2.6 Comparative profit analysis
From now on, we assume that the BUCL1 condition holds and that the price
strategy (p
A
, p
B
) is the local optimum price strategy determined in Theorem
1.2.1.
Let ∆1 = ∆A + ∆B and ∆2 = ∆A − ∆B. We observe that the differ-
ence between the ex-post profits of both firms, piEPA (z, w)− piEPB (z, w), has a
very useful and clear economical interpretation in terms of the expected cost
deviations and is given by
16 t2m2 l∆l + 2 tm (3 l∆2 −∆l ∆1) + (∆E − 3 ∆C) (8 t l m−∆1)
24 tm
.
Furthermore, for different production costs, the differences between the ex-
post profit of firm A, piEPA (z1, w)− piEPA (z2, w), is given by
(cz2A − cz1A ) (4 tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆E + 3 (cwB + E(cA)− cz1A − cz2A ))
24 tm
and, similarly, piEPB (z, w1)− piEPB (z, w2) is given by
(cw2B − cw1B ) (4 tm (3 l −∆l) + ∆E + 3 (czA + E(cB)− cw1B − cw2B ))
24 tm
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for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB.
We observe that the difference between the ex-ante profits of both firms
has a very useful and clear economical interpretation in terms of the expected
cost deviations.
piEAA (z)− piEAB (w) =
(4 tm l −∆1) (4 (tm∆l −∆E)− 3 ∆2)
24 tm
.
Furthermore, for different production costs, the differences between the ex-
ante profit of firm A, piEAA (z1)− piEAA (z2), is given by
(cz2A − cz1A ) (4 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 4 ∆E + 3 (2E(cA)− cz1A − cz2A ))
24 tm
and, similarly, piEAB (w1)− piEAB (w2) is given by
(cw2B − cw1B ) (4 tm (3 l −∆l) + 4 ∆E + 3 (2E(cB)− cw1B − cw2B ))
24 tm
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB.
The difference between the ex-post and the ex-ante profit for a firm is
the real deviation from the realized gain of the firm and the expected gain
of the firm knowing its own production cost but being uncertain about the
production cost of the other firm. It is the best measure of the risk involved
for the firm given the uncertainty in the production costs of the other firm.
The difference between the ex-post profit and the ex-ante profit for firm A is
piEPA (z, w)− piEAA (z) =
∆B
24 tm
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 2 ∆E − 3 ∆A) .
The difference between the ex-post profit and the ex-ante profit for firm B is
piEPB (z, w)− piEAB (w) =
∆A
24 tm
(2 tm (3 l −∆l) + 2 ∆E − 3 ∆B) .
Definition 1.2.10. The Hotelling model satisfies the A-bounded uncertain
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costs and location (A−BUCL) condition, if for all z ∈ IA
3 ∆A + 2 ∆E < 2 tm (3 l + ∆l).
The Hotelling model satisfies the B-bounded uncertain costs and location
(B −BUCL) condition, if for all w ∈ IB
3 ∆B − 2 ∆E < 2 tm (3 l −∆l).
The following corollary tells us that the sign of the risk of a firm has the
opposite sign of the deviation of the competitor firm realized production cost
from its average. Hence, under incomplete information the sign of the risk
of a firm is not accessible to the firm. However, the probability of the sign
of the risk of a firm to be positive or negative is accessible to the firm.
Corollary 1.2.3. Under the A-bounded uncertain costs (A − BUCL) con-
dition,
piEPA (z, w) < pi
EA
A (z) if and only if ∆B < 0. (1.88)
Under the B-bounded uncertain costs (B −BUCL) condition,
piEPB (z, w) < pi
EA
B (w) if and only if ∆A < 0. (1.89)
The proof of the above corollary follows from a simple manipulation of
the previous formulas for the ex-post and ex-ante profits.
The expected profit of the firm is the expected gain of the firm. We
observe that the ex-ante and the ex-posts profits of both firms are strictly
positive with respect to the local optimum price strategy. Hence, the expec-
ted profits of both firms are also strictly positive. Since the ex-ante profit
piEAA (z) of firm A is equal to
piEAA (z) =
9 ∆2A − 12 ∆A (tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆E) + 4 (tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆E)2
72 tm
,
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from (1.64), we obtain that the expected profit of firm A is given by
E(piEPA ) =
(tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆E)2
18 tm
+
VA
8 tm
.
Similarly, the expected profit of firm B is given by
E(piEPB ) =
(tm (3 l −∆l) + ∆E)2
18 tm
+
VB
8 tm
.
The difference between the ex-ante and the expected profit of a firm is the
deviation from the expected realized gain of the firm given the realization
of its own production cost and the expected gain in average for different
realizations of its own production cost, but being in both cases uncertain
about the production costs of the competitor firm. It is the best measure
of the quality of its realized production cost in terms of the expected profit
over its own production costs.
Corollary 1.2.4. The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected
profit for firm A is
E(piEPA )− piEAA (z) =
∆A (4 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A − 4 ∆E) + 3VA
24 tm
. (1.90)
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit for firm B
is
E(piEPB )− piEAB (w) =
∆B (4 tm (3 l −∆l)− 3 ∆B + 4 ∆E) + 3VB
24 tm
. (1.91)
Proof. Let Z = 2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 2 ∆E. Hence,
E(piEPA )− piEAA (z) =
Z2 − (Z − 3 ∆A)2
72 tm
+
VA
8 tm
=
∆A (2Z − 3 ∆A) + 3VA
24 tm
.
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and so equality (1.90) holds. The proof of equality (1.91) follows similarly.
1.2.7 Comparative consumer surplus and welfare ana-
lysis
Consider throughout this subsection that X = tm (3 l + ∆l).
The ex-post consumer surplus is the realized gain of the consumers com-
munity for given outcomes of the production costs of both firms. Under
incomplete information, by equation (1.54), the ex-post consumer surplus is
CSEP = X1 − E(cA) + 2E(cB)
3
l − ∆B
2
l +
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l) + ∆E − 3 ∆C)2
144 tm
.
The expected value of the consumer surplus is the expected gain of the con-
sumers community for all possible outcomes of the production costs of both
firms. The expected value of the consumer surplus E(CSEP ) is given by
E(CSEP ) =
∫
IB
∫
IA
CSEPdqA(z) dqB(w)
= X1 − E(cA) + 2E(cB)
3
l +
4 (tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆E)2 + 9 (VA + VB)
144 tm
.
We note that, from equalities (1.64) and (1.67), the expected value of
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l) + ∆E − 3 ∆C)2
144 tm
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is given by
(2X + ∆E)
2 − 6E(∆C) (2X + ∆E) + 9E(∆2C)
144 tm
=
(2X + ∆E)
2 − 6 ∆E (2X + ∆E) + 9 (VA + VB + ∆2E)
144 tm
=
4 (X −∆E)2 + 9 (VA + VB)
144 tm
.
The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and the expected
value of the consumer surplus measures the difference between the gain of
the consumers for the realized outcomes of the production costs of both
firms and the expected gain of the consumers for all possible outcomes of
the production costs of both firms. Hence, it measures the risk taken by the
consumers for different outcomes of the production costs of both firms.
Corollary 1.2.5. The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and
the expected value of the consumer surplus, CSEP − E(CSEP ), is
−∆A + ∆B
4
l +
∆E −∆C
12
∆l +
(∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2E − 9 (VA + VB)
144 tm
.
Proof.
CSEP − E(CSEP ) =
= −∆B
2
l +
(2X + ∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 (X −∆E)2 − 9 (VA + VB)
144 tm
= −∆B
2
l +
12X (∆E −∆C) + (∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2E − 9 (VA + VB)
144 tm
=
∆E −∆C − 2 ∆B
4
l +
∆E −∆C
12
∆l +
(∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2E − 9 (VA + VB)
144 tm
= −∆A + ∆B
4
l +
∆E −∆C
12
∆l +
(∆E − 3 ∆C)2 − 4 ∆2E − 9 (VA + VB)
144 tm
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The ex-post welfare is the realized gain of the state that includes the gains
of the consumers community and the gains of the firms for a given outcomes
of the production costs of both firms. By equation (1.55), the ex-post welfare
is
WEP =
5(∆E − 3∆C) + 3(∆A −∆B)
36
∆l − ∆A + ∆B + E(cA) + E(cB)
2
l +
+ X1 +X2 +X3,
where
X3 =
(3 ∆C −∆E) (9 ∆C + ∆E)
144 tm
.
The expected value of the welfare is the expected gain of the state for all
possible outcomes of the production costs of both firms. The expected value
of the welfare E(WEP ) is given by
E(WEP ) =
∫
IB
∫
IA
WEPdqA(z) dqB(w)
= X1 +X2 − E(cA) + E(cB)
2
l − 5 ∆E
18
∆l + U2
where
U2 =
20 ∆2E + 27 (VA + VB)
144 tm
.
We note that, from equalities (1.64) and (1.67), the expected value of X3 is
given by
U2 =
27E(∆2C)− 6E(∆C) ∆E −∆2E
144 tm
=
27 (∆2E + VA + VB)− 7 ∆2E
144 tm
=
20 ∆2E + 27 (VA + VB)
144 tm
.
The difference between the ex-post welfare and the expected value of the
welfare measures the difference in the gains of the state between the realized
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outcomes of the production costs of both firms and the expected gain of
the state for all possible outcomes of the production costs of both firms.
Hence, it measures the risk taken by the state for different outcomes of the
production costs of both firms. The difference between the ex-post welfare
and the expected value of welfare is
WEP − E(WEP ) = ∆A + ∆B
2
l +
∆B −∆A)
3
∆l +X4
where
X4 =
9 (∆2C − VA − VB)− 2 ∆C ∆E − 7 ∆2E
48 tm
.
1.2.8 Complete versus Incomplete information
Let us consider the case where the production costs are revealed to both
firms before they choose the prices. In this case, the competition between
the firms is under complete information.
A price strategy (pCIA , p
CI
B ) is given by a pair of functions p
CI
A : IA× IB →
R+0 and pCIB : IA× IB → R+0 where pCIA (z, w) denotes the price of firm A and
pCIB (z, w) denotes the price of firm B when the type of firm A is z ∈ IA and
the type of firm B is w ∈ IB.
Under the BC condition, by equations (1.56) and (1.57), the Nash price
strategy (pCIA , p
CI
B ) is given by
pCI
A
(z, w) = tm
(
l +
∆l
3
)
+ cA − ∆C
3
and
pCI
B
(z, w) = tm
(
l − ∆l
3
)
+ cB +
∆C
3
.
By equation (1.58), the profit piCIA : IA × IB → R+0 of firm A is given by
piCIA (z, w) =
(m (3 l + ∆l) t−∆C)2
18 tm
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Similarly, by equation (1.59), the profit piCIB : IA × IB → R+0 of firm B is
given by
piCIB (z, w) =
(m (3 l −∆l) t+ ∆C)2
18 tm
.
Using equality (1.66), the expected profit EB(pi
CI
A ) for firm A is given by
EB(pi
CI
A ) =
(mt (3 l + ∆l)−∆A −∆E)2 + VB
18 tm
Similarly, using equality (1.65), the expected profit EA(pi
CI
B ) for firm B is
given by
EA(pi
CI
B ) =
(mt (3 l −∆l)−∆B + ∆E)2 + VA
18 tm
The expected profit E(piCIA ) for firm A is given by
E(piCIA ) =
(mt (3 l + ∆l)−∆E)2 + VA + VB
18 tm
Similarly, the expected profit E(piCIB ) for firm B is given by
E(piCIB ) =
(mt (3 l −∆l) + ∆E)2 + VA + VB
18 tm
By equation (1.62), the consumer surplus is given by
CSCI(z, w) = X1−E(cA) + 2E(cB) + ∆A + 2 ∆B
3
l+
(tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆C)2
36 tm
,
Using equality (1.67), we obtain that the expected value of the consumer
surplus E(CSCI) is
E(CSCI(z, w)) = X1−E(cA) + 2E(cB)
3
l+
(tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆E)2 + VA + VB
36 tm
.
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By equation (1.63), the welfare is given by
WCI(z, w) = X1 − E(cA) + E(cB) + ∆A + ∆B
2
l − 5 ∆C
18
∆l +
5 ∆2C
36 tm
+X2.
Using equality (1.67), we obtain that the expected value of the welfare
E(WCI) is given by
E(WCI(z, w)) = X1− E(cA) + E(cB)
2
l− 5 ∆E
18
∆l +
5 (∆2E + VA + VB)
36 tm
+X2.
Corollary 1.2.6. The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit,
under complete information, for firm A, piEPA (z, w)− piCIA (z, w), is
(∆A −∆B)(∆A + 2 ∆B)− 2 (tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆C) (2∆A + ∆B)
72 tm
. (1.92)
The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit, under complete in-
formation, for firm B, piEPB (z, w)− piCIB (z, w), is
(∆B −∆A)(∆B + 2 ∆A)− 2 (tm (3 l −∆l) + ∆C) (2∆B + ∆A)
72 tm
. (1.93)
Proof. Let CI = tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆C . Hence,
piEPA (z, w)− piCIA (z, w) =
(2 IC + ∆B −∆A)(2CI −∆A − 2 ∆B)− 4CI2
72 tm
=
(∆B −∆A)(−∆A − 2 ∆B) + 2CI(−2∆A − ∆B)
72 tm
and so equality (1.92) holds. The proof of equality (1.93) follows similarly.
Corollary 1.2.7. The difference between the ex-ante profit EB(pi
EP
A ) and
EB(pi
CI
A ) for firm A is
EB(pi
EP
A )− EB(piCIA ) =
∆A (5 ∆A − 4 (tm (3 l + ∆l)−∆E))
72 t
− VB
18 tm
.
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The difference between the ex-ante profit EA(pi
EP
B ) and EA(pi
CI
B ) for firm B
is
EA(pi
EP
B )− EA(piCIB ) =
∆B (5 ∆B − 4 (tm (3 l −∆l) + ∆E))
72 t
− VA
18 tm
.
The proof of the above corollary follows from a simple manipulation of
the previous formulas for the ex-post and ex-ante profits.
The difference between the expected profits of firm A with complete and
incomplete information is given by
E(piEPA )− E(piCIA ) =
5VA − 4VB
72 tm
. (1.94)
The difference between the expected profits of firm B with complete and
incomplete information is given by
E(piEPB )− E(piCIB ) =
5VB − 4VA
72 tm
. (1.95)
Corollary 1.2.8. The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and
the consumer surplus, under complete information, CSEP − CSCI is
∆A + ∆B
4
l +
∆B −∆A
36
∆l +
(∆B −∆A)(∆B −∆A − 4 ∆C)
144 tm
. (1.96)
Therefore, equation (1.96) determines in which cases it is better to have
uncertainty in the production costs instead of complete information in terms
of consumer surplus CSEP > CSCI .
Proof. Let X = tm (3 l+ ∆l). The difference between the ex-post consumer
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surplus and the consumer surplus, under complete information, is
CSEP − CSCI = ∆A + 2 ∆B
3
l − ∆B
2
l +
(2X + ∆E − 3 ∆C)2
144 tm
− (X −∆C)
2
36 tm
=
2 ∆A + ∆B
6
l +
(2X − 2 ∆C + ∆E −∆C)2 − (2X − 2 ∆C)2
144 tm
=
2 ∆A + ∆B
6
l +
X (∆B −∆A)
36 tm
+
(∆B −∆A) (∆B −∆A − 4 ∆C)
144 tm
=
2 ∆A + ∆B
6
l +
(3 l + ∆l) (∆B −∆A)
36
+
(∆B −∆A) (∆B −∆A − 4 ∆C)
144 tm
=
∆A + ∆B
4
l +
∆B −∆A
36 tm
∆l +
(∆B −∆A) (∆B −∆A − 4 ∆C)
144 tm
The difference between expected value of the consumer surplus and the
expected value of the consumer surplus under complete information, is
E(CSEP )− E(CSCI) = 5 (VA + VB)
144 tm
. (1.97)
Therefore, in expected value the consumer surplus is greater with incomplete
information than with complete information.
The difference between the ex-post welfare and the welfare, under com-
plete information, is
WEP −WCI = ∆B −∆A
18
∆l +
7 ∆2C − 6 ∆C ∆E −∆2E
144 tm
(1.98)
Therefore, equation (1.98) determines in which cases it is better to have
uncertainty in the production costs instead of complete information in terms
of welfare WEP > WCI .
The difference between expected value of the welfare and the expected
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value of the welfare under complete information, is
E(WEP )− E(WCI) = 7 (VA + VB)
144 tm
. (1.99)
Therefore, in expected value the welfare is greater with incomplete informa-
tion than with complete information.
1.2.9 Example: Symmetric Hotelling
A Hotelling game is symmetric, if (IA,ΩA, qA) = (IB,ΩB, qB) and c = cA =
cB. Hence, we observe that all the formulas of this section hold with the
following simplifications
∆E = 0; E(c) = E(cA) = E(cB) and V = VA = VB.
The bounded uncertain costs in the symmetric case can be written in the
following simple way.
Definition 1.2.11. The symmetric Hotelling model satisfies the bounded
uncertain costs (BUCL1) condition, if
|2 ∆l tm− 3 ∆C | < 6 tm l.
for all z ∈ IA and for all w ∈ IB.
The Hotelling model with incomplete symmetric information satisfies the
bounded uncertain costs (BUCL2) condition, if
6 (cM − cm) + ∆l (c
M − E(c))
l
≤ tm (3 l −∆l)
2
3 l
+
3 (cM − E(c))2
4 tm l
and
6 (cM − cm)− ∆l (c
M − E(c))
l
≤ tm (3 l + ∆l)
2
3 l
+
3 (cM − E(c))2
4 tm l
.
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Under the BUC1 condition, the expected prices of the local optimum
price strategy have the simple expression
E(p
A
) = tm
(
l +
∆l
3
)
+ E(c);E(p
B
) = tm
(
l − ∆l
3
)
+ E(c)
By Proposition 1.2.1, for the Hotelling game with incomplete symmetric
information, the local optimum price strategy (pA, pB) has the form
pzA = E(pA) +
∆A
2
; pwB = E(pB) +
∆B
2
.
The ex-post profit of firm A and firm B are, respectively
piEPA (z, w) =
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A) (2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆C)
72 tm
and
piEPB (z, w) =
(2 tm (3 l −∆l)− 3 ∆B) (2 tm (3 l −∆l) + 3 ∆C)
72 tm
.
The difference between the ex-post profits, piEPA (z, w) − piEPB (z, w), of both
firms is given by
16 t2m2 l∆l + 2 tm (3 l∆C −∆l (∆A + ∆B))− 3 ∆C (8 t l m−∆A −∆B)
24 tm
.
Furthermore, for different production costs, the difference between the ex-
post profit of firm A, piEPA (z1, w)− piEPA (z2, w), is given by
(cz2A − cz1A ) (4 tm (3 l + ∆l) + 3 (cwB + E(cA)− cz1A − cz2A ))
24 tm
and, for different production costs, the difference between the ex-post profit
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of firm B, piEPB (z, w1)− piEPB (z, w2), is given by
(cw2B − cw1B ) (4 tm (3 l −∆l) + 3 (czA + E(cB)− cw1B − cw2B ))
24 tm
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB. The ex-ante profit profit of firm A
and firm B are, respectively
piEAA (z) =
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A)2
72 tm
and
piEAB (w) =
(2 tm (3 l −∆l)− 3 ∆B)2
72 tm
.
The difference between the ex-ante profits of both firms is given by
piEAA (z)− piEAB (w) =
(4 tm l −∆A −∆B) (4 tm∆l − 3 ∆C)
24 tm
Furthermore, for different production costs, the differences between the ex-
ante profits of a firm are given by
piEAA (z1)− piEAA (z2) =
(cz2A − cz1A ) (4 tm (3 l + ∆l) + 3 (2E(c)− cz1A − cz2A ))
24 tm
and
piEAB (w1)− piEAB (w2) =
(cw2B − cw1B ) (4 tm (3 l −∆l) + 3 (2E(c)− cw1B − cw2B ))
24 tm
for all z, z1, z2 ∈ IA and w,w1, w2 ∈ IB. The difference between the ex-post
profit and the ex-ante profit for firm A is
piEPA (z, w)− piEAA (z) =
∆B
24 tm
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A) .
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The difference between the ex-post profit and the ex-ante profit for firm B is
piEPB (z, w)− piEAB (w) =
∆A
24 tm
(2 tm (3 l −∆l)− 3 ∆B) .
We observe that that the A−BUCL and B−BUCL conditions are implied
by the BUCL1 condition. Hence, Corollary 1.2.3 can be rewritten without
any restriction, i.e.
piEPA (z, w) < pi
EA
A (z) if and only if ∆B < 0;
and
piEPB (z, w) < pi
EA
B (w) if and only if ∆A < 0.
The expected profit of firm A and firm B are
E(piEPA ) =
tm (3 l + ∆l)
2
18
+
V
8 tm
;E(piEPB ) =
tm (3 l −∆l)2
18
+
V
8 tm
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit for firm A
is
E(piEPA )− piEAA (z) =
∆A (4 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆A) + 3V
24 tm
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit for firm B
is
E(piEPB )− piEAB (w) =
∆B (4 tm (3 l −∆l)− 3 ∆B) + 3V
24 tm
.
The ex-post consumer surplus is
CSEP = X1 − E(c) l − ∆B
2
l +
(2 tm (3 l + ∆l)− 3 ∆C)2
144 tm
.
The expected value of the consumer surplus is
E(CSEP ) = X1 − E(c) l + 4 t
2m2 (3 l + ∆l)
2 + 18V
144 tm
.
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The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and the expected value
of the consumer surplus is
CSEP − E(CSEP ) = −∆A + ∆B
4
l − ∆C
12
∆l +
9 ∆2C − 18V
144 tm
The ex-post welfare is
WEP = X1 +X2 − E(c) l − ∆C
3
∆l +
27 ∆2C
144 tm
,
The expected value of the welfare E(WEP ) is given by
E(WEP ) = X1 +X2 − E(c) l − 5 ∆E
18
∆l +
27 (VA + VB)
144 tm
.
The difference between the ex-post welfare and the expected value of welfare
is
WEP − E(WEP ) = ∆A + ∆B
2
l − ∆C)
3
∆l +
9 (∆2C − 2V )
48 tm
.
The expected profit EB(pi
CI
A ) for firm A is given by
EB(pi
CI
A ) =
(mt (3 l + ∆l)−∆A)2 + V
18 tm
and the expected profit EA(pi
CI
B ) for firm B is given by
EA(pi
CI
B ) =
(mt (3 l −∆l)−∆B)2 + V
18 tm
The expected profits for firm A and B are given by
E(piCIA ) =
m2 t2 (3 l + ∆l)
2 + 2V
18 tm
and E(piCIB ) =
m2 t2 (3 l −∆l)2 + 2V
18 tm
.
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The expected value of the consumer surplus E(CSCI) is
E(CSCI(z, w)) = X1 − E(cB) l + t
2m2 (3 l + ∆l)
2 + 2V
36 tm
.
The expected value of the welfare E(WCI) is given by
E(WCI(z, w)) = X1 − E(cB) l + 10V
36 tm
+
mt
36
(45 l2 + 6 l∆l + 5 ∆
2
l ).
The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit, under complete
information, for firm A, is
piEPA (z, w)− piCIA (z, w) =
∆C (5 ∆A + 4 ∆B)− 2 tm (3 l + ∆l) (2∆A + ∆B)
72 tm
.
The difference between the ex-post profit and the profit, under complete
information, for firm B, is
piEPB (z, w)− piCIB (z, w) =
−∆C (5 ∆B + 4 ∆A)− 2 tm (3 l −∆l) (2∆B + ∆A)
72 tm
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit, under
complete information, for firm A is
EB(pi
EP
A )− EB(piCIA ) =
∆A (5 ∆A − 4 tm (3 l + ∆l))
72 t
− V
18 tm
.
The difference between the ex-ante profit and the expected profit, under
complete information, for firm B is
EA(pi
EP
B )− EA(piCIB ) =
∆B (5 ∆B − 4 tm (3 l −∆l))
72 t
− V
18 tm
.
The differences between the expected profits with complete and incomplete
105
information for firm A and firm B are given by
E(piEPA )− E(piCIA ) = E(piEPB )− E(piCIB ) =
V
72 tm
.
The difference between the ex-post consumer surplus and the consumer sur-
plus, under complete information, is
CSEP − CSCI = ∆A + ∆B
4
l − ∆C
36
∆l +
5∆2C
144 tm
.
The difference between expected value of the consumer surplus and the ex-
pected value of the consumer surplus under complete information, is
E(CSEP )− E(CSCI) = 10V
144 tm
.
The difference between the ex-post welfare and the welfare, under complete
information, is
WEP −WCI = −∆C
18
∆l +
7 ∆2C
144 tm
The difference between expected value of the welfare and the expected value
of the welfare under complete information, is
E(WEP )− E(WCI) = 7V
72 tm
.
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Chapter 2
Hotelling Network
The Hotelling town model consists of a network of consumers and firms. The
consumers (buyers) are located along the edges (roads) of the network and
the firms (shops) are located at neighborhoods of the vertices (nodes) of the
network. Every road has two vertices and in a neighborhood of every vertex
is located a single firm. The degree k of the vertex is given by the number of
incident edges. If the degree k is greater that 2 then the vertex is a crossroad
of k roads; if the degree k is equal to 2 then the vertex is a junction between
two roads; and if k is equal to 1 the vertex is in the end of a road with no
exit. Every consumer will buy one unit of the commodity from only one firm
in the network and each firm will charge its customers the same price for the
commodity.
A Hotelling town price strategy P consists of a vector whose coordinates
are the prices pi of each firm Fi. Every firm Fi is located at a position yi in
a neighborhood of a vertex i ∈ V , where V is the set of all vertices of the
Hotelling town. A consumer located at a point x of the network who decides
to buy at firm Fi spends
E(x; i,P) = pi + T (ti, d(x, yi))
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the price pi charged by the firm Fi plus a value, T , that depends on the trans-
portation cost ti and on minimal distance measured in the network between
the position yi of the firm Fi and the position x of the consumer. Given a
price strategy P, the consumer will choose to buy in the firm Fv(x,P) that
minimizes his expenditure
v(x,P) = argmini∈VE(x; i,P).
Hence, for every firm Fi, the market
M(i,P) = {x : v(x,P) = i}
consists of all consumers who minimize their expenditures by opting to buy
in firm Fi. The road market size li,j of a road Ri,j is the Lebesgue measure
(or length) of the road Ri,j, because the consumers are uniformly distributed
along the roads. The market size S(i,P) of the firm Fi is the Lebesgue
measure of M(i,P). The Hotelling town production cost C is the vector
whose coordinates are the production costs ci of the firms Fi. The Hotelling
town profit Π(P,C) is the vector whose coordinates
pii(P,C) = (pi − ci)S(i,P)
are the profits of the firms Fi. The local firms of a consumer located at a
point x in a road Ri,j with vertices i and j are the firms Fi and Fj. For
every vertex i let Ni be the set of all neighboring vertices j for which there
is a road Ri,j connecting the vertices. A price strategy P determines a local
market structure if every consumer buys from one of his local firms, i.e.
M(i,P) ⊂
⋃
j∈Ni
Ri,j.
If a price strategy P determines a local market structure then for every road
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Ri,j there is one consumer located at a point xi,j ∈ Ri,j who is indifferent to
the local firm from which he going to buy his commodity, i.e. E(x; i,P) =
E(x; j,P).
We denote by cM (resp. cm) the maximum (resp. minimum) production
cost of the Hotelling town
cM = max{ci : i ∈ V } and cm = min{ci : i ∈ V }.
We denote by lM (resp. lm) the maximum (resp. minimum) road length of
the Hotelling town
lM = max{le : e ∈ E} and lm = min{le : e ∈ E},
where E is the set of all edges of the Hotelling town. Let ∆(c) be the maximal
difference between the firm’s production cost of the commodity, ∆(l) be the
maximal difference between the road lengths in the network and ∆2(l) be
the maximal difference between the square road lengths in the network
∆(c) = cM − cm , ∆(l) = lM − lm and ∆2(l) = l2M − l2m.
We introduce the weak-bound WB condition that defines a bound for the
∆(c) and ∆(l) (∆(c) and ∆2(l), in the quadratic transportation cost case)
in terms of the transportation cost t and the minimal road length lm of the
network (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1). We prove that a Hotelling town net-
work satisfying the WB condition has a unique local optimum price strategy
PL, i.e. the profit of every firm is optimal for small perturbations of its
own price. We prove that if a Hotelling town network satisfying the WB
condition the local optimum price strategy PL determines a local market
structure. Furthermore, if there is a Nash price equilibrium P∗ then the
Nash price equilibrium is the local optimum price strategy PL. However,
in sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2, we exhibit simple Hotelling town networks that
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satisfy the WB condition but the local optimum price strategy is not a Nash
price equilibrium.
We denote by kM (resp. km) the maximum (resp. minimum) node degree
of the Hotelling town
kM = max{ki : i ∈ V } and km = min{ki : i ∈ V }.
We introduce the strong-bound SB condition that defines a bound for ∆(c)
and ∆(l) (∆(c) and ∆2(l), in the quadratic transportation cost case) in terms
of the transportation cost t, the minimal road length lm and also on the
maximum node degree kM (see Subsections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2). We prove that
a Hotelling town network satisfying the SB condition has a unique Nash
price equilibrium P∗. Since the SB condition implies the WB condition, the
Nash price equilibrium P∗ is equal to the local optimum price strategy PL.
We give an explicit series expansion formula for the Nash price equilibrium
P∗. This formula has the feature to show explicitly how the Nash price
equilibrium of a firm depends on the production costs, road market sizes and
firms locations of its local neighborhood network structure. Furthermore,
the influence of a firm in the Nash price equilibrium of other firm decreases
exponentially with the distance between the firms.
We say that a firm has n-space bounded information, if the firm knows the
production costs of the other firms and the road lengths of the network up to
n consecutive nodes of distance. Given a Hotelling town network satisfying
the WB condition, every firm with n-space bounded information can readily
compute a price pi(n) that estimates its own local optimum price p
L
i , with
exponential precision depending upon n. In addition, the firm can then easily
estimate the profit obtained with the local optimum price strategy, also with
exponential precision depending upon n.
A localization strategy for the firms in the network consists in every firm
Fi to choose its position in the neighborhood of its vertex i. For every given
localization strategy, we assume the firms opt for their Nash price strategy.
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A local optimal localization strategy is achieved when for every firm Fi small
perturbations in its location no longer result in improved profits for the firm
Fi. In Subsection 2.1.3, we prove that a Hotelling town network with linear
transportation costs satisfying the SB condition and with km ≥ 3 has a
local optimal localization strategy, whereby every firm Fi is located at the
corresponding node i. Furthermore, the network can also have nodes with
degree 2 under appropriate symmetric assumptions.
We say that a price strategy has the profit degree growth property if the
profits of the firms increase with the degree of the nodes in the neighborhoods
in which they are located. In Subsection 2.1.1 we introduce the degree-bound
DB condition that gives a new bound for ∆(c) and ∆(l) and we prove that
for a Hotelling town network with linear transportation costs satisfying the
WB and DB conditions the Nash price strategy P∗ has the profit degree
growth property.
For example, the Hotelling town networks, where all firms have the same
production costs and all roads have the same length, satisfy the SB and
DB conditions. Therefore, these networks have a Nash price equilibrium
satisfying the profit degree growth property. Furthermore, if km ≥ 3 the
firms have a local optimal localization strategy whereby they are located at
the corresponding nodes. The original idea of the Hotelling town model was
presented in [30].
2.1 Linear transportation costs
This section extends the Hotelling model with linear transportation costs to
networks.
A consumer located at a point x of the network who decides to buy at
firm Fi spends
E(x; i,P) = pi + t d(x, yi)
the price pi charged by the firm Fi plus the transportation cost that is pro-
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portional t to the minimal distance measured in the network between the
position yi of the firm Fi and the position x of the consumer.
2.1.1 Local optimal equilibrium price strategy
For every v ∈ V , let v = d(v, yv) and j(v) be the node with the property
that yv is at the road Rv,j(v). The shift location matrix S(v) associated to
node v is defined by
si,j(v) =

v if i = v and j ∈ Nv \ {j(v)} ;
−v if i = v and j = j(v) ;
v if j = v and i ∈ Nv \ {j(v)} ;
−v if j = v and i = j(v) ;
0 otherwise.
The distance l˜i,j = d(yi, yj) between the location of firms Fi and Fj is given
by
l˜i,j = li,j +
∑
v∈{i,j}
si,j(v). (2.1)
Let  = maxv∈V v. Hence, for every i, j ∈ V we have
li,j − 2  ≤ l˜i,j ≤ li,j + 2 .
We observe that, for every road Ri,j there is an indifferent consumer located
at a distance
0 < xi,j = (2 t)
−1(pj − pi + t l˜i,j) < l˜i,j (2.2)
of firm Fi if and only if |pi− pj| < t l˜i,j. Thus, a price strategy P determines
a local market structure if and only if |pi − pj| < t l˜i,j for every road Ri,j.
Hence, if
|pi − pj| < t li,j − 2 t  (2.3)
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then condition (2.2) is satisfied. Therefore, if condition (2.3) holds then the
price strategy P determines a local market structure.
Let ki denote is the cardinality of the set Ni that is equal to the degree of
the vertex i. If the price strategy determines a local market structure then
S(i,P) = (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
xi,j
and
pii(P,C) = (pi − ci)S(i,P)
= (2 t)−1(pi − ci)
(
2 t (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
pj − pi + t l˜i,j
)
.(2.4)
Given a pair of price strategies P and P∗ and a firm Fi, we define the
price vector P˜(i,P,P∗) whose coordinates are p˜i = p∗i and p˜j = pj, for every
j ∈ V \ {i}. Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market
structures. The price strategy P∗ is a local best response to the price strategy
P, if for every i ∈ V the price strategy P˜(i,P,P∗) determines a local market
structure and
∂pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)
∂p˜i
= 0 and
∂2pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)
∂p˜2i
< 0.
The Hotelling town admissible market size L is the vector whose coordin-
ates are the admissible local firm market sizes
Li =
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
li,j.
The Hotelling town neighboring market structure K is the matrix whose
elements are (i) ki,j = k
−1
i , if there is a road Ri,j between the firms Fi and
Fj; and (ii) ki,j = 0, if there is not a road Ri,j between the firms Fi and Fj.
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The Hotelling town firm deviation is the vector Y whose coordinates are
Yi = k
−1
i
(
(2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(j)
)
.
Let 1 denote the identity matrix.
Lemma 2.1.1. Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market
structures. The price strategy P∗ is the local best response to price strategy
P if and only if
P∗ =
1
2
(C+ t (L+Y)) +
1
2
KP (2.5)
and the price strategies P˜(i,P,P∗) determine local market structures for all
i ∈ V .
Proof. By (2.4), the profit function pii(P,C) of firm Fi, in a local market
structure, is given by
pii(P,C) = (2 t)
−1(pi − ci)
(
2 t (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
pj − pi + t l˜i,j
)
.
Let P˜(i,P,P∗) be the price vector whose coordinates are p˜i = p∗i and p˜j =
pj, for every j ∈ V \ {i}. Since P and P∗ are local price strategies, the
local best response of firm Fi to the price strategy P, is given by computing
∂pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)/∂p˜i = 0. Hence,
p∗i =
1
2
(
ci +
2 t (2− ki)
ki
i +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
t l˜i,j + pj
)
. (2.6)
By (2.1), we obtain
p∗i =
1
2
ci + 2 t (2− ki)
ki
i +
t
ki
∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈{i,j}
si,j(v) +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
t li,j + pj
 .
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We note that∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈{i,j}
si,j(v) =
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(i) +
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(j) = (ki − 2) i +
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(j).
Hence,
p∗i =
1
2
(
ci +
t
ki
(
(2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(j)
)
+
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
t li,j + pj
)
.
Therefore, since ∂2pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)/∂p˜2i = −ki/t < 0, the local best re-
sponse strategy prices P∗ is given by
P∗ =
1
2
(C + t (Y + L) + K P) .
Definition 2.1.1. A Hotelling town satisfies the weak bounded length and
costs (WB) condition, if
∆(c) + t∆(l) < t lm − 6 t .
Hence, the WB condition implies  < lm/6.
Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market structures.
A price strategy P∗ is a local optimum price strategy if P∗ is the local best
response to P∗.
Proposition 2.1.1. If the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, then
there is unique local optimum price strategy given by
PL =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
(C+ t (L+Y))
=
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C+ t (L+Y)) . (2.7)
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The local optimum price strategy PL determines a local market structure.
Furthermore, the local optimal equilibrium prices pLi are bounded by
t lm +
1
2
(ci + cm)− 2 t  ≤ pLi ≤ t lM +
1
2
(ci + cM) + 2 t . (2.8)
The local optimal profit piLi = pi
L
i (P,C) of firm Fi is given by
piLi (P,C) = (2t)
−1 ki (pLi − ci)2
and it is bounded by
(8t)−1 ki (2t lm−∆(c)− 4 t )2 ≤ piLi (P,C) ≤ (8t)−1 ki (2 t lM + ∆(c) + 4 t )2.
Corollary 2.1.1. Consider a Hotelling town where all firms are located at
the nodes. If ∆(c) + t∆(l) < t lm, then there is unique local optimum price
strategy given by
PL =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C+ tL) .
The local optimum price strategy PL determines a local market structure.
Furthermore, the local optimal equilibrium prices pLi are bounded by
t lm +
1
2
(ci + cm) ≤ pLi ≤ t lM +
1
2
(ci + cM).
The local optimal profit piLi = pi
L
i (P,C) of firm Fi is given by
piLi (P,C) = (2t)
−1 ki (pLi − ci)2
and it is bounded by
(8t)−1 ki (2t lm −∆(c))2 ≤ piLi (P,C) ≤ (8t)−1 ki (2 t lM + ∆(c))2.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1.1.
The matrix K is a stochastic matrix (i.e.,
∑
j∈V ki,j = 1, for every i ∈ V ).
Thus, we have ‖K‖ = 1. Hence, the matrix Q is well-defined by
Q =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
=
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km
and Q is also a non-negative and stochastic matrix. By Lemma 2.1.1, a local
optimum price strategy satisfy equality (2.5). Therefore,
PL =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
(C + t (L + Y))
=
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km (C + t (L + Y)) ,
and so PL satisfies (2.7). By construction,
pLi =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cv + t (Lv + Yv)). (2.9)
Let us prove that the price strategy PL is local, i.e., the indifferent consumer
xi,j satisfies 0 < xi,j < l˜i,j for every Ri,j ∈ E. We note that
lm ≤ Lv = k−1v
∑
j∈Nv
lv,j ≤ lM . (2.10)
We note that
−kv  ≤
∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j) ≤ kv 
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Hence, if kv = 1 then
− ≤ v −  ≤ Yv = k−1v
(
v +
∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j)
)
≤ v +  ≤ 2 ; (2.11)
if kv = 2 then
− ≤ Yv = k−1v
∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j) ≤ ; (2.12)
and if kv ≥ 3 then
2− kv
kv
v −  ≤ Yv = k−1v
(
(2− kv) v +
∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j)
)
≤ 2− kv
kv
v + .
Hence,
−2  ≤ −v −  ≤ Yv = k−1v
(
(2− kv) v +
∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j)
)
≤ . (2.13)
Therefore, from (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13), we have
−2  ≤ Yv = k−1v
(
(2− kv) v +
∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j)
)
≤ 2 . (2.14)
Since Q is a nonnegative and stochastic matrix, we obtain∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cm + t lm − 2 t ) = cm + t lm − 2 t 
and ∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cM + t lM + 2 t ) = cM + t lM + 2 t .
Hence, putting (2.9), (2.10) and (2.14) together we obtain that
cm + t lm − 2 t  ≤ pLi ≤ cM + t lM + 2 t .
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Since the last relation is satisfied for every firm, we obtain
− (cM − cm + t(lM − lm) + 4 t ) ≤ pLi − pLj ≤ cM − cm + t(lM − lm) + 4 t .
Therefore,
|pLi − pLj | ≤ ∆(c) + t∆(l) + 4 t .
Hence, by the WB condition, we conclude that
|pLi − pLj | < t lm − 2 t .
Thus, by equation (2.3), we obtain that the indifferent consumer is located
at 0 < xi,j < l˜i,j for every road Ri,j ∈ E. Hence, the price strategy PL is
local and is the unique local optimum price strategy.
From (2.9), (2.10) and (2.14), we obtain
pLi ≥
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(t lm − 2 t ) +
∑
v∈V \{i}
Qi,v cm +Qi,i ci.
By construction of matrix Q, we have Qi,i > 1/2. Furthermore, since Q is
stochastic, ∑
v∈V \{i}
Qi,v < 1/2,
∑
v∈V Qi,vt lm = t lm and
∑
v∈V Qi,v2 t  = 2 t . Hence,
pLi ≥ t lm − 2 t +
1
2
(ci + cm).
Similarly, we obtain
pLi ≤ t lM + 2 t +
1
2
(ci + cM),
and so the local optimal equilibrium prices pLi are bounded and satisfy (2.8).
We can write the the profit function (2.4) of firm Fi for the price strategy
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PL as
piLi = pii(P
L,C) = (2t)−1(pLi − ci)
(
2 t (2− ki) i − ki pLi +
∑
j∈Ni
(pLj + t l˜i,j)
)
(2.15)
Since PL satisfies the best response function (2.6), we have
2 pLi = ci +
2 t (2− ki)
ki
i +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
(
t l˜i,j + p
L
j
)
.
Therefore,
∑
j∈Ni
(
t l˜i,j + p
L
j
)
= 2 ki p
L
i − ki ci + 2 t (ki − 2) i, and replacing
this sum in the profit function (2.15), we obtain
piLi = (2t)
−1(pLi − ci)
(−ki pLi + 2 ki pLi − ki ci) = (2t)−1 ki (pLi − ci)2.
Hence, using the price bounds (2.8), we conclude
(2t)−1 ki (t lm −∆(c)/2− 2 t )2 ≤ piLi ≤ (2t)−1 ki (t lM + ∆(c)/2 + 2 t )2.
Consider the two networks presented in Figure 2.1.
1
2
3
4
7
8
8
(a) Star Network
1 2
34
5
6
6
5
(b) Regular Network
Figure 2.1: Hotelling networks satisfying WB condition
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For network 2.1a the parameter values are i = 0, ci = 0, lm = 7, lM = 8,
∆(l) = 1 and kM = 3. For network 2.1b the parameter values are i = 0,
ci = 0, lm = 5, lM = 6, ∆(l) = 1 and kM = 2. Both networks satisfies the
WB condition. Hence, by Proposition 2.1.1, there is a local optimum price
strategy PL. The local optimal prices for network 2.1a are given by
pLi = t
(
23
3
,
22
3
,
47
6
,
47
6
)
and the correspondent profits are given by
piL = t
(
529
6
,
242
9
,
2209
72
,
2209
72
)
.
The local optimal prices for network 2.1b are given by
pLi = t
(
21
4
,
11
2
,
23
4
,
11
2
)
and the correspondent profits are given by
piL = t
(
441
16
,
121
4
,
529
16
,
121
4
)
.
We say that a price strategy P has the profit degree growth property if
ki > kj ⇒ pii(P,C) > pij(P,C)
for every i, j ∈ V .
Lemma 2.1.2. Let Fi be a firm located in a node of degree ki and Fj a firm
located in a node of degree kj. Then, pi
L
i > pi
L
j if and only if
ki − kj
kj
>
(pLj − cj)2 − (pLi − ci)2
(pLi − ci)2
.
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Let p¯i = p
L
i − ci and p¯j = pLj − cj represent the unit profit of firms Fi and
Fj located at nodes of degree ki and kj, respectively. Let θ(p) = p
L
i − pLj ,
θ(k) = ki − kj and θ(p¯) = p¯i − p¯j.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.2.
If Fj is a firm located in a node of degree kj, then
piLj = (2t)
−1 kj (pLj − cj)2 = (2t)−1 kj p¯2j .
Similarly, if Fi is a firm located in a node of degree ki, then
piLi = (2t)
−1 ki (pLi − ci)2 = (2t)−1 ki p¯2i = (2t)−1 (kj + θ(k)) (p¯j + θ(p¯))2 .
Hence,
2 t piLi = kj p¯
2
j + kj θ(p¯) (2 p¯j + θ(p¯)) + θ(k) (p¯j + θ(p¯))
2
= 2 t piLj + kj θ(p¯) (p¯j + p¯i) + θ(k) p¯
2
i ,
and so
2 t (piLi − piLj ) = kj (p¯i − p¯j) (p¯j + p¯i) + θ(k) p¯2i = kj (p¯2i − p¯2j) + (ki − kj) p¯2i .
Therefore,
piLi > pi
L
j if and only if
ki − kj
kj
>
p¯2j − p¯2i
p¯2i
.
Definition 2.1.2. A Hotelling town network satisfies the degree bounded
lengths and costs (DB) condition if
∆(c) + t∆(l) <
(√
1 + 1/kM − 1
)
(t lm −∆(c)/2− 2 t )− 4 t .
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Theorem 2.1.1. A Hotelling town network satisfying the WB and DB con-
ditions has the profit degree growth property.
Proof. Let Fi and Fj be firms in the Hotelling town network such that ki > kj.
We need to prove that piLi > pi
L
j . From Lemma 2.1.2 we say that pi
L
i > pi
L
j if
and only if
kj θ(p¯) (p¯j + p¯i) + θ(k) p¯
2
i > 0. (2.16)
Since ki > kj, then θ(k) > 0. Hence, if θ(p¯) > 0, i.e. p¯i > p¯j, then condition
(2.16) is satisfied.
Let us now consider the case where θ(p¯) < 0. Condition (2.16) is equi-
valent to
kj θ(p¯)
2 − 2 kj p¯i θ(p¯)− θ(k) p¯2i < 0. (2.17)
Solving the second degree equation kj θ(p¯)
2 − 2 kj p¯i θ(p¯) − θ(k) p¯2i = 0, we
obtain
θ(p¯)± = p¯i
(
1±
√
1 + θ(k)/kj
)
.
Let f(θ(k), kj) be the function given by
f(θ(k), kj) =
√
1 + θ(k)/kj − 1.
We note that f(θ(k), kj) > 0 and θ(p¯)− = −f(θ(k), kj) p¯i. If θ(p¯)− < θ(p¯) < 0
then condition (2.17) is satisfied. By hypothesis θ(p¯) < 0 and, so, if
f(θ(k), kj) p¯i > −θ(p¯) (2.18)
then (2.17) is satisfied.
Since θ(p¯) = p¯i − p¯j, from (2.8) we have |θ(p¯)| < ∆(c) + t∆(l) + 4 t .
Hence, if
f(θ(k), kj) p¯i > ∆(c) + t∆(l) + 4 t  (2.19)
then (2.18) is satisfied. Noting that f(θ(k), kj) > f(1, kM) =
√
1 + 1/kM−1,
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if
∆(c) + t∆(l) + 4 t  <
(√
1 + 1/kM − 1
)
p¯i (2.20)
then (2.19) is satisfied. By (2.8), we have p¯i ≥ t lm −∆(c)/2 − 2 t . Hence,
if
∆(c) + t∆(l) + 4 t  <
(√
1 + 1/kM − 1
)
(t lm −∆(c)/2− 2 t ) (2.21)
then (2.20) is satisfied. Hence, if condition (2.21) is satisfied, then (2.16) is
satisfied, piLi > pi
L
j for every firms Fi and Fj such that ki > kj, and, so, the
network has the profit degree growth property.
We are going to present an example satisfying the WB condition but not
the DB condition. Furthermore, we will show that in this example does not
has the profit degree growth property. Consider the Hotelling town network
presented in Figure 2.2. The parameter values are i = 0, ci = 0, lm = 5,
1
2
3
4
5
5 8
85
5
Figure 2.2: Network not satisfying the DB condition
lM = 8, ∆(l) = 3 and kM = 3.
Hence, Network 2.2 satisfies the WB condition. Hence, by Proposition
2.1.1, there is a local optimum price strategy PL. The profits valued at the
local optimal prices are given by
piL = t
(
48387
1058
,
21904
529
,
27556
529
,
21904
529
,
14641
1058
)
.
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Network 2.2 does not satisfy the DB condition and does not has the profit
degree growth property, since k1 > k3 and pi
L
3 > pi
L
1 .
The two networks presented in Figure 2.1 satisfies the DB condition.
Hence, both networks have the profit degree growth property.
2.1.2 Nash equilibrium price strategy
The price strategy P∗ is a best response to the price strategy P, if
(p˜i − ci)S(i, P˜(i,P,P∗)) ≥ (p′i − ci)S(i,P′i),
for all i ∈ V and for all price strategies P′i whose coordinates satisfy p′i ≥ ci
and p′j = pj for all j ∈ V \ {i}. A price strategy P∗ is a Hotelling town Nash
equilibrium if P∗ is the best response to P∗.
Lemma 2.1.3. In a Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition, if there is
a Nash price P∗ then P∗ is unique and P∗ = PL.
Hence, the local optimum price strategy PL is the only candidate to
be a Nash equilibrium price strategy. However, PL might not be a Nash
equilibrium price strategy because there can be a firm Fi that by decreasing
his price is able to absorb markets of other firms in such a way that increases
its own profit. Therefore, the best response price strategy PL,∗ to the local
optimum price strategy PL might be different from PL.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.3.
Suppose that P ∗ is a Nash price strategy and that P∗ 6= PL. Hence, P∗ does
not determine a local market structure, i.e., there exists i ∈ V such that
M(i,P∗) 6⊂ ∪j∈NiRi,j.
Hence, there exists j ∈ Ni such that M(j,P∗) = 0 and, therefore, pi∗j = 0.
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Moreover, in this case, we have that
p∗j > p
∗
i + t l˜i,j.
Consider, now, that Fj changes his price to pj = cj + t∆(l) + 4 t . Since
p∗i > ci and cj − ci ≤ ∆(c) we have that
pj − p∗i < pj − ci = cj + t∆(l) + 4 t − ci ≤ ∆(c) + t∆(l) + 4 t 
Since the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, we obtain
pj − p∗i < t lm − 2 t  ≤ t li,j − 2 t  ≤ t l˜i,j.
Hence, M(j, P˜(j,P∗,P)) > 0 and pij = (t∆(l) + 4 t )S(j, P˜(j,P∗,P)) > 0.
Therefore, Fj will change its price and so P
∗ is not a Nash equilibrium price
strategy. Hence, if there is a Nash price P∗ then P∗ = PL.
Let ∪j∈NiRi,j be the 1-neighbourhood N (i, 1) of a firm i ∈ V . Let
∪j∈Ni ∪k∈Nj Rj,k be the 2-neighbourhood N (i, 2) of a firm i ∈ V .
Lemma 2.1.4. In a Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition,
M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2)
for every i ∈ V .
Hence, a consumer x ∈ Rj,k might not buy in its local firms Fj and
Fk. However, the consumer x ∈ Rj,k still has to buy in a firm Fi that is a
neighboring firm of its local firms Fj and Fk, i.e. i ∈ Nj ∪Nk.
Proof of Lemma 2.1.4.
By contradiction, let us consider a consumer z ∈ M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) and
z /∈ N (i, 2). The price that consumer z pays to buy in firm Fi is given by
e = pi + t
(
l˜i1,i2 + l˜i2,i3 + d (yi3 , z)
)
≥ pi + t (li1,i2 + li2,i3 − 2 + d (yi3 , z))
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where pi = p
L,∗
i is the coordinate of the vector P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗) and for the
2-path (Ri1,i2 , Ri2,i3) with i1 = i. If the consumer z buys at firm Fi3 , then
the price that has to pay is
e˜ = pLi3 + t d (yi3 , z).
Since, by hypothesis, z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)), we have e < e˜. Therefore
pi < p
L
i3
− t (li1,i2 + li2,i3 − 2 ) .
By (2.8), pLi ≤ t lM + 2 t  +
1
2
(ci + cM) for all i ∈ V . Since li,j ≥ lm for all
Ri,j ∈ E,
pi < t lM +
1
2
(cM + ci3)− 2 t lm + 4 t  ≤ cM + t∆(l)− t lm + 4 t .
Furthermore,
pi − ci < ∆(c) + t∆(l)− t lm + 4 t .
By the WB condition, pi − ci < 0. Hence, piL,∗i < 0 which contradicts the
fact that pi is the best response to P
L (since piLi > 0). Therefore, z ∈ N (i, 2)
and M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2).
Definition 2.1.3. A Hotelling town satisfies the strong bounded length and
costs (SB) condition, if
∆(c) + t∆(l) ≤ (2 t lm −∆(c)− 4 t )
2
8 t kM (lM + )
− 3 t .
The SB condition implies the WB condition, and so under the SB con-
dition the only candidate to be a Nash equilibrium price strategy is the local
optimum strategy price PL. On the other hand, the condition
∆(c) + t∆(l) ≤ t l
2
M
8 kM (lM + )
− 3 t .
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together with the
WB
condition implies the SB condition. Hence, we note that the condition
∆(c) + t∆(l) ≤ t l
2
m
8 kM (lM + )
− 6 t .
implies the WB and SB conditions.
Theorem 2.1.2. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition then there is
a unique Hotelling town Nash equilibrium price strategy P∗ = PL.
Hence, the Nash equilibrium price strategy for the Hotelling town sat-
isfying the SB condition determines a local market structure, i.e. every
consumer located at x ∈ Ri,j spends less by shopping at his local firms Fi
or Fj than in any other firm in the town and so the consumer at x will buy
either at his local firm Fi or at his local firm Fj.
For  small enough, a cost and length uniform Hotelling town, i.e. cm =
cM and lm = lM , has a unique pure network Nash price strategy which
satisfies the profit degree growth property.
Corollary 2.1.2. Consider a Hotelling town where all firms are located at
the nodes. If
∆(c) + t∆(l) ≤ (2 t lm −∆(c))
2
8 t kM lM
then there is a unique Hotelling town Nash equilibrium price strategy P∗ =
PL.
Proof of Theorem 2.1.2.
By Proposition 2.1.1 and Lemma 2.1.3, if there is a Nash equilibrium price
strategy P∗ then P∗ is unique and P∗ = PL.
We note that if M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 1) for every i ∈ V then
P˜(i,PL,PL,∗) = pLi and so P
L is a Nash equilibrium.
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By Lemma 2.1.4, we have that M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2) for every i ∈ V .
Now, we will prove that the SB condition implies that firm Fi earns more
competing only in the 1-neighborhood than competing in a 2-neighborhood.
By Proposition 2.1.1,
piLi ≥ (2 t)−1 ki (t lm −∆(c)/2− 2 t )2 (2.22)
By Lemma 2.1.4,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) ≤ (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
l˜i,j + ∑
k∈Nj\{i}
l˜j,k

≤ (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈Nj
l˜j,k,
where pi = p
L,∗
i is the coordinate of the vector P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗). Hence,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) ≤ (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈Nj
(lj,k + ) ≤ (pi − ci)ki kM (lM + ).
(2.23)
By contradiction, let us consider a consumer z ∈ M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) and
z /∈ N (i, 1). Let i2 ∈ Ni be the vertex such that z ∈ N (i2, 1). The price that
consumer z pays to buy in firm Fi is given by
e = pi + t l˜i,i2 + t d (yi2 , z) ≥ pi + t li,i2 + t d (yi2 , z)− t .
If the consumer y buys at firm Fi2 , then the price that has to pay is
e˜ = pLi2 + t d (yi2 , z).
Since, by hypothesis, z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)), we have e < e˜. Therefore
pi < p
L
i2
− t li,i2 + t .
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By (2.8), pLi2 ≤ t lM + 2 t +
1
2
(cM + ci2). Since li,i2 ≥ lm, we have
pi < t lM +
1
2
(cM + ci2) + 2 t − t lm + t  ≤ cM + t∆(l) + 3 t .
Thus,
pi − ci < ∆(c) + t∆(l) + 3 t .
Hence, from (2.23) we obtain
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) < ki kM (lM + ) (∆(c) + t∆(l) + 3 t ) .
By the SB condition,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) < (2 t)−1 ki (t lm −∆(c)/2− 2 t )2. (2.24)
Hence, by inequalities (2.22) and (2.24), piLi > pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C), which
contradicts the fact that pi is the best response to P
L. Therefore, z ∈ N (i, 1)
and M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 1). Hence, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗) = pLi and so PL is
a Nash equilibrium.
We are going to present an example satisfying the WB condition but not
the SB condition. Furthermore, we will show that in this example the local
optimum price strategy do not form a Nash price equilibrium. Consider the
Hotelling town network presented in figure 2.3.
The parameter values are i = 0, ci = 0, lm = 4, lM = 7, ∆(l) = 3 and
kM = 3. Hence, Network 2.3 satisfies the WB condition. By Proposition
2.1.1, the local optimal equilibrium prices and the correspondent profits are
PL = t
(
16
3
,
14
3
,
31
6
,
37
6
)
; piL = t
(
128
3
,
98
9
,
961
72
,
1369
72
)
.
We will show that the local optimum price strategy is not a Nash equilibrium.
The profits of the firms are given by piLi = pi S(i,P
L), and the local market
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3
4
4
5
7
Figure 2.3: Star Network not satisfying the SB condition
sizes S(i,PL) are
S(i,PL) =
piLi
pLi
=
ki p
L
i
2 t
Hence, the local market sizes are
S(1,PL) = 8; S(2,PL) =
14
6
; S(3,PL) =
31
12
; S(4,PL) =
37
12
.
Suppose that firm F2 decides to lower its price in order to capture the market
of firm F1. The firm F2 captures the market of F1, excluding F1 from the
game, if the firm F2 charges a price p2 such that p2 +4 t < p
L
1 or, equivalently
p2 < 4/3 t. Let us consider p2 = 4/3 t − δ, where δ is sufficiently small.
Hence, for this new price, firm F2 keeps the market M(2,P
L) and, since
the price of F2 at location of F1 is less that p
L
1 , firm F2 gains at least the
market of firm F1. Thus, the new market M(2,P) of firm F2 is such that
S(2,P) > S(1,PL) + S(2,PL). Therefore, S(2,P) > 31/3 and so
pi2 > p2 S(2,P) =
(
4
3
t− δ
)
31
3
=
124
9
t− 31
3
δ.
Thus pi2 > 98 t/9 = pi
L
2 , and so firm F2 prefers to alter its price p
L
2 . Therefore,
PL is not a Nash equilibrium price.
The two networks presented in figure 2.1 satisfies the SB condition.
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Hence, the local optimum price strategy PL is also a Nash equilibrium price
strategy.
2.1.3 Strategic optimal location
The marginal rate of the price of a firm Fi located at yi with respect to the
deviation of the localization of the firm is given by
∂pLi /∂i = t
(
Qi,i ∂Yi/∂i +
∑
j∈Ni
Qi,j ∂Yj/∂i
)
= t
(
Qi,i
2− ki
ki
− 2Qi,j(i)
kj(i)
+
∑
j∈Ni
Qi,j
kj
)
.
The marginal rate of the profit of a firm Fi located at yi with respect to the
deviation of the localization of the firm is given by
∂piLi /∂i =
ki (p
L
i − ci)
t
· ∂pLi /∂i.
Definition 2.1.4. Let us explicit pi(i) the dependence of pii on the parameter
i. We say that a firm Fi is node local stable if there is  > 0 such that
pii(0) > pii(i) for every 0 < i < , with respect to the local optimum price
strategy. A Hotelling network is firm node local stable if every firm in the
network is node stable.
If node i has degree ki = 2, let us define
Ui =
Qi,v
kv
− Qi,j(i)
kj(i)
where v is uniquely determined by {v} = Ni \ {j(i)} and j(i) is the node
with the property that yi is at the road Ri,j(i).
Theorem 2.1.3. The marginal rate of the profit of a firm Fi located at yi with
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respect to the deviation of the localization of the firm satisfies the following
inequalities:
(i) Case ki ≥ 1. Then ∂piLi /∂i > 0.
(ii) Case ki = 2.
(a) If Ui > 0 then ∂pi
L
i /∂i > 0;
(b) if Ui < 0 then ∂pi
L
i /∂i < 0;
(c) if Ui = 0 then ∂pi
L
i /∂i = 0.
(iii) Case ki ≥ 3 and kv ≥ 3, for every v ∈ Ni. Then ∂piLi /∂i < 0.
(iv) Case ki ≥ 4 and kv ≥ 2, for every v ∈ Ni. Then ∂piLi /∂i < 0.
Hence, a Hotelling town network satisfying the WB condition and with
km ≥ 3 has a local optimal localization strategy, whereby every firm Fi is
located at the corresponding node i.
We observe that firms Fi with node degree ki = 1 are node local unstable.
Firms Fi with ki = 2 are node local unstable, except for networks satisfying
special symmetric properties. Firms Fi with ki = 3 whose neighboring firms
have nodes degree greater or equal to 3 are node local stable. Furthermore,
firms Fi with ki ≥ 4 whose neighboring firms have nodes degree greater or
equal to 2 are node local stable.
Proof of Theorem 2.1.3.
From Theorem 2.1.2, we have
pLi =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cv + t Lv + t Yv), (2.25)
and
piLi = (2 t)
−1 ki (pLi − ci)2.
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Hence,
∂piLi /∂i =
ki (p
L
i − ci)
t
· ∂pLi /∂i.
Hence, to study the influence of i in the profit pi
L
i , we only have to study
the signal of ∂pLi /∂i. By (2.25), we have
∂pLi /∂i =
∑
v∈V
∂pLi /∂Yv · ∂Yv/∂i.
Since, for every v ∈ V , ∂pLi /∂Yv = tQi,v, we have
∂pLi /∂i = t
∑
v∈V
Qi,v ∂Yv/∂i.
Recall that
Yv =
1
kv
(∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j)− v (kv − 2)
)
Hence, for v = i, we have
∂Yi/∂i =
2− ki
ki
;
for v ∈ Ni, we have
∂Yv/∂i = ∂/∂i
(
1
kv
sv,i(i)
)
= ± 1
kv
;
and for v /∈ Ni, we have ∂Yi/∂i = 0. Therefore,
∂pLi /∂i = t
(
Qi,i
2− ki
ki
− 2Qi,j(i)
kj(i)
+
∑
j∈Ni
Qi,j
kj
)
If ki = 1, then
∂pLi /∂i = tQi,i > 0.
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If ki = 2, then
∂pLi /∂i = t
(
Qi,j
kj
− Qi,j(i)
kj(i)
)
= t Ui
where j ∈ Ni and j 6= j(i). If ki ≥ 3, then
∂pLi /∂i ≤ t
(
Qi,i
2− ki
ki
+
∑
j∈Ni
Qi,j
1
kj
)
By construction, Qi,i > 1/2 and
∑
j∈Ni Qi,j < 1/2. Hence, if kv ≥ 3, for
every v ∈ Ni, then
∂pLi /∂i < t
(−1
6
+
1
6
)
= 0.
Furthermore, if ki ≥ 4 and kv ≥ 2, for every v ∈ Ni, then
∂pLi /∂i < t
(−1
4
+
1
4
)
= 0.
2.1.4 Space bounded information
Given m + 1 vertices x0, . . . , xm with the property that there are roads
Rx0,x1 , . . . , Rxm−1,xm the (ordered) m path R is
R = (Rx0,x1 , . . . , Rxm−1,xm).
Let R(i, j;m) be the set of all m (ordered) paths R = (Rx0,x1 , . . . , Rxm−1,xm)
starting at i = x0 and ending at j = xm. Given a m order path R =
(Rx0,x1 , . . . , Rxm−1,xm), the corresponding weight is
k(R) =
m−1∏
q=0
kxq ,xq+1 .
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The matrix K0 is the identity matrix and, for n ≥ 1, the elements of the
matrix Km are
kmi,j =
∑
R∈R(i,j;m)
k(R).
Definition 2.1.5. A Hotelling town has n space bounded information (n-
I) if for every 1 ≤ m ≤ n, for every firm Fi and for every non-empty set
R(i, j;m): (i) firm Fi knows the cost cj and the average length road Lj and
the firm deviation Yj of firm Fj; (ii) for every m path R ∈ R(i, j;m), firm
Fi knows the corresponding weight k(R).
The n local optimal price vector is
P(n) =
n∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km (C + t (L + Y)) .
We observe that in a n-I Hotelling town, the firms might not be able to
compute K, C, L or Y. However, every firm Fi is able to compute his n
local optimal price pi(n)
pi(n) =
n∑
m=0
2−(m+1)
∑
v∈V
kmi,v (cv + t (Lv + Yv)) .
By (2.5), the best response P′ to P(n) is given by
P′ =
1
2
(C + t (L + Y)) +
1
2
K P(n)
=
1
2
(C + t (L + Y)) +
n∑
m=0
2−(m+2)Km+1 (C + t (L + Y))
=
n+1∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C + t (L + Y)) = P(n+ 1).
Hence, P(n+ 1) is the best response to P(n) for n sufficiently large.
Let G denote the number of nodes in the network and let e = ∆(c) +
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3 t (lM + 2 ).
Theorem 2.1.4. A Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition has a local
optimum price strategy PL that is well approximated by the n local optimal
price P(n) with the following 2−n bound
0 ≤ pLi − pi(n) ≤ 2−(n+1)G (cM + t (lM + 2 )).
The profit pii(P
L) is well approximated by pii(P(n)) with the following bound
|pii(PL)− pii(P(n))| ≤ 2−(n+2)Gt−1 (cM + t (lM + 2 )) (ki e+ 4 t ) .
Proof. By Proposition 2.1.1, if a Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition
then there is local optimum price strategy PL given by
PL =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C + t (L + Y)) .
Considering Q =
∑∞
m=0 2
−(m+1)Km, we can write the equilibrium prices as
pLi =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v (cv + t (Lv + Yv)), where Qi,v =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)kmi,v.
For the space bounded information Hotelling town, the n local optimal price
P(n) is given by
P(n) =
n∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C + t (L + Y))
and
pi(n) =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(n) (cv + t (Lv + Yv)), where Qi,v(n) =
n∑
m=0
2−(m+1)kmi,v.
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The difference Ri(n) between p
L
i and pi(n) is positive and is given by
Ri(n) =
∑
v∈V
(Qi,v −Qi,v(n)) (cv + t (Lv + Yv)).
We note that
Qi,v −Qi,v(n) =
∞∑
m=n+1
2−(m+1)kmi,v.
Since 0 ≤ kmi,v ≤ 1, for all m ∈ N and all i, v ∈ V and
∞∑
m=n+1
2−(m+1) = 2−(n+1),
we have that
Qi,v −Qi,v(n) ≤ 2−(n+1).
Hence,
Ri(n) ≤
∑
v∈V
2−(n+1) (cv + t (Lv + Yv)).
Since Lv ≤ lM , Yv ≤ 2  and cv ≤ cM , we have that
Ri(n) ≤ 2−(n+1)G (cM + t (lM + 2 )). (2.26)
Therefore,
0 ≤ pLi − pi(n) ≤ 2−(n+1)G (cM + t (lM + 2 )).
The profit for firm Fi for the local optimal price is given by
pii(P
L) = (2t)−1 (pLi − ci)
(∑
j∈Ni
(pLj − pLi + t l˜i,j)− 2 t (ki − 2) i
)
(2.27)
and the profit for firm Fi when all firms have n-space bounded information
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is
pii(P(n)) = (2t)
−1 (pi(n)− ci)
(∑
j∈Ni
(pj(n)− pi(n) + t l˜i,j)− 2 t (ki − 2) i
)
Let Rj,i(n) = Rj(n)−Ri(n) and
Zi =
∑
j∈Ni
(pj(n)− pi(n) + t l˜i,j +Rj,i(n))− 2 t (ki − 2) i
=
∑
j∈Ni
(pLj − pLi + t l˜i,j)− 2 t (ki − 2) i.
Since pLi = pi(n) +Ri(n), we can write the local equilibrium profit (2.27) for
firm i as
pii(P
L) = (2t)−1 (pi(n)− ci +Ri(n))Zi
Hence,
pii(P
L) = pii(P(n)) + (2t)
−1
(
(pi(n)− ci)
∑
j∈Ni
Rj,i(n) +Ri(n)Zi
)
The difference between the equilibrium profit and the profit where all firms
have n-space bounded information is
pii(P
L)− pii(P(n)) = (2t)−1
(
(pi(n)− ci)
∑
j∈Ni
Rj,i(n) +Ri(n)Zi
)
.
Hence,
|pii(PL)− pii(P(n))| ≤ (2t)−1
(
(pi(n)− ci)
∑
j∈Ni
|Rj,i(n)|+Ri(n)Zi
)
.
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Since pLj − pLi + t l˜i,j ≤ 2 t l˜i,j ≤ 2 t (lM + 2 ), we have
Zi ≤ 2 t ki (lM + 2 )− 2 t (ki − 2)  < 2 t (ki (lM + 2 ) + 2 i).
Let Z = ∆(c) + t (lM + 2 ). Since pi(n) − ci ≤ pLi − ci, from (2.8) we have
pi(n)− ci ≤ ∆(c) + t (lM + 2 ) = Z. Hence,
|pii(PL)−pii(P(n))| < (2t)−1
(
Z
∑
j∈Ni
|Rj,i(n)|+ 2 t Ri(n) (ki (lM + 2 ) + 2 )
)
Let ZM = cM + t (lM + 2 ). By (2.26), Ri(n) ≤ 2−(n+1)GZM . Then, also,
|Rj,i(n)| ≤ 2−(n+1)GZM . Therefore,∑
j∈Ni
|Rj,i(n)| ≤ 2−(n+1) kiGZM .
Hence,
|pii(PL)− pii(P(n))| ≤ 2−(n+2)Gt−1 ZM (ki (∆(c) + 3 t (lM + 2 )) + 4 t ) .
2.1.5 Static Analysis
For simplicity of notation, in this subsection, we assume that the firms are
located at the nodes of the network. Let s be the gross consumer surplus,
i.e., the maximum consumer willingness to pay for the commodity. Let us
assume that the market is covered, i.e., s is sufficiently large for all consumers
to be willing to buy. The utility for each consumer x is given by
Ux = s− p− t d(x)
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where p is the price to pay and d(x) is the distance between x and the
location of the firm where it buys. Since the consumers with the lowest
utility are the indifferent consumers, we may say that the market is covered
if the indifferent consumer buys. Hence, if P is a local price strategy then
the market is covered if for every road Ri,j
s− pi − pj − pi + t li,j
2
≥ 0.
Thus, the market is covered if
s ≥ pi + pj + t li,j
2
. (2.28)
Let us define si,j = s− 1
2
(pi + pj + t li,j). We note that si,j ≥ 0.
Recall that the Hotelling town admissible market size L is the vector whose
coordinates are
Li = k
−1
i
∑
j∈Ni
li,j.
Let a ∈ V , j ∈ Ni and b ∈ V \ {i, Ni}. Hence, ∂Li/∂ca = 0, ∂Li/∂t = 0 and
∂Li/∂li,j = k
−1
i , ∂Lj/∂li,j = k
−1
j and ∂Lb/∂li,j = 0. (2.29)
Similarly, we have
∂li,j/∂Li = ki, ∂li,j/∂Lj = kj and ∂li,j/∂Lb = 0. (2.30)
By Proposition 2.1.1, if a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition then the
unique Hotelling town Nash equilibrium price for firm Fi is given by
p∗i =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v (cv + t Lv), where Qi,v =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)kmi,v.
Let us define Ai(r, s) = k
−1
r Qi,r + k
−1
s Qi,s.
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Corollary 2.1.3. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition, equilibrium
prices are increasing in production costs, admissible local firm market sizes,
transportation cost and road lengths.
Proof. Let a ∈ V . Hence,
∂p∗i /∂ca = Qi,a =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) kmi,a > 0, (2.31)
∂p∗i /∂La = tQi,a = t
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) kmi,a > 0 (2.32)
and
∂p∗i /∂t =
∑
v∈V
Qi,vLv > 0. (2.33)
Let Rr,s ∈ E. Since ∂Lv/∂lr,s = 0, for v 6= r and v 6= s, from (2.29) and
(2.32), we have
∂p∗i /∂lr,s =
∑
v∈V
∂p∗i /∂Lv · ∂Lv/∂lr,s
= ∂p∗i /∂Lr · ∂Lr/∂lr,s + ∂p∗i /∂Ls · ∂Ls/∂lr,s.
= t (k−1r Qi,r + k
−1
s Qi,s) = t Ai(r, s) > 0 (2.34)
From (2.31), (2.32), (2.33) and (2.34), prices are increasing in production
costs, admissible local firm market sizes, transportation cost and road lengths.
Corollary 2.1.4. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition, equilibrium
profits are decreasing in his own production cost and increasing in production
costs of other firms, admissible local firm market sizes, transportation costs
and road lengths.
Proof. From Proposition 2.1.1, if Fi is a firm located at a node of degree ki,
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his profit in equilibrium is given by
pi∗i = (2t)
−1 ki (p∗i − ci)2.
Hence,
∂pi∗i /∂p
∗
i = ki t
−1 (p∗i − ci). (2.35)
Let a ∈ V \ {i}. From (2.35) and (2.31), we get
∂pi∗i /∂ca = ∂pi
∗
i /∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂ca = ki t−1 (p∗i − ci)Qi,a > 0.
Similarly,
∂pi∗i /∂ci = ki t
−1 (p∗i − ci) (∂p∗i /∂ci − 1) = ki t−1 (p∗i − ci) (Qi,i − 1) .
Since Qi,i < 1, ∂pi
∗
i /∂ci < 0. Hence, profits are increasing in production costs
of other firms and are decreasing in own production cost.
Let b ∈ V . From (2.35) and (2.32), we get
∂pi∗i /∂Lb = ∂pi
∗
i /∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂Lb = ki (p∗i − ci)Qi,b > 0
and profits are increasing in admissible local firm market sizes.
From (2.35) and (2.33), we get
∂pi∗i /∂t = ∂pi
∗
i /∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂t−
ki
2
t−2 (p∗i − ci)2
= ki t
−1 (p∗i − ci)
∑
v∈V
Qi,vLv − ki
2
t−2 (p∗i − ci)2
= ki t
−2 (p∗i − ci)
(
t
∑
v∈V
Qi,vLv − 1
2
(p∗i − ci)
)
.
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Then, ∂pi∗i /∂t > 0 if and only if
ci > p
∗
i − 2 t
∑
v∈V
Qi,v Lv =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v (cv − t Lv).
Since Q is stochastic, ci =
∑
v∈V Qi,v ci, and ∂pi
∗
i /∂t > 0 if and only if∑
v∈V
Qi,v (ci − cv + t Lv) > 0. (2.36)
Since Lv ≥ lm, then ci− cv + t Lv ≥ cm− cM + t lm = t lm−∆(c). By the WB
condition, ci − cv + t Lv > 0. Since Q is a non-negative matrix, condition
(2.36) holds and ∂pi∗i /∂t > 0. Hence, profits are increasing in transportation
cost.
Let Rr,s ∈ E. From (2.35) and (2.34)
∂pi∗i /∂lr,s = ∂pi
∗
i /∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂lr,s = ki t−1 (p∗i − ci) t Ai(r, s)
= ki (p
∗
i − ci)Ai(r, s) > 0.
Hence, profits are increasing in road lengths.
The road consumer surplus CSi,j(P) for the road Ri,j is the integral of
the difference s− E(x; P) between the valuation s of the consumers for the
commodity and the expenditure E(x; P) for all the consumers living in the
road Ri,j. Then,
CS∗i,j = CSi,j(P
∗) =
∫ x∗i,j
0
s− p∗i − t x dx+
∫ li,j
x∗i,j
s− p∗j − t (li,j − x) dx
= s li,j + t (x
∗
i,j)
2 − t
2
l2i,j − p∗j li,j
= s li,j + (4 t)
−1(p∗j − p∗i + t li,j)2 −
t
2
l2i,j − p∗j li,j. (2.37)
Corollary 2.1.5. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition, the road
consumer surplus on road Ri,j, CSi,j(P
∗), is decreasing in production costs,
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decreasing in other road lengths, increasing in own length, decreasing in trans-
portation costs, increasing in admissible local firm market sizes Li and Lj and
decreasing in other admissible local firm market sizes.
Proof. From (2.37), we have
∂CS∗i,j/∂p
∗
i = −(2t)−1(p∗j − p∗i + t li,j) = −x∗i,j (2.38)
and
∂CS∗i,j/∂p
∗
j = (2 t)
−1(p∗j − p∗i + t li,j)− li,j = x∗i,j − li,j. (2.39)
Since 0 < x∗i,j < li,j, ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂p
∗
i < 0 and ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂p
∗
j < 0.
Let a ∈ V . Hence, from (2.38), (2.39) and (2.31) and
∂CS∗i,j/∂ca = ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂ca + ∂CS∗i,j/∂p∗j · ∂p∗j/∂ca
= −x∗i,j Qi,a + (x∗i,j − li,j)Qj,a.
Since Q is a non-negative matrix, ∂CS∗i,j/∂ca < 0 and road consumer surplus
on road Ri,j is decreasing in production costs.
Let b ∈ V \ {i, j}. Hence, from (2.38), (2.39), (2.32), (2.30),
∂CS∗i,j/∂Lb = ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂Lb + ∂CS∗i,j/∂p∗j · ∂p∗j/∂Lb
= −x∗i,j tQi,b + (x∗i,j − li,j) tQj,b.
Since Q is a non-negative matrix, ∂CS∗i,j/∂Lb < 0 and consumer surplus on
road Ri,j is decreasing in other admissible local firm market sizes.
Similarly, from (2.38), (2.39), (2.32), (2.30)
∂CS∗i,j/∂Li = ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂Li + ∂CS∗i,j/∂p∗j · ∂p∗j/∂Li + si,j ki
= −x∗i,j tQi,i + (x∗i,j − li,j) tQj,i + si,j ki
= t x∗i,j (Qj,i −Qi,i)− t li,j Qj,i + si,j ki.
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If
si,j >
t
ki
(
li,j Qj,i + x
∗
i,j (Qi,i −Qj,i)
)
then ∂CS∗i,j/∂Li > 0. Otherwise, ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂Li < 0.
Similarly,
∂CS∗i,j/∂Lj = t x
∗
i,j (Qj,j −Qi,j)− t li,j Qj,j + si,j kj.
If
si,j >
t
kj
(
li,j Qj,j + x
∗
i,j (Qi,j −Qj,j)
)
then ∂CS∗i,j/∂Lj > 0. Otherwise, ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂Lj < 0.
Since we consider the valuation s sufficiently large, we have CS∗i,j/∂Li > 0
and CS∗i,j/∂Lj > 0. Hence, road consumer surplus on road Ri,j is increasing
in admissible local firm market sizes Li and Lj.
From (2.37), (2.38), (2.39) and (2.33)
∂CS∗i,j/∂t =
= ∂CS∗i,j/∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂t+ ∂CS∗i,j/∂p∗j · ∂p∗j/∂t+ x∗i,j
(
li,j − x∗i,j
)− l2i,j
2
= −x∗i,j
∑
v∈V
Qi,v Lv + (x
∗
i,j − li,j)
∑
v∈V
Qj,v Lv + x
∗
i,j
(
li,j − x∗i,j
)− l2i,j
2
= x∗i,j
(∑
v∈V
(Qj,v −Qi,v)Lv + li,j − x∗i,j
)
− li,j
(∑
v∈V
Qj,v Lv +
li,j
2
)
.
Since 0 < x∗i,j < li,j and
∑
v∈V Qj,v Lv +
li,j
2
> 0, if
∑
v∈V
(Qj,v −Qi,v)Lv + li,j − x∗i,j <
∑
v∈V
Qj,v Lv +
li,j
2
(2.40)
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then ∂CS∗i,j/∂t < 0. But condition (2.40) is equivalent to∑
v∈V
Qi,vLv + x
∗
i,j −
1
2
li,j > 0. (2.41)
Since Lv ≥ lm, then
∑
v∈V Qi,v Lv ≥
∑
v∈V Qi,v lm = lm. Hence,∑
v∈V
Qi,vLv + x
∗
i,j −
1
2
li,j ≥ lm + x∗i,j −
1
2
li,j > lm − 1
2
li,j.
From the WB condition we know that lm > lM/2. Hence, lm > li,j/2,
condition (2.41) holds, and ∂CS∗i,j/∂t < 0. Therefore, consumer surplus on
road Ri,j is decreasing in transportation cost.
Let Rr,s ∈ E \ {Ri,j}. Hence, from (2.38), (2.39) and (2.34)
∂CS∗i,j/∂lr,s = ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂lr,s + ∂CS∗i,j/∂p∗j · ∂p∗j/∂lr,s
= −x∗i,j t Ai(r, s) + (x∗i,j − li,j) t Aj(r, s).
Hence, ∂CS∗i,j/∂lr,s < 0 and road consumer surplus on road Ri,j is decreasing
in other road lengths.
From (2.37), (2.38), (2.39) and (2.34)
∂CS∗i,j/∂li,j = ∂CS
∗
i,j/∂p
∗
i · ∂p∗i /∂li,j + ∂CS∗i,j/∂p∗j · ∂p∗j/∂li,j + si,j
= −x∗i,j t Ai(i, j) + (x∗i,j − li,j) t Aj(i, j) + si,j
= x∗i,j t (Aj(i, j)− Ai(i, j))− li,j t Aj(i, j) + si,j.
If si,j > li,j t Aj(i, j) + x
∗
i,j t (Ai(i, j)− Aj(i, j)) then CS∗i,j/∂li,j > 0. Other-
wise, CS∗i,j/∂li,j < 0. Since we consider the valuation s sufficiently large, we
have CS∗i,j/∂li,j > 0 and road consumer surplus on road Ri,j is increasing in
local road length.
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The (total) consumer surplus CS(P) is
CS(P) =
∑
Ri,j∈E
CSi,j(P).
Hence, CS∗ = CS(P∗) is given by
CS∗ = (4 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
(
4 t s li,j + (p
∗
j − p∗i )2 − 2 t li,j (p∗j + p∗i )− t2 l2i,j
)
. (2.42)
Corollary 2.1.6. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition, the con-
sumer surplus is decreasing in production costs, increasing in road lengths,
decreasing in transportation costs and increasing in admissible local firm mar-
ket sizes.
Proof. Let D(u,w) = p∗u − p∗w − t lu,w. From (2.42), we obtain that, for any
road Ru,w
∂CS∗/∂p∗u = (2 t)
−1 (p∗u − p∗w − t lu,w) =
D(u,w)
2 t
< 0 (2.43)
and
∂CS∗/∂p∗w = (2 t)
−1 (p∗w − p∗u − t lu,w) =
D(w, u)
2 t
< 0. (2.44)
Let a ∈ V . From (2.42), (2.43), (2.44) and (2.31)
∂CS∗/∂ca = (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
(
D(i, j) · ∂p∗i /∂ca +D(j, i) · ∂p∗j/∂ca
)
= (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
D(i, j)Qi,a +D(j, i)Qj,a.
Since D(i, j) < 0, D(j, i) < 0 and Q is non-negative, ∂CS∗/∂ca < 0 and
consumer surplus is decreasing in production costs.
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From (2.42), (2.43), (2.44), (2.32) and (2.30)
∂CS∗/∂La = (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
D(i, j) · ∂p∗i /∂La +D(j, i) · ∂p∗j/∂La +
+ (4 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
(
4 t s− 2 t (p∗j + p∗i )− 2 t2 li,j
)
∂li,j/∂La
= (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
D(i, j) tQi,a +D(j, i) tQj,a + ka
∑
b∈Na
sa,b
+
1
2
∑
b∈Na
(2 s− p∗b − p∗a − t la,b) ka
=
1
2
 ∑
Ri,j∈E
D(i, j)Qi,a +D(j, i)Qj,a + ka
∑
b∈Na
sa,b
 .
Since we consider s sufficiently high, ∂CS∗/∂La > 0 and consumer surplus
is increasing in admissible local firm market sizes.
From (2.42), (2.43), (2.44) and (2.33)
∂CS∗/∂t = (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
(
D(i, j) · ∂p∗i /∂t+D(j, i) · ∂p∗j/∂t
)−
− (2 t)−2
∑
Ri,j∈E
(p∗j − p∗i )2 + t2 l2i,j
= (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
D(i, j)
∑
v∈V
Qi,v Lv +D(j, i)
∑
v∈V
Qj,v Lv −
− (2 t)−2
∑
Ri,j∈E
(p∗j − p∗i )2 + t2 l2i,j.
SinceD(i, j) < 0, D(j, i) < 0 and (p∗j−p∗i )2+t2 l2i,j > 0, we have ∂CS∗/∂t < 0.
Hence, consumer surplus is decreasing in transportation cost.
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Let Rr,s ∈ E. From (2.42), (2.43), (2.44) and (2.34)
∂CS∗/∂lr,s = (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
D(i, j) · ∂p∗i /∂lr,s +D(j, i) · ∂p∗j/∂lr,s + sr,s
= (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
D(i, j) t Ai(r, s) +D(i, j) t Aj(r, s) + sr,s
=
1
2
2 sr,s + ∑
Ri,j∈E
D(i, j)Ai(r, s) +D(j, i)Aj(r, s)
 .
Since we consider s sufficiently high, ∂CS∗/∂lr,s > 0 and consumer surplus
is increasing road lengths.
The (total) welfare W (P) is
W (P) =
∑
i∈V
pii(P) + CS(P).
Hence, W ∗ = W (P∗) is given by
W ∗ = (4 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
2 t li,j (2 s−ci−cj)+2 (p∗j−p∗i ) (cj − ci)−(p∗j−p∗i )2−t2 l2i,j
(2.45)
Corollary 2.1.7. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition, the welfare
is increasing in road lengths and in local firm market sizes. The marginal
rates on production and transportation costs are inconclusive.
Proof. Let G(u,w) = pw − cw − pu + cu. From (2.45), we obtain that for any
road Ru,w
∂W ∗/∂p∗u = (2 t)
−1 (pw − cw − pu + cu) = G(u,w)
2 t
; (2.46)
and
∂W ∗/∂p∗w = (2 t)
−1 (pu − cu − pw + cw) = −G(u,w)
2 t
. (2.47)
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Let a ∈ V . From (2.46), (2.47) and (2.31)
∂W ∗/∂ca = (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
G(i, j) · ∂p∗i /∂ca −G(i, j) · ∂p∗j/∂ca
= (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
G(i, j) (Qi,a −Qj,a) .
Let H(i, j) = 2 s− ci− cj − li,j. From (2.45), (2.46), (2.47) (2.32) and (2.30)
∂W ∗/∂La = (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
G(i, j) · ∂p∗i /∂La −G(i, j) · ∂p∗j/∂La +
+
1
2
∑
Ri,j∈E
(2 s− ci − cj − t li,j) · ∂li,j/∂La
= (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
tQi,aG(i, j)− tQj,aG(i, j) + 1
2
∑
b∈Na
H(a, b) ka
=
1
2
 ∑
Ri,j∈E
G(i, j) (Qi,a −Qj,a) + ka
∑
b∈Na
H(a, b)
 .
Since we consider s sufficiently high, ∂W ∗/∂La > 0 and welfare is increasing
in admissible local firm market sizes.
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From (2.45), (2.46), (2.47) and (2.33)
∂W ∗/∂t = (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
G(i, j) · ∂p∗i /∂t−G(i, j) · ∂p∗j/∂t−
− (2 t)−2
∑
Ri,j∈E
2 (p∗j − p∗i ) (cj − ci)− (p∗j − p∗i )2 + t2 l2i,j
= (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
G(i, j)
∑
v∈V
Lv (Qi,v −Qj,v) +
+ (2 t)−2
∑
Ri,j∈E
2 (p∗j − p∗i ) (ci − cj) + (p∗j − p∗i )2 − t2 l2i,j
= (2 t)−2
 ∑
Ri,j∈E
2G(i, j)
∑
v∈V
Lv (Qi,v −Qj,v)
+
+ (2 t)−2
(
2 (p∗j − p∗i ) (ci − cj) + (p∗j − p∗i )2 − t2 l2i,j
)
.
Let Rr,s ∈ E. From (2.45), (2.46), (2.47) and (2.34)
∂W ∗/∂lr,s = (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
G(i, j) · ∂p∗i /∂lr,s −G(i, j) · ∂p∗j/∂lr,s +
+
1
2
(2 s− cr − cs − t lr,s)
= (2 t)−1
∑
Ri,j∈E
(
G(i, j) (t Ai(r, s)− t Aj(r, s)) + 1
2
H(r, s)
)
=
1
2
 ∑
Ri,j∈E
G(i, j) (Ai(r, s)− Aj(r, s)) +H(r, s)
 .
Since we consider s sufficiently high, ∂W ∗/∂lr,s > 0 and welfare is increasing
road lengths.
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2.2 Quadratic transportation costs
This section extends the Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs
to networks.
A consumer located at a point x of the network who decides to buy at
firm Fi spends
E(x; i,P) = pi + t d
2(x, yi)
the price pi charged by the firm Fi plus the transportation cost that is pro-
portional t to the square of the minimal distance measured in the network
between the position yi of the firm Fi and the position x of the consumer.
2.2.1 Local optimal equilibrium price strategy
For every v ∈ V , let v = d(v, yv) and j(v) be the node with the property
that yv is at the road Rv,j(v). The shift location matrix S(v) associated to
node v is defined by
si,j(v) =

v if i = v and j ∈ Nv \ {j(v)} ;
−v if i = v and j = j(v) ;
v if j = v and i ∈ Nv \ {j(v)} ;
−v if j = v and i = j(v) ;
0 otherwise.
The distance l˜i,j = d(yi, yj) between the location of firms Fi and Fj is given
by
l˜i,j = li,j +
∑
v∈{i,j}
si,j(v). (2.48)
Let  = maxv∈V v. Hence, for every i, j ∈ V we have
li,j − 2  ≤ l˜i,j ≤ li,j + 2 .
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We observe that, for every road Ri,j there is an indifferent consumer located
at a distance
0 < xi,j =
pj − pi + t l˜2i,j
2 t l˜i,j
< l˜i,j (2.49)
of firm Fi if and only if |pi− pj| < t l˜2i,j. Thus, a price strategy P determines
a local market structure if and only if |pi − pj| < t l˜2i,j for every road Ri,j.
Hence, if
|pi − pj| < t (li,j − 2 )2 = t l2i,j − 4 t li,j + 4 t 2 (2.50)
then condition (2.49) is satisfied. Therefore, if condition (2.50) holds then
the price strategy P determines a local market structure.
Let ki denote is the cardinality of the set Ni that is equal to the degree of
the vertex i. If the price strategy determines a local market structure then
S(i,P) = (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
xi,j
and
pii(P,C) = (pi − ci)S(i,P)
=
pi − ci
2 t
(
2 t (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
pj − pi + t l˜2i,j
l˜i,j
)
. (2.51)
Given a pair of price strategies P and P∗ and a firm Fi, we define the
price vector P˜(i,P,P∗) whose coordinates are p˜i = p∗i and p˜j = pj, for every
j ∈ V \ {i}. Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market
structures. The price strategy P∗ is a local best response to the price strategy
P, if for every i ∈ V the price strategy P˜(i,P,P∗) determines a local market
structure and
∂pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)
∂p˜i
= 0 and
∂2pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)
∂p˜2i
< 0.
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Let l˜i =
∑
j∈Ni
1
l˜i,j
. The Hotelling town admissible market size L is the
vector whose coordinates are the admissible local firm market sizes
Li =
1
l˜i
∑
j∈Ni
li,j,
The Hotelling town neighboring market structure K is the matrix whose
elements are (i) ki,j = l˜
−1
i l˜
−1
i,j , if there is a road Ri,j between the firms Fi and
Fj; and (ii) ki,j = 0, if there is not a road Ri,j between the firms Fi and Fj.
The Hotelling town firm deviation is the vector Y whose coordinates are
Yi = l˜
−1
i
(
(2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(j)
)
.
Let 1 denote the identity matrix.
Lemma 2.2.1. Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market
structures. The price strategy P∗ is the local best response to price strategy
P if and only if
P∗ =
1
2
(C+ t (L+Y)) +
1
2
KP (2.52)
and the price strategies P˜(i,P,P∗) determine local market structures for all
i ∈ V .
Proof.
By (2.51), the profit function pii(P,C) of firm Fi, in a local market structure,
is given by
pii(P,C) = (2 t)
−1(pi − ci)
(
2 t (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
pj − pi + t l˜2i,j
l˜i,j
)
Let P˜(i,P,P∗) be the price vector whose coordinates are p˜i = p∗i and p˜j =
pj, for every j ∈ V \ {i}. Since P and P∗ are local price strategies, the
155
local best response of firm Fi to the price strategy P, is given by computing
∂pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)/∂p˜i = 0. Hence,
p∗i =
1
2
(
ci +
2 t (2− ki)
l˜i
i +
1
l˜i
∑
j∈Ni
t l˜i,j +
pj
l˜i,j
)
. (2.53)
By (2.48), we obtain
p∗i =
1
2
ci + 2 t (2− ki)
l˜i
i +
t
l˜i
∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈{i,j}
si,j(v) +
1
l˜i
∑
j∈Ni
t li,j +
pj
l˜i,j
 .
We note that∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈{i,j}
si,j(v) =
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(i) +
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(j) = (ki − 2) i +
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(j).
Hence,
p∗i =
1
2
(
ci +
t
l˜i
(
(2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
si,j(j)
)
+
1
l˜i
∑
j∈Ni
t li,j +
pj
l˜i,j
)
.
Therefore, since ∂2pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)/∂p˜2i = −l˜i/t < 0, the local best re-
sponse strategy prices P∗ is given by
P∗ =
1
2
(C + t (Y + L) + K P) .
Definition 2.2.1. A Hotelling town satisfies the weak bounded length and
costs (WB) condition, if
∆(c) + t∆2(l) < t (lm − 2 )2 − 4 t  (lM + lm).
Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market structures.
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A price strategy P∗ is a local optimum price strategy if P∗ is the local best
response to P∗.
Proposition 2.2.1. If the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, then
there is unique local optimum price strategy given by
PL =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
(C+ t (L+Y))
=
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C+ t (L+Y)) . (2.54)
The local optimum price strategy PL determines a local market structure.
Furthermore, the local optimal equilibrium prices pLi are bounded by
t (lm − 2 )2 + 1
2
(ci + cm) ≤ pLi ≤ t (lM + 2 )2 +
1
2
(ci + cM). (2.55)
The local optimal profit piLi = pi
L
i (P,C) of firm Fi is given by
piLi (P,C) = (2t)
−1 l˜i (pLi − ci)2
and it is bounded by
ki (2 t (lm − 2 )2 −∆(c))2
8 t (lM + 2 )
≤ piLi (P,C) ≤
ki (2 t (lM + 2 )
2 + ∆(c))2
8 t (lm − 2 )
Corollary 2.2.1. Consider a Hotelling town where all firms are located at
the nodes. If ∆(c) + t∆2(l) < t l
2
m, then there is unique local optimum price
strategy given by
PL =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C+ tL) .
The local optimum price strategy PL determines a local market structure.
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Furthermore, the local optimal equilibrium prices pLi are bounded by
t l2m +
1
2
(ci + cm) ≤ pLi ≤ t l2M +
1
2
(ci + cM).
The local optimal profit piLi = pi
L
i (P,C) of firm Fi is given by
piLi (P,C) = (2t)
−1 (pLi − ci)2
∑
j∈Ni
1
li,j
and it is bounded by
ki (2 t l
2
m −∆(c))2
8 t lM
≤ piLi (P,C) ≤
ki (2 t l
2
M + ∆(c))
2
8 t lm
Proof of Proposition 2.2.1.
Let, first, prove that K is a stochastic matrix (i.e.,
∑
j∈V ki,j = 1, for every
i ∈ V ). Since ki,j = l˜−1i l˜−1i,j and l˜i =
∑
j∈Ni
1
l˜i,j
, we have
∑
j∈V
ki,j =
∑
j∈Ni
ki,j =
∑
j∈Ni
l˜−1i l˜
−1
i,j = l˜
−1
i
∑
j∈Ni
l˜−1i,j =
1∑
j∈Ni
1
l˜i,j
∑
j∈Ni
1
l˜i,j
= 1.
Then, K is a stochastic matrix, and we have ‖K‖ = 1. Hence, the matrix Q
is well-defined by
Q =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
=
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km
and Q is also a non-negative and stochastic matrix. By Lemma 2.2.1, a local
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optimum price strategy satisfy equality (2.52). Therefore,
PL =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
(C + t (L + Y))
=
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km (C + t (L + Y)) ,
and so PL satisfies (2.54). By construction,
pLi =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cv + t (Lv + Yv)). (2.56)
Let us prove that the price strategy PL is local, i.e., the indifferent consumer
xi,j satisfies 0 < xi,j < l˜i,j for every Ri,j ∈ E. We note that
lm − 2 
kv
=
1
kv
lm − 2 
≤ l˜−1v =
1∑
j∈Nv
1
l˜v,j
≤ 1
kv
lM + 2 
≤ lM + 2 
kv
. (2.57)
Hence,
lm − 2 
kv
∑
j∈Nv
lv,j ≤ Lv = l˜−1v
∑
j∈Nv
lv,j ≤ lM + 2 
kv
∑
j∈Nv
lv,j.
Therefore,
lm (lm − 2 ) ≤ Lv ≤ lM (lM + 2 ). (2.58)
We note that
−kv  ≤
∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j) ≤ kv 
If kv = 1 then Yv = l˜
−1
v
(
v +
∑
j∈Nv sv,j(j)
)
, and from (2.57)
−(lm − 2 ) ≤ (lm − 2 ) (v − ) ≤ Yv ≤ (lM + 2 ) (v + ) ≤ 2 (lM + 2 );
(2.59)
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if kv = 2 then Yv = l˜
−1
v
∑
j∈Nv sv,j(j), and from (2.57)
− (lm − 2 ) = − lm − 2 
2
2  ≤ Yv ≤ lM + 2 
2
2  =  (lM + 2 ); (2.60)
and if kv ≥ 3 then Yv = l˜−1v
(
(2− kv) v +
∑
j∈Nv sv,j(j)
)
, and from (2.57)
−((kv − 2) v + kv ) lm − 2 
kv
≤ Yv ≤ lM + 2 
kv
((2− kv) v + kv ) .
Hence, if kv ≥ 3 then
−2  (lm − 2 ) ≤ − lm − 2 
kv
(kv (+ v)) ≤ Yv ≤  (lM + 2 ). (2.61)
Therefore, from (2.59), (2.60) and (2.61), we have
−2  (lm−2 ) ≤ Yv = l˜−1v
(∑
j∈Nv
sv,j(j)− v(kv − 2)
)
≤ 2  (lM +2 ). (2.62)
Since Q is a nonnegative and stochastic matrix, we obtain∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cm + t (lm − 2 )2) = cm + t (lm − 2 )2
and ∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cM + t (lM + 2 )
2) = cM + t (lM + 2 )
2.
Hence, putting (2.56), (2.58) and (2.62) together we obtain that
cm + t (l
2
m − 4 lm + 4 2) ≤ pLi ≤ cM + t (l2M + 4 lM + 4 2).
Therefore,
cm + t (lm − 2 )2 ≤ pLi ≤ cM + t (lM + 2 )2.
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Since the last relation is satisfied for every firm, we obtain
pLi − pLj ≥ − (cM − cm + t(∆2(l) + 4 (lM + lm)))
and
pLi − pLj ≤ cM − cm + t(∆2(l) + 4 (lM + lm)).
Therefore,
|pLi − pLj | ≤ ∆(c) + t(∆2(l) + 4 (lM + lm)).
Hence, by the WB condition, we conclude that
|pLi − pLj | < t (lm − 2 )2.
Thus, by equation (2.50), we obtain that the indifferent consumer is located
at 0 < xi,j < l˜i,j for every road Ri,j ∈ E. Hence, the price strategy PL is
local and is the unique local optimum price strategy.
From (2.56), (2.58) and (2.62), we obtain
pLi ≥
∑
v∈V
Qi,v t(lm − 2 )2 +
∑
v∈V \{i}
Qi,v cm +Qi,i ci.
By construction of matrix Q, we have Qi,i > 1/2. Furthermore, since Q is
stochastic, ∑
v∈V \{i}
Qi,v < 1/2,
∑
v∈V Qi,v t(lm − 2 )2 = t(lm − 2 )2. Hence,
pLi ≥ t (lm − 2 )2 +
1
2
(ci + cm).
Similarly, we obtain
pLi ≤ t (lM + 2 )2 +
1
2
(ci + cM),
161
and so the local optimal equilibrium prices pLi are bounded and satisfy (2.55).
We can write the the profit function (2.51) of firm Fi for the price strategy
PL as
piLi = pii(P
L,C) = (2t)−1(pLi − ci)
(
2 t (2− ki) i − l˜i pLi +
∑
j∈Ni
pLj + t l˜
2
i,j
l˜i,j
)
(2.63)
Since PL satisfies the best response function (2.53), we have
2 pLi = ci +
2 t (2− ki)
l˜i
i +
1
l˜i
∑
j∈Ni
pLj + t l˜
2
i,j
l˜i,j
.
Therefore,
∑
j∈Ni
pLj + t l˜
2
i,j
l˜i,j
= 2 l˜i p
L
i − l˜i ci− 2 t (2− ki) i, and replacing this
sum in the profit function (2.63), we obtain
piLi = (2t)
−1(pLi − ci) l˜i (pLi − ci) = (2t)−1 l˜i (pLi − ci)2.
Hence, since
ki
lM + 2 
≤ l˜i ≤ ki
lm − 2 ,
using the price bounds (2.55), we conclude
ki (2 t (lm − 2 )2 −∆(c))2
8 t (lM + 2 )
≤ piLi ≤
ki (2 t (lM + 2 )
2 + ∆(c))2
8 t (lm − 2 ) .
Let a ∈ V , Rb,c ∈ E and d ∈ V \ {i}. The marginal rates of the local
optimal equilibrium prices pLi are positive with respect to the production
costs ca, admissible local firm market sizes La, transportation costs t and
road lengths lb,c. The marginal rates of the local optimal equilibrium profit
piLi are negative with respect to the production costs ci and positive with
respect to the production costs cd, admissible local firm market sizes La,
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transportation costs t and road lengths lb,c.
2.2.2 Nash equilibrium price strategy
The price strategy P∗ is a best response to the price strategy P, if
(p˜i − ci)S(i, P˜(i,P,P∗)) ≥ (p′i − ci)S(i,P′i),
for all i ∈ V and for all price strategies P′i whose coordinates satisfy p′i ≥ ci
and p′j = pj for all j ∈ V \ {i}. A price strategy P∗ is a Hotelling town Nash
equilibrium if P∗ is the best response to P∗.
Lemma 2.2.2. In a Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition, if there is
a Nash price P∗ then P∗ is unique and P∗ = PL.
Hence, the local optimum price strategy PL is the only candidate to
be a Nash equilibrium price strategy. However, PL might not be a Nash
equilibrium price strategy because there can be a firm Fi that by decreasing
his price is able to absorb markets of other firms in such a way that increases
its own profit. Therefore, the best response price strategy PL,∗ to the local
optimum price strategy PL might be different from PL.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.2.
Suppose that P ∗ is a Nash price strategy and that P∗ 6= PL. Hence, P∗ does
not determine a local market structure, i.e., there exists i ∈ V such that
M(i,P∗) 6⊂ ∪j∈NiRi,j.
Hence, there exists j ∈ Ni such that M(j,P∗) = 0 and, therefore, pi∗j = 0.
Moreover, in this case, we have that
p∗j > p
∗
i + t l˜
2
i,j.
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Consider, now, that Fj changes his price to pj = cj + t∆2(l) + 4 t  (lM + lm).
Since p∗i > ci and cj − ci ≤ ∆(c) we have that
pj − p∗i = cj + t∆2(l) + 4 t  (lM + lm)− p∗i < ∆(c) + t∆2(l) + 4 t  (lM + lm).
Since the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, we obtain
pj − p∗i < t (lm − 2 )2 ≤ t (li,j − 2 )2 ≤ t l˜2i,j.
Hence, M(j, P˜(j,P∗,P)) > 0 and
pij = (t∆2(l) + 4 t  (lM + lm))S(j, P˜(j,P
∗,P)) > 0.
Therefore, Fj will change its price and so P
∗ is not a Nash equilibrium price
strategy. Hence, if there is a Nash price P∗ then P∗ = PL.
Let ∪j∈NiRi,j be the 1-neighbourhood N (i, 1) of a firm i ∈ V . Let
∪j∈Ni ∪k∈Nj Rj,k be the 2-neighbourhood N (i, 2) of a firm i ∈ V .
Lemma 2.2.3. In a Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition,
M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2)
for every i ∈ V .
Hence, a consumer x ∈ Rj,k might not buy in its local firms Fj and
Fk. However, the consumer x ∈ Rj,k still has to buy in a firm Fi that is a
neighboring firm of its local firms Fj and Fk, i.e. i ∈ Nj ∪Nk.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.3.
By contradiction, let us consider a consumer z ∈ M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) and
z /∈ N (i, 2). The price that consumer z pays to buy in firm Fi is given by
e = pi + t
(
l˜i1,i2 + l˜i2,i3 + d (yi3 , z)
)2
≥ pi + t (li1,i2 + li2,i3 − 2 + d (yi3 , z))2
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where pi = p
L,∗
i is the coordinate of the vector P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗) and for the
2-path (Ri1,i2 , Ri2,i3) with i1 = i. If the consumer z buys at firm Fi3 , then
the price that has to pay is
e˜ = pLi3 + t d
2 (yi3 , z).
Since, by hypothesis, z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)), we have e < e˜. Therefore
pi < p
L
i3
− t (li1,i2 + li2,i3 − 2 )2 − 2 t (li1,i2 + li2,i3 − 2 ) d(yi3 , z).
Since li,j ≥ lm for all Ri,j ∈ E,
pi < p
L
i3
− 4 t (lm − )2 − 4 t (lm − ) d(yi3 , z).
By (2.55), pLi ≤ t (lM + 2 )2 + cM for all i ∈ V . Hence,
pi < cM + t (lM + 2 )
2 − 4 t (lm − )2 − 4 t (lm − ) d(yi3 , z).
Furthermore,
pi − ci < ∆(c) + t (lM + 2 )2 − 4 t (lm − )2
= ∆(c) + t∆2(l)− 3 t l2m + 4 t  (lM + lm) + 4 t lm + 4 t 2 − 4 t 2
= ∆(c) + t∆2(l)− t (lm − 2 )2 + 4 t  (lM + lm) + 2 t (2 2 − l2m).
Since lm > 2 , by the WB condition, pi− ci < 0. Hence, piL,∗i < 0 which con-
tradicts the fact that pi is the best response to P
L (since piLi > 0). Therefore,
z ∈ N (i, 2) and M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2).
Definition 2.2.2. A Hotelling town satisfies the strong bounded length and
costs (SB) condition, if
∆(c) + t∆2(l) ≤ (2 t (lm − 2 )
2 −∆(c))2
8 t kM (lM + 2 )2
− 4 t  (lM + lm).
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The SB condition implies the WB condition, and so under the SB con-
dition the only candidate to be a Nash equilibrium price strategy is the local
optimum strategy price PL. On the other hand, the condition
∆(c) + t∆2(l) ≤ t l
4
M
8 kM (lM + 2 )2
− 4 t  (lM + lm).
together with the WB condition implies the SB condition. Hence, we note
that the condition
∆(c) + t∆2(l) ≤ t (lm − 2 )
4
8 kM (lM + 2 )2
− 4 t  (lM + lm).
implies the WB and SB conditions.
Theorem 2.2.1. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition then there is
a unique Hotelling town Nash equilibrium price strategy P∗ = PL.
Hence, the Nash equilibrium price strategy for the Hotelling town sat-
isfying the SB condition determines a local market structure, i.e. every
consumer located at x ∈ Ri,j spends less by shopping at his local firms Fi
or Fj than in any other firm in the town and so the consumer at x will buy
either at his local firm Fi or at his local firm Fj.
For  small enough, a cost and length uniform Hotelling town, i.e. cm =
cM and lm = lM , has a unique pure network Nash price strategy.
Corollary 2.2.2. Consider a Hotelling town where all firms are located at
the nodes. If
∆(c) + t∆2(l) ≤ (2 t l
2
m −∆(c))2
8 t kM l2M
then there is a unique Hotelling town Nash equilibrium price strategy P∗ =
PL.
Proof of Theorem 2.2.1.
By Proposition 2.2.1 and Lemma 2.2.2, if there is a Nash equilibrium price
strategy P∗ then P∗ is unique and P∗ = PL.
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We note that if M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 1) for every i ∈ V then
P˜(i,PL,PL,∗) = pLi and so P
L is a Nash equilibrium.
By Lemma 2.2.3, we have that M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2) for every i ∈ V .
Now, we will prove that the SB condition implies that firm Fi earns more
competing only in the 1-neighborhood than competing in a 2-neighborhood.
By Proposition 2.2.1,
piLi ≥
ki (2 t (lm − 2 )2 −∆(c))2
8 t (lM + 2 )
(2.64)
By Lemma 2.2.3,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) ≤ (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
l˜i,j + ∑
k∈Nj\{i}
l˜j,k

≤ (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈Nj
l˜j,k,
where pi = p
L,∗
i is the coordinate of the vector P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗). Hence,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) ≤ (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈Nj
(lj,k + ) ≤ (pi − ci)ki kM (lM + ).
(2.65)
By contradiction, let us consider a consumer z ∈ M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) and
z /∈ N (i, 1). Let i2 ∈ Ni be the vertex such that z ∈ N (i2, 1). The price that
consumer z pays to buy in firm Fi is given by
e = pi + t (l˜i,i2 + d (yi2 , z))
2 ≥ pi + t (li,i2 − 2 + d (yi2 , z))2.
If the consumer y buys at firm Fi2 , then the price that has to pay is
e˜ = pLi2 + t d
2 (yi2 , z).
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Since, by hypothesis, z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)), we have e < e˜. Therefore
pi < p
L
i2
− t (li,i2 − 2 )2 − 2 t (li,i2 − 2 ) d (yi2 , z).
By (2.55), pLi2 ≤ t (lM +2 )2+
1
2
(cM +ci2) ≤ cM +t (lM +2 )2. Since li,i2 ≥ lm,
we have
pi < cM + t (lM + 2 )
2 − t (lm − 2 )2 − 2 t (lm − 2 ) d (yi2 , z).
Thus,
pi − ci < ∆(c) + t (lM + 2 )2 − t (lm − 2 )2.
Hence, from (2.65) we obtain
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) < ki kM (lM + )
(
∆(c) + t (lM + 2 )
2 − t (lm − 2 )2
)
.
Hence,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) < ki kM (lM + 2 )
(
∆(c) + t (lM + 2 )
2 − t (lm − 2 )2
)
.
By the SB condition,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) <
ki (2 t (lm + 2 )
2 −∆(c))2
8 t (lM + 2 )
. (2.66)
By inequalities (2.64) and (2.66), piLi > pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C), which contra-
dicts the fact that pi is the best response to P
L. Therefore, z ∈ N (i, 1) and
M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 1). Hence, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗) = pLi and so PL is a
Nash equilibrium.
We are going to present an example satisfying the WB condition but not
the SB condition. Furthermore, we will show that in this example the local
optimal prices do not form a Nash price equilibrium. Consider the Hotelling
town network presented in figure 2.4. The parameter values are i = 0, ci = 0,
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Figure 2.4: Star Network not satisfying the SB condition
lm = 5, lM = 7, ∆2(l) = 24 and kM = 3. Hence, Network 2.4 satisfies the
WB condition. By Proposition 2.2.1, the local optimal equilibrium prices
are
PL = t
(
3780
107
,
6455
214
,
3816
107
,
9023
214
)
and the correspondent profits are
piL = t
(
34020
107
,
8333405
91592
,
1213488
11449
,
11630647
91592
)
.
We will show that the local optimum price strategy is not a Nash equilibrium.
The profits of the firms are given by piLi = pi S(i,P
L), and the local market
sizes S(i,PL) are
S(i,PL) =
piLi
pLi
=
li p
L
i
2 t
Hence, the local market sizes are
S(1,PL) = 9; S(2,PL) =
6455
2140
; S(3,PL) =
3816
1284
; S(4,PL) =
9023
2996
.
Suppose that firm F2 decides to lower its price in order to capture the market
of firm F1. The firm F2 captures the market of F1, excluding F1 from the
game, if the firm F2 charges a price p2 such that p2+25 t < p
L
1 or, equivalently
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p2 < 1105 t/107. Let us consider p2 = 1105 t/107− δ, where δ is sufficiently
small. Hence, for this new price, firm F2 keeps the market M(2,P
L) and,
since the price of F2 at location of F1 is less that p
L
1 , firm F2 gains at least
the market of firm F1. Thus, the new market M(2,P) of firm F2 is such that
S(2,P) > S(1,PL) + S(2,PL). Therefore, S(2,P) > 5143/428 and so
pi2 > p2 S(2,P) =
(
1105
107
t− δ
)
5143
428
=
11366030
91592
t− 5143
428
δ.
Thus pi2 >
8333405
91592
t = piL2 , and so firm F2 prefers to alter its price p
L
2 .
Therefore, PL is not a Nash equilibrium price.
2.2.3 Space bounded information
The notation in this subsection has already been introduced in subsection
2.2.3. However, we duplicate the information in order to guarantee the inde-
pendence of the sections.
Given m + 1 vertices x0, . . . , xm with the property that there are roads
Rx0,x1 , . . . , Rxm−1,xm the (ordered) m path R is
R = (Rx0,x1 , . . . , Rxm−1,xm).
Let R(i, j;m) be the set of all m (ordered) paths R = (Rx0,x1 , . . . , Rxm−1,xm)
starting at i = x0 and ending at j = xm. Given a m order path R =
(Rx0,x1 , . . . , Rxm−1,xm), the corresponding weight is
k(R) =
m−1∏
q=0
kxq ,xq+1 .
The matrix K0 is the identity matrix and, for n ≥ 1, the elements of the
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matrix Km are
kmi,j =
∑
R∈R(i,j;m)
k(R).
Definition 2.2.3. A Hotelling town has n space bounded information (n-
I) if for every 1 ≤ m ≤ n, for every firm Fi and for every non-empty set
R(i, j;m): (i) firm Fi knows the cost cj and the average length road Lj and
the firm deviation Yj of firm Fj; (ii) for every m path R ∈ R(i, j;m), firm
Fi knows the corresponding weight k(R).
The n local optimal price vector is
P(n) =
n∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km (C + t (L + Y)) .
We observe that in a n-I Hotelling town, the firms might not be able to
compute K, C, L or Y. However, every firm Fi is able to compute his n
local optimal price pi(n)
pi(n) =
n∑
m=0
2−(m+1)
∑
v∈V
kmi,v (cv + t (Lv + Yv)) .
By (2.52), the best response P′ to P(n) is given by
P′ =
1
2
(C + t (L + Y)) +
1
2
K P(n)
=
1
2
(C + t (L + Y)) +
n∑
m=0
2−(m+2)Km+1 (C + t (L + Y))
=
n+1∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C + t (L + Y)) = P(n+ 1).
Hence, P(n+ 1) is the best response to P(n) for n sufficiently large.
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Let G denote the number of nodes in the network and let
e =
∆(c) + t (lM + 2 )
2
lm − 2  + 2 t (lM + 2 ).
Theorem 2.2.2. A Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition has a local
optimum price strategy PL that is well approximated by the n local optimal
price P(n) with the following 2−n bound
0 ≤ pLi − pi(n) ≤ 2−(n+1)G (cM + t (lM + 2 )2).
The profit pii(P
L) is well approximated by pii(P(n)) with the following bound
|pii(PL)− pii(P(n))| ≤ 2−(n+2)Gt−1 (cM + t (lM + 2 )2) (ki e+ 4 t ) .
Proof. By Proposition 2.2.1, if a Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition
then there is local optimum price strategy PL given by
PL =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C + t (L + Y)) .
Considering Q =
∑∞
m=0 2
−(m+1)Km, we can write the equilibrium prices as
pLi =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v (cv + t (Lv + Yv)), where Qi,v =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)kmi,v.
For the space bounded information Hotelling town, the n local optimal price
P(n) is given by
P(n) =
n∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C + t (L + Y))
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and
pi(n) =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(n) (cv + t (Lv + Yv)), where Qi,v(n) =
n∑
m=0
2−(m+1)kmi,v.
The difference Ri(n) between p
L
i and pi(n) is positive and is given by
Ri(n) =
∑
v∈V
(Qi,v −Qi,v(n)) (cv + t (Lv + Yv)).
We note that
Qi,v −Qi,v(n) =
∞∑
m=n+1
2−(m+1)kmi,v.
Since 0 ≤ kmi,v ≤ 1, for all m ∈ N and all i, v ∈ V and
∞∑
m=n+1
2−(m+1) = 2−(n+1),
we have that
Qi,v −Qi,v(n) ≤ 2−(n+1).
Hence,
Ri(n) ≤
∑
v∈V
2−(n+1) (cv + t (Lv + Yv)).
Since Lv ≤ lM (lM + 2 ), Yv ≤ 2  (lM + 2 ) and cv ≤ cM , we have that
Ri(n) ≤ 2−(n+1)G (cM + t (lM + 2 )2). (2.67)
Therefore,
0 ≤ pLi − pi(n) ≤ 2−(n+1)G (cM + t (lM + 2 )2).
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The profit for firm Fi for the local optimal price is given by
pii(P
L) = (2t)−1 (pLi − ci)
(
2 t (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
pLj − pLi + t l˜2i,j
l˜i,j
)
(2.68)
and the profit for firm Fi when all firms have n-space bounded information
is
pii(P(n)) = (2t)
−1 (pi(n)− ci)
(
2 t (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
pj(n)− pi(n) + t l˜2i,j
l˜i,j
)
Let Rj,i(n) = Rj(n)−Ri(n) and
Zi = 2 t (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
pj(n)− pi(n) +Rj,i(n) + t l˜2i,j
l˜i,j
= 2 t (2− ki) i +
∑
j∈Ni
pLj − pLi + t l˜2i,j
l˜i,j
.
Since pLi = pi(n) +Ri(n), we can write the local equilibrium profit (2.68) for
firm i as
pii(P
L) = (2t)−1 (pi(n)− ci +Ri(n))Zi
Hence,
pii(P
L) = pii(P(n)) + (2t)
−1
(
(pi(n)− ci)
∑
j∈Ni
Rj,i(n)
l˜i,j
+Ri(n)Zi
)
The difference between the equilibrium profit and the profit where all firms
have n-space bounded information is
pii(P
L)− pii(P(n)) = (2t)−1
(
(pi(n)− ci)
∑
j∈Ni
Rj,i(n)
l˜i,j
+Ri(n)Zi
)
.
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Hence,
|pii(PL)− pii(P(n))| ≤ (2t)−1
(
(pi(n)− ci)
∑
j∈Ni
|Rj,i(n)|
l˜i,j
+Ri(n)Zi
)
.
Since
pLj − pLi + t l˜2i,j
l˜i,j
≤ 2 t l˜i,j ≤ 2 t (lM + 2 ),
we have
Zi ≤ 2 t (2− ki) i + 2 t ki (lM + 2 ) < 2 t (ki (lM + 2 ) + 2 i).
Let Z = ∆(c) + t (lM + 2 )
2. Since pi(n)− ci ≤ pLi − ci, from (2.55) we have
pi(n)− ci ≤ ∆(c) + t (lM + 2 )2 = Z. Hence,
|pii(PL)−pii(P(n))| < (2t)−1
(
Z
∑
j∈Ni
|Rj,i(n)|
l˜i,j
+ 2 t Ri(n) (ki (lM + 2 ) + 2 )
)
Let ZM = cM + t (lM + 2 )
2. By (2.67), Ri(n) ≤ 2−(n+1)GZM . Then, also,
|Rj,i(n)| ≤ 2−(n+1)GZM . Therefore,
∑
j∈Ni
|Rj,i(n)|
l˜i,j
≤ 2−(n+1) ki
lm − 2  GZM .
We note that
Z
lm − 2  + 2 t (lM + 2 ) = e.
Hence,
|pii(PL)− pii(P(n))| ≤ 2−(n+2)Gt−1 ZM (ki e+ 4 t ) .
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2.3 Different transportation costs
This section extends the Hotelling model with different linear transportation
costs to networks. For simplicity of notation, we assume that the firms are
located at the nodes of the network.
A consumer located at a point x of the network who decides to buy at
firm Fi spends
E(x; i,P) = pi + ti d(x, i)
the price pi charged by the firm Fi plus the transportation cost that is pro-
portional ti to the minimal distance measured in the network between the
position i of the firm Fi and the position x of the consumer.
2.3.1 Local optimal equilibrium price strategy
We observe that, for every road Ri,j there is an indifferent consumer located
at a distance
0 < xi,j =
pj − pi + tj li,j
ti + tj
< li,j
of firm Fi if and only if −ti li,j < pi − pj < tj li,j. Thus, a price strategy P
determines a local market structure if and only if
−ti li,j < pi − pj < tj li,j (2.69)
for every road Ri,j.
If the price strategy determines a local market structure then
S(i,P) =
∑
j∈Ni
xi,j
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and
pii(P,C) = (pi − ci)S(i,P)
= (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
pj − pi + tj li,j
ti + tj
. (2.70)
Given a pair of price strategies P and P∗ and a firm Fi, we define the
price vector P˜(i,P,P∗) whose coordinates are p˜i = p∗i and p˜j = pj, for every
j ∈ V \ {i}. Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market
structures. The price strategy P∗ is a local best response to the price strategy
P, if for every i ∈ V the price strategy P˜(i,P,P∗) determines a local market
structure and
∂pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)
∂p˜i
= 0 and
∂2pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)
∂p˜2i
< 0.
Let Ti =
∑
j∈Ni
1
ti + tj
. The Hotelling town admissible market size L is
the vector whose coordinates are the admissible local firm market sizes
Li = T
−1
i
∑
j∈Ni
tj li,j
ti + tj
.
The Hotelling town neighboring market structure K is the matrix whose
elements are (i) ki,j =
1
Ti (ti + tj)
, if there is a road Ri,j between the firms Fi
and Fj; and (ii) ki,j = 0, if there is not a road Ri,j between the firms Fi and
Fj. Let 1 denote the identity matrix.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market
structures. The price strategy P∗ is the local best response to price strategy
P if and only if
P∗ =
1
2
(C+ L) +
1
2
KP (2.71)
and the price strategies P˜(i,P,P∗) determine local market structures for all
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i ∈ V .
Proof. By (2.70), the profit function pii(P,C) of firm Fi, in a local market
structure, is given by
pii(P,C) = (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
pj − pi + tj li,j
ti + tj
.
Let P˜(i,P,P∗) be the price vector whose coordinates are p˜i = p∗i and p˜j =
pj, for every j ∈ V \ {i}. Since P and P∗ are local price strategies, the
local best response of firm Fi to the price strategy P, is given by computing
∂pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)/∂p˜i = 0. Hence,
p∗i =
1
2
(
ci +
1
Ti
∑
j∈Ni
pj + tj li,j
ti + tj
)
. (2.72)
Therefore, since ∂2pii(P˜(i,P,P
∗),C)/∂p˜2i = −2Ti < 0, the local best re-
sponse strategy prices P∗ is given by
P∗ =
1
2
(C + L + K P) .
We denote by tM (resp. tm) the maximum (resp. minimum) transporta-
tion cost of the Hotelling town
tM = max{ti : i ∈ V } and tm = min{ti : i ∈ V }.
Let ∆(t) = tM − tm.
Definition 2.3.1. A Hotelling town satisfies the weak bounded length and
costs (WB) condition, if
∆(c) +
lM t
3
M − lm t3m
tm tM
< tm lm.
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Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market structures.
A price strategy P∗ is a local optimum equilibrium if P∗ is the local best
response to P∗.
Proposition 2.3.1. If the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, then
there is unique local optimum price strategy given by
PL =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
(C+ L) =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1)Km (C+ L) . (2.73)
The local optimum price strategy PL determines a local market structure.
Furthermore, the local optimal equilibrium prices pLi are bounded by
lm t
2
m
tM
+
1
2
(ci + cm) ≤ pLi ≤
lM t
2
M
tm
+
1
2
(ci + cM) (2.74)
The local optimal profit piLi = pi
L
i (P,C) of firm Fi is given by
piLi (P,C) = Ti (p
L
i − ci)2
and it is bounded by
ki
ti + tM
(
lm t
2
m
tM
− ∆(c)
2
)2
≤ piLi ≤
ki
ti + tm
(
lM t
2
M
tm
+
∆(c)
2
)2
.
Proof. Let, first prove that K is a stochastic matrix (i.e.,
∑
j∈V ki,j = 1, for
every i ∈ V ). Since
Ti =
∑
j∈Ni
1
ti + tj
and ki,j =
1
Ti (ti + tj)
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we have ∑
j∈V
ki,j =
∑
j∈Ni
ki,j =
∑
j∈Ni
T−1i
1
ti + tj
= T−1i
∑
j∈Ni
1
ti + tj
=
1∑
j∈Ni
1
ti + tj
∑
j∈Ni
1
ti + tj
= 1.
Then K is a stochastic matrix, and we have ‖K‖ = 1. Hence, the matrix Q
is well-defined by
Q =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
=
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km
and Q is also a non-negative and stochastic matrix. By Lemma 2.3.1, a local
optimum price strategy satisfy equality (2.71). Therefore,
PL =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
(C + L) =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km (C + L) ,
and so PL satisfies (2.73). By construction,
pLi =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cv + Lv). (2.75)
Let us prove that the price strategy PL is local, i.e., the indifferent consumer
xi,j satisfies 0 < xi,j < li,j for every Ri,j ∈ E.
We note that
kv
tv + tM
≤ Tv =
∑
j∈Nv
1
tv + tj
≤ kv
tv + tm
(2.76)
Hence,
tv + tm
kv
≤ T−1v ≤
tv + tM
kv
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and, therefore,
tv + tm
kv
kv
tm lm
tv + tM
≤ Lv = T−1v
∑
j∈Nv
tj lv,j
tv + tj
≤ tv + tM
kv
kv
tM lM
tv + tm
Hence,
lm t
2
m
tM
≤ tm lm (tv + tm)
tv + tM
Lv ≤ tM lM (tv + tM)
tv + tm
≤ lM t
2
M
tm
. (2.77)
Since Q is a nonnegative and stochastic matrix, we obtain
∑
v∈V
Qi,v
(
cm +
lm t
2
m
tM
)
= cm +
lm t
2
m
tM
and ∑
v∈V
Qi,v
(
cM +
lM t
2
M
tm
)
= cM +
lM t
2
M
tm
.
Hence, putting (2.75) and (2.77) together we obtain that
cm +
lm t
2
m
tM
≤ pLi ≤ cM +
lM t
2
M
tm
.
Since the last relation is satisfied for every firm, we obtain
−
(
cM − cm + lM t
2
M
tm
− lm t
2
m
tM
)
≤ pLi − pLj ≤ cM − cm +
lM t
2
M
tm
− lm t
2
m
tM
.
Therefore,
|pLi − pLj | ≤ ∆(c) +
lM t
3
M − lm t3m
tm tM
.
Hence, by the WB condition, we conclude that
|pLi − pLj | < tm lm.
Thus, by equation (2.69), we obtain that the indifferent consumer is located
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at 0 < xi,j < li,j for every road Ri,j ∈ E. Hence, the price strategy PL is
local and is the unique local optimum price strategy.
From (2.75) and (2.77), we obtain
pLi ≥
∑
v∈V
Qi,v
lm t
2
m
tM
+
∑
v∈V \{i}
Qi,v cm +Qi,i ci.
By construction of matrix Q, we have Qi,i > 1/2. Furthermore, since Q is
stochastic,
∑
v∈V \{i}
Qi,v < 1/2, and
∑
v∈V
Qi,v
lm t
2
m
tM
=
lm t
2
m
tM
.
Hence,
pLi ≥
lm t
2
m
tM
+
1
2
(ci + cm).
Similarly, we obtain
pLi ≤
lM t
2
M
tm
+
1
2
(ci + cM),
and so the local optimal equilibrium prices pLi are bounded and satisfy (2.74).
We can write the the profit function (2.70) of firm Fi for the price strategy
PL as
piLi = pii(P
L,C) = (pLi − ci)
(
−pLi Ti +
∑
j∈Ni
pLj + tj li,j
ti + tj
)
. (2.78)
Since PL satisfies the best response function (2.72), we have
2 pLi = ci +
1
Ti
∑
j∈Ni
pLj + tj li,j
ti + tj
.
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Therefore, ∑
j∈Ni
pLj + tj li,j
ti + tj
= 2 pLi Ti − ci Ti,
and replacing this sum in the profit function (2.78), we obtain
piLi = (p
L
i − ci)
(−pLi Ti + 2 pLi Ti − ci Ti) = Ti (pLi − ci)2.
Hence, from (2.76), and using the price bounds (2.74), we conclude
ki
ti + tM
(
lm t
2
m
tM
−∆(c)/2
)2
≤ piLi ≤
ki
ti + tm
(
lM t
2
M
tm
+ ∆(c)/2
)2
.
Let a ∈ V , Rb,c ∈ E and d ∈ V \ {i}. The marginal rates of the local
optimal equilibrium prices pLi are positive with respect to the production
costs ca, admissible local firm market sizes La, transportation costs t and
road lengths lb,c. The marginal rates of the local optimal equilibrium profit
piLi are negative with respect to the production costs ci and positive with
respect to the production costs cd, admissible local firm market sizes La,
transportation costs t and road lengths lb,c.
2.3.2 Nash equilibrium price strategy
The price strategy P∗ is a best response to the price strategy P, if
(p˜i − ci)S(i, P˜(i,P,P∗)) ≥ (p′i − ci)S(i,P′i),
for all i ∈ V and for all price strategies P′i whose coordinates satisfy p′i ≥ ci
and p′j = pj for all j ∈ V \ {i}. A price strategy P∗ is a Hotelling town Nash
equilibrium if P∗ is the best response to P∗.
Lemma 2.3.2. In a Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition, if there is
a Nash price P∗ then P∗ is unique and P∗ = PL.
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Hence, the local optimum price strategy PL is the only candidate to
be a Nash equilibrium price strategy. However, PL might not be a Nash
equilibrium price strategy because there can be a firm Fi that by decreasing
his price is able to absorb markets of other firms in such a way that increases
its own profit. Therefore, the best response price strategy PL,∗ to the local
optimum price strategy PL might be different from PL.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2.
Suppose that P ∗ is a Nash price strategy and that P∗ 6= PL. Hence, P∗ does
not determine a local market structure, i.e., there exists i ∈ V such that
M(i,P∗) 6⊂ ∪j∈NiRi,j.
Hence, there exists j ∈ Ni such that M(j,P∗) = 0 and, therefore, pi∗j = 0.
Moreover, in this case, we have that
p∗j > p
∗
i + ti li,j.
Consider, now, that Fj changes his price to
pj = cj +
lM t
3
M − lm t3m
tm tM
.
Since p∗i > ci and cj − ci ≤ ∆(c) we have that
pj − p∗i < pj − ci = cj +
lM t
3
M − lm t3m
tm tM
− ci ≤ ∆(c) + lM t
3
M − lm t3m
tm tM
.
Since the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, we obtain
pj − p∗i < tm lm ≤ ti li,j.
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Hence, M(j, P˜(j,P∗,P)) > 0 and
pij =
(
lM t
3
M − lm t3m
tm tM
)
S(j, P˜(j,P∗,P)) > 0.
Therefore, Fj will change its price and so P
∗ is not a Nash equilibrium price
strategy. Hence, if there is a Nash price P∗ then P∗ = PL.
Definition 2.3.2. A Hotelling town satisfies the WB1 condition, if
∆(c) +
lM t
2
M
tm
− lm tm + ∆(t) lM ≤ lm tm.
Let ∪j∈NiRi,j be the 1-neighbourhood N (i, 1) of a firm i ∈ V . Let
∪j∈Ni ∪k∈Nj Rj,k be the 2-neighbourhood N (i, 2) of a firm i ∈ V .
Lemma 2.3.3. In a Hotelling town satisfying the WB1 condition,
M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2)
for every i ∈ V .
Hence, a consumer x ∈ Rj,k might not buy in its local firms Fj and
Fk. However, the consumer x ∈ Rj,k still has to buy in a firm Fi that is a
neighboring firm of its local firms Fj and Fk, i.e. i ∈ Nj ∪Nk.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3.
By contradiction, let us consider a consumer z ∈ M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) and
z /∈ N (i, n), with n ≥ 2. The price that consumer z pays to buy in firm Fi
is given by
e = pi + ti
(
n∑
j=1
lij ,ij+1 + d (in+1, z)
)
where pi = p
L,∗
i is the coordinate of the vector P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗) and for the
n-path (Ri1,i2 , Ri2,i3 , . . . , Rin,in+1) with i1 = i. If the consumer z buys at firm
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Fin+1 , then the price that has to pay is
e˜ = pLin+1 + tin+1 d (in+1, z).
Since, by hypothesis, z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)), we have e < e˜. Therefore
pi < p
L
in+1
− ti
(
n∑
j=1
lij ,ij+1
)
+ (tin+1 − ti) d (in+1, z).
By inequality (2.74),
pLi ≤
lM t
2
M
tm
+
1
2
(cM + ci)
for all i ∈ V . Since li,j ≥ lm for all Ri,j ∈ E,
pi <
lM t
2
M
tm
+
1
2
(cM + cin+1)− n ti lm + (tin+1 − ti) d (in+1, z).
Since n ≥ 2, d (in+1, z) < lM and tin+1 − ti ≤ ∆(t) we obtain that
pi <
lM t
2
M
tm
+
1
2
(cM + cin+1)− 2 ti lm + ∆(t) lM .
Since ti ≥ tm and cm ≤ ci ≤ cM for all i ∈ V we conclude that
pi − ci < ∆(c) + lM t
2
M
tm
− 2 tm lm + ∆(t) lM .
By the WB1 condition, pi − ci < 0. Hence, piL,∗i < 0 which contradicts the
fact that pi is the best response to P
L (since piLi > 0). Therefore, z ∈ N (i, 2)
and M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2).
Definition 2.3.3. A Hotelling town satisfies the strong bounded length and
costs (SB) condition, if
∆(c) +
lM t
2
M
tm
− lm tm + ∆(t) lM ≤ (2 lm t
2
m −∆(c) tM)2
4 t2M lM kM (tm + tM)
.
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The SB condition implies the WB condition, and so under the SB con-
dition the only candidate to be a Nash equilibrium price strategy is the local
optimum strategy price PL.
Theorem 2.3.1. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition then there is
a unique Hotelling town Nash equilibrium price strategy P∗ = PL.
Hence, the Nash equilibrium price strategy for the Hotelling town sat-
isfying the SB condition determines a local market structure, i.e. every
consumer located at x ∈ Ri,j spends less by shopping at his local firms Fi
or Fj than in any other firm in the town and so the consumer at x will buy
either at his local firm Fi or at his local firm Fj.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1.
By Proposition 2.3.1 and Lemma 2.3.2, if there is a Nash equilibrium price
strategy P∗ then P∗ is unique and P∗ = PL.
We note that if M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 1) for every i ∈ V then
P˜(i,PL,PL,∗) = pLi and so P
L is a Nash equilibrium.
We note that the SB condition implies the WB1 condition. Hence, by
Lemma 2.3.3, we have that M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2) for every i ∈ V .
Now, we will prove that the SB condition implies that firm Fi earns more
competing only in the 1-neighborhood than competing in a 2-neighborhood.
By Proposition 2.3.1
piLi ≥
ki
ti + tM
(
lm t
2
m
tM
− ∆(c)
2
)2
(2.79)
By Lemma 2.3.3,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) ≤ (pi − ci)
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈Nj
lj,k ≤ (pi − ci)ki kM lM (2.80)
where pi = p
L,∗
i is the coordinate of the vector P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗).
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By contradiction, let us consider a consumer z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) and
z /∈ N (i, 1). Let i2 ∈ Ni be the vertex such that z ∈ N (i2, 1). The price that
consumer z pays to buy in firm Fi is given by
e = pi + ti (li,i2 + d (i2, z)).
If the consumer z buys at firm Fi2 , then the price that has to pay is
e˜ = pLi2 + ti2 d (i2, z).
Since, by hypothesis, z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)), we have e < e˜. Therefore
pi < p
L
i2
− ti li,i2 + (ti2 − ti) d (i2, z).
By inequality (2.74),
pLi ≤
lM t
2
M
tm
+
1
2
(cM + ci)
for all i ∈ V . Since li,j ≥ lm for all Ri,j ∈ E,
pi <
lM t
2
M
tm
+
1
2
(cM + ci2)− ti lm + (ti2 − ti) d (i2, z).
Since d (i2, z) < lM and ti2 − ti ≤ ∆(t) we obtain that
pi <
lM t
2
M
tm
+
1
2
(cM + ci2)− ti lm + ∆(t) lM .
Since ti ≥ tm and cm ≤ ci ≤ cM for all i ∈ V we conclude that
pi − ci < ∆(c) + lM t
2
M
tm
− tm lm + ∆(t) lM .
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Hence, from (2.80) we obtain
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) < ki kM lM
(
∆(c) +
lM t
2
M
tm
− tm lm + ∆(t) lM
)
.
By the SB condition,
pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C) <
ki (2 lm t
2
m −∆(c) tM)2
4 t2M (tm + tM)
. (2.81)
Hence, by inequalities (2.79) and (2.81), piLi > pii(P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C), which
contradicts the fact that pi is the best response to P
L. Therefore, z ∈ N (i, 1)
and M(i, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 1). Hence, P˜(i,PL,PL,∗) = pLi and so PL is
a Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Uncertainty on the Hotelling Network
In this section, we introduce incomplete information, considering uncertainty
on the production costs of the firms, in the Hotelling network with linear
transportation costs, and we find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in prices.
For simplicity of notation, we consider a Hotelling town model where the
firms are located at the nodes and where each firm has a specific space of
price strategies associated with their production costs.
For every v ∈ V , let the triples (Iv,Ωv, qv) represent (finite, countable or
uncountable) sets of types Iv with σ-algebras Ωv and probability measures
qv over Iv. Hence dqv(zv) denotes the probability of the common believes of
the other firms on the production costs of the firm Fv to be c
zv
v .
The Hotelling town production cost C is the vector (c1, . . . , cNv) whose co-
ordinates cv : Iv → [cmv , cMv ] ⊆ [cm, cM ] ⊆ R+0 are measurable functions. The
Hotelling town average production cost E(C) is the vector (E(c1), . . . , E(cNv))
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whose coordinates are the expected production costs
E(cv) =
∫
Iv
czvv dqv(zv) <∞.
A price strategy P is the vector (p1, . . . , pNv) whose coordinates pv : Iv → R+0
are measurable functions. The average E(P) of the price strategy P is the
vector (E(p1), . . . , E(pNv)) whose coordinates are the expected prices
E(pv) =
∫
Iv
pzvv dqv(zv).
For each road Ri,j, the indifferent consumer xi,j : Ii × Ij → (0, li,j) is given
by
x
zi,zj
i,j =
p
zj
j − pzii + t li,j
2 t
. (2.82)
Let the type of the neighbours of a firm Fi of degree ki be denoted by ZNi =
(zi,1, zi,2, . . . , zi,ki) which is a vector of dimension ki. Consider that INi =
Ii,1× Ii,2 . . .× Ii,ki . The ex-post market size of firm Fi, SEPi : Ii× INi → R+0 ,
is given by
SEPi (i,P) =
∑
j∈Ni
x
zi,zj
i,j . (2.83)
The ex-post profit of firm Fi, pi
EP
i : Ii × INi → R+0 , is given by
piEPi (zi,ZNi) = pi
EP
i (P,C, zi,ZNi)
= (pzii − czii )SEPi (i,P) = (pzii − czii )
∑
j∈Ni
x
zi,zj
i,j . (2.84)
We assume that dqNi(ZNi) denotes the probability of the belief of the firm Fi
on the production costs of its neighbours to be C
zNi
Ni
= (c
zi,1
i,1 , c
zi,2
i,2 , . . . , c
zi,ki
i,ki
).
We note that
dqNi(ZNi) = dqi,1(zi,1) dqi,2(zi,2) . . . dqi,ki(zi,ki).
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The ex-ante market size of firm Fi, S
EA
i : Ii → R+0 , is given by
SEAi (i,P) =
∫
INi
SEPi (i,P) dqNi(ZNi) =
∑
j∈Ni
E(pj)− pzii + t li,j
2 t
. (2.85)
The ex-ante profit of firm Fi, pi
EA
i : Ii → R+0 , is given by
piEAi (zi) = pi
EA
i (P,C, zi)
=
∫
INi
piEPi (zi,ZNi) dqNi(ZNi) = (p
zi
i − czii )SEAi (i,P)
= (pzii − czii )
∑
j∈Ni
E(pj)− pzii + t li,j
2 t
. (2.86)
The expected profit of firm Fi, E(pii), is given by
E(pii) =
∫
Ii
piEAi (zi) dqi(zi) =
∫
Ii
∫
INi
piEPA (zi,ZNi) dqNi(ZNi) dqi(zi)
2.4.1 Local optimal equilibrium price strategy
Given a pair of price strategies P and P∗ and a firm Fi, we define the price
vector P˜(i,P,P∗) whose coordinates are p˜i = p∗i and p˜j = pj, for every
j ∈ V \ {i}. Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market
structures. The price strategy P∗ is a local best response to the price strategy
P, if for every i ∈ V the price strategy P˜(i,P,P∗) determines a local market
structure and
∂piEAi (P˜(i,P,P
∗),C, zi)
∂p˜i
= 0 and
∂2piEAi (P˜(i,P,P
∗),C, zi)
∂p˜2i
< 0.
Consider that L and K represent, respectively, the admissible market size
vector and the neighboring market structure matrix defined in section 2.1.1.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market
structures. The price strategy P∗ is the local best response to price strategy
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P if and only if
P∗ =
1
2
(C+KE(P) + tL) . (2.87)
and the price strategies P˜(i,P,P∗) determine local market structures for all
i ∈ V . Furthermore,
E(P∗) =
1
2
(E(C) + tL) +
1
2
KE(P). (2.88)
Proof. From (2.86), the ex-ante profit for firm Fi in a local market structure
is given by
piEAi (zi) =
pzii − czii
2 t
(∑
j∈Ni
E(pj)− pzii + t li,j
)
(2.89)
Let P˜(i,P,P∗) be the price vector whose coordinates are p˜i = p∗i and p˜j =
pj, for every j ∈ V \ {i}. Since P and P∗ are local price strategies, the
local best response of firm Fi to the price strategy P, is given by computing
∂piEAi (P˜(i,P,P
∗), E(C), zi)/∂p˜i = 0. Hence,
pzi,∗i =
1
2
(
czii +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
E(pj) + t li,j
)
. (2.90)
and equation (2.87) is satisfied.
Then,
E(p∗i ) =
∫
Ii
pzi,∗i dqi(zi) =
1
2
(
E(ci) +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
E(pj) + t li,j
)
Therefore, since ∂2piEAi (P˜(i,P,P
∗),C, zi)/∂p˜2i = −ki/t < 0, the local best
192
response strategy prices P∗ satisfy
E(P∗) =
1
2
(E(C) + tL + KE(P)) .
Let P and P∗ be price strategies that determine local market structures.
A price strategy P∗ is a local optimum price strategy if P∗ is the local best
response to P∗.
Let
Qi,j =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) kmi,j.
Proposition 2.4.1. If the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, then
there is unique Bayesian local optimal equilibrium price strategy given by
PE =
1
2
(
C+KE(PE) + tL
)
(2.91)
where
E(PE) =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
(E(C) + tL) .
Furthermore, the Bayesian local optimal equilibrium price PE determines a
local market structure and the local optimal equilibrium prices pEi are bounded
by
t lm +
1
2
czii +
E(ci) + cm
4
≤ pzi,Ei ≤ t lM +
1
2
czii +
E(ci) + cM
4
. (2.92)
Proof. The matrix K is a stochastic matrix (i.e.,
∑
j∈V ki,j = 1, for every
i ∈ V ). Thus, we have ‖K‖ = 1. Hence, the matrix Q is well-defined by
Q =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
=
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km
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and Q is also a non-negative and stochastic matrix. By Lemma 2.4.1, a local
optimum price strategy satisfy equality (2.88). Therefore,
E(PE) =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
(E(C) + tL) =
∞∑
m=0
2−(m+1) Km (E(C) + tL) .
(2.93)
By construction,
E(pEi ) =
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(E(cv) + t Lv). (2.94)
From equality (2.87), we obtain that the Bayesian local optimal equilibrium
price PE has coordinates
pzi,Ei =
1
2
(
ci +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
E(pEj ) + t li,j
)
=
1
2
(
ci +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
(∑
v∈V
Qj,v(E(cv) + t Lv) + t li,j
))
. (2.95)
Let us prove that the price strategy PE is local, i.e., the indifferent consumer
x
zi,zj
i,j satisfies 0 < x
zi,zj
i,j < li,j for every Ri,j ∈ E which, from (2.82), is
equivalent to ∣∣∣pzi,Ei − pzj ,Ej ∣∣∣ < t li,j. (2.96)
Since cm ≤ E(cv) ≤ cM for every v ∈ V , from (2.94) we obtain that for every
i ∈ V ∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cm + t Lv) ≤ E(pEi ) ≤
∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cM + t Lv). (2.97)
We note that
lm ≤ Lv = k−1v
∑
j∈Nv
lv,j ≤ lM . (2.98)
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Since Q is a nonnegative and stochastic matrix we obtain∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cm + t lm) = cm + t lm
and ∑
v∈V
Qi,v(cM + t lM) = cM + t lM .
Hence, putting (2.97) and (2.98) together, we obtain that
cm + t lm ≤ E(pEi ) ≤ cM + t lM .
Then,
pzi,Ei ≤
1
2
(
czii +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
cM + t lM + t li,j
)
≤ 1
2
(czii + cM + 2 t lM)
and
pzi,Ei ≥
1
2
(
czii +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
cm + t lm + t li,j
)
≥ 1
2
(czii + cm + 2 t lm) .
Therefore,
cm + t lm ≤ pzi,Ei ≤ cM + t lM .
Since the last relation is satisfied for every firm, we obtain
− (cM − cm + t(lM − lm)) ≤ pzi,Ei − pzj ,Ej ≤ cM − cm + t(lM − lm).
Therefore, ∣∣∣pzi,Ei − pzj ,Ej ∣∣∣ ≤ ∆(c) + t∆(l).
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Hence, by the WB condition, we conclude that∣∣∣pzi,Ei − pzi,Ej ∣∣∣ < t lm.
Thus, by equation (2.96), we obtain that the indifferent consumer is located
at 0 < x
zi,zj
i,j < li,j for every road Ri,j ∈ E. Hence, the price strategy PE is
local and is the unique local optimal equilibrium price strategy.
From (2.94) and (2.98), we obtain
E(pEi ) ≥
∑
v∈V
Qi,v t lm +
∑
v∈V \{i}
Qi,v cm +Qi,iE(ci).
By construction of matrix Q, we have Qi,i > 1/2. Furthermore, since Q is
stochastic, ∑
v∈V \{i}
Qi,v < 1/2,
and
∑
v∈V Qi,vt lm = t lm. Hence,
E(pEi ) ≥ t lm +
1
2
(E(ci) + cm).
Similarly, we obtain
E(pEi ) ≤ t lM +
1
2
(E(ci) + cM).
Hence
pzi,Ei ≥
1
2
(
ci +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
t lm +
1
2
(E(ci) + cm) + t li,j
)
≥ t lm + 1
2
ci +
1
4
(E(ci) + cm).
Similarly,
pzi,Ei ≤ t lM +
1
2
ci +
1
4
(E(ci) + cM).
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and so the Bayesian local optimal equilibrium prices pEi are bounded and
satisfy (2.92).
Proposition 2.4.2. If the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, the
ex-ante local optimal profit piEA,Ei (zi) of firm Fi is given by
piEA,Ei (zi) = pi
EA
i (P
E, E(C), zi) =
ki (p
zi,E
i − czii )2
2 t
and is bounded by
ki (4 t lm + E(ci) + cm − 2 czii )2
32 t
≤ piEA,Ei (zi) ≤
ki (4 t lM + E(ci) + cM − 2 czii )2
32 t
.
Proof. We can write the ex-ante profit function (2.89) of firm Fi with respect
to the local optimum price strategy PE by
piEA,Ei (zi) = (2t)
−1(pzi,Ei − czii )
(
−ki pzi,Ei +
∑
j∈Ni
(E(pEj ) + t li,j)
)
(2.99)
Since PE satisfies the best response function (2.87), we have
2 pzi,Ei = c
zi
i +
1
ki
∑
j∈Ni
(
E(pEj ) + t li,j
)
.
Therefore, ∑
j∈Ni
(
E(pEj ) + t li,j
)
= 2 ki p
zi,E
i − ki czii ,
and replacing this sum in the profit function (2.99), we obtain
piEA,Ei (zi) = (2t)
−1 ki (p
zi,E
i − czii )2.
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Using the price bounds (2.92), we conclude
ki (4 t lm + E(ci) + cm − 2 czii )2
32 t
≤ piEA,Ei (zi) ≤
ki (4 t lM + E(ci) + cM − 2 czii )2
32 t
.
2.4.2 Bayesian Nash equilibrium price strategy
The price strategy P∗ is a best response to the price strategy P, if
(p˜i − ci)SEA(i, P˜(i,P,P∗)) ≥ (p′i − ci)SEA(i,P′i),
for all i ∈ V and for all price strategies P′i whose coordinates satisfy p′i ≥ ci
and p′j = pj for all j ∈ V \ {i}. A price strategy P∗ is a Hotelling town Nash
equilibrium if P∗ is the best response to P∗.
Lemma 2.4.2. In a Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition, if there is
a Bayesian Nash price P∗ then P∗ is unique and P∗ = PE.
Hence, the Bayesian local optimum price strategy PE is the only can-
didate to be a Nash equilibrium price strategy. However, PE might not be
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium price strategy because there can be a firm Fi
that by decreasing his price is able to absorb markets of other firms in such a
way that increases its own profit. Therefore, the best response price strategy
PE,∗ to the optimal local price strategy PE might be different from PE.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.2.
Suppose that P ∗ is a Nash price strategy and that P∗ 6= PE. Hence, P∗ does
not determine a local market structure, i.e., there exists i ∈ V such that
M(i,P∗) 6⊂ ∪j∈NiRi,j.
Hence, there exists j ∈ Ni such that M(j,P∗) = 0 and, therefore, piEA,∗j = 0.
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Moreover, in this case, we have that
p
zj ,∗
j > E(p
∗
i ) + t li,j.
Consider, now, that Fj changes his price to pj = c
zj
j +t∆(l). Since E(p
∗
i ) > cm
and c
zj
j − cm ≤ ∆(c) we have that
pj − E(p∗i ) = czjj + t∆(l)− E(p∗i ) < czjj + t∆(l)− cm ≤ ∆(c) + t∆(l).
Since the Hotelling town satisfies the WB condition, ∆(c)+ t∆(l) < t lm, we
have
pj − E(p∗i ) < t lm ≤ t li,j.
Hence, M(j, P˜(j,P∗,P)) > 0 and piEAj = (cj+t∆(l))S
EA(j, P˜(j,P∗,P)) > 0.
Therefore, Fj will change its price and so P
∗ is not a Nash equilibrium price
strategy. Hence, if there is a Nash price P∗ then P∗ = PE.
Lemma 2.4.3. In a Hotelling town satisfying the WB condition,
M(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2)
for every i ∈ V .
Hence, a consumer x ∈ Rj,k might not buy in its local firms Fj and
Fk. However, the consumer x ∈ Rj,k still has to buy in a firm Fi that is a
neighboring firm of its local firms Fj and Fk, i.e. i ∈ Nj ∪Nk.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.3.
By contradiction, let us consider a consumer z ∈ M(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)) and
z /∈ N (i, 2). For every type zi ∈ Ii, the price that consumer z pays to buy in
firm Fi is given by
e = pzii + t (li1,i2 + li2,i3 + d (yi3 , z))
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where pi = p
E,∗
i is the coordinate of the vector P˜(i,P
E,PE,∗) and for the
2-path (Ri1,i2 , Ri2,i3) with i1 = i. If the consumer z buys at firm Fi3 , then
the price that has to pay for every type zi3 ∈ Ii3 is
e˜ = p
zi3 ,E
i3
+ t d (yi3 , z).
Since, by hypothesis, z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)), we have e < e˜. Therefore, for
every types zi ∈ Ii and zi3 ∈ Ii3 , we have
pzii < p
zi3 ,E
i3
− t (li1,i2 + li2,i3) .
By (2.92), pzi,Ei ≤ t lM +
1
2
(
czii +
E(ci) + cM
2
)
for all i ∈ V . Since li,j ≥ lm
for all Ri,j ∈ E,
pzii < t lM +
1
2
(
c
zi3
i3
+
E(ci3) + cM
2
)
− 2 t lm ≤ cM + t∆(l)− t lm.
Furthermore,
pzii − czii < ∆(c) + t∆(l)− t lm.
By the WB condition, pzii − czii < 0. Hence, piE,∗i < 0 which contradicts the
fact that pi is the best response to P
E (since piEi > 0). Therefore, z ∈ N (i, 2)
and M(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2).
Definition 2.4.1. A Hotelling town satisfies the strong bounded length and
costs (SB) condition, if
∆(c) + t∆(l) ≤ (2 t lm −∆(c))
2
8 t kM lM
. (2.100)
Theorem 2.4.1. If a Hotelling town satisfies the SB condition then there is
a unique Hotelling town Bayesian Nash equilibrium price strategy P∗ = PE.
Hence, the Nash equilibrium price strategy for the Hotelling town sat-
isfying the SB condition determines a local market structure, i.e. every
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consumer located at x ∈ Ri,j spends less by shopping at his local firms Fi
or Fj than in any other firm in the town and so the consumer at x will buy
either at his local firm Fi or at his local firm Fj.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.1.
By Proposition 2.4.1 and Lemma 2.4.2, if there is a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium price strategy P∗ then P∗ is unique and P∗ = PE.
We note that if M(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 1) for every i ∈ V then
P˜(i,PE,PE,∗) = pEi and so P
E is a Nash equilibrium.
By Lemma 2.4.3, we have thatM(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 2) for every i ∈ V .
Now, we will prove that condition (2.100) implies that firm Fi earns more
competing only in the 1-neighborhood than competing in a 2-neighborhood.
By Lemma 2.4.3,
piEAi (P˜(i,P
E,PE,∗),C, zi) ≤ (pzii − czii )
∑
j∈Ni
li,j + ∑
k∈Nj\{i}
lj,k

≤ (pzii − czii )
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈Nj
lj,k,
where pi = p
E,∗
i is the coordinate of the vector P˜(i,P
E,PE,∗). Hence,
piEAi (P˜(i,P
E,PE,∗),C, zi) ≤ (pzii − czii )
∑
j∈Ni
∑
k∈Nj
lj,k ≤ (pzii − czii )ki kM lM .
(2.101)
By contradiction, let us consider a consumer z ∈ M(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)) and
z /∈ N (i, 1). Let i2 ∈ Ni be the vertex such that z ∈ N (i2, i). The price that
consumer z pays to buy in firm Fi is given by
e = pi + t li,i2 + t d (yi2 , z).
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If the consumer y buys at firm Fi2 , then the price that has to pay is
e˜ = pEi2 + t d (yi2 , z).
Since, by hypothesis, z ∈M(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)), we have e < e˜. Therefore
pi < p
E
i2
− t li,i2 .
By (2.92), pEi ≤ t lM +
1
2
(
ci +
E(ci) + cM
2
)
. Since li,i2 ≥ lm, we have
pi < t lM +
1
2
(
ci2 +
E(ci2) + cM
2
)
− t lm ≤ cM + t∆(l).
Thus,
pi − ci < ∆(c) + t∆(l).
Hence, from (2.101) we obtain
piEAi (P˜(i,P
E,PE,∗),C, zi) < ki kM lM (∆(c) + t∆(l)) .
By the SB condition,
piEAi (P˜(i,P
L,PL,∗),C, zi) < (2 t)−1 ki (t lm −∆(c)/2)2. (2.102)
By Proposition 2.4.2 and (2.102),
piEA,Ei (zi) ≥ (2 t)−1 ki (t lm −∆(c)/2)2 > piEAi (P˜(i,PE,PE,∗),C, zi),
which contradicts the fact that pi is the best response to P
E. Therefore,
z ∈ N (i, 1) and M(i, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗)) ⊂ N (i, 1). Hence, P˜(i,PE,PE,∗) = pEi
and so PE is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
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2.5 Future Work: General model
This section presents the initial ideas of the general model for the Hotelling
model, allowing that firms can have entire markets and compete with other
that its neighbours.
Let Si,j ⊆ E denote the set of edges where Fi and Fj divide consumers
Si,j = {(k, l), (k′, l′), . . .}
Let lk,l denote the length of the roads Rk,l and let Li,k and Lj,l denote the
length between node i and node k and between node j and node l, respect-
ively.
For every edge shared by firm Fi and Fj, Rk,l there is an indifferent
consumer located at distance
xi(k, l) =
pj − pi
2 t
+
Lj,l − Li,k + lk,l
2
from firm Fi. Hence,
x˜i(k, l) =
pj − pi
2 t
+
Lj,l − 3Li,k + lk,l
2
is the distance of the indifferent consumer to the node k.
Let MCi denote the market of the network that belongs exclusively to
firm Fi, i.e., the set of edges where all the consumers buy at Fi. Hence, the
total market of firm Fi, Mi is given by
Mi = MCi +
∑
j∈N
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j
pj − pi
2 t
+
Lj,l − 3Li,k + lk,l
2
and the profit of Fi is given by
pii = (pi − ci)MCi + (pi − ci)
∑
j∈N
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j
pj − pi
2 t
+
Lj,l − 3Li,k + lk,l
2
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Hence
∂pii
∂pi
= MCi +
∑
j∈N
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j
pj − 2 pi + ci
2 t
+
Lj,l − 3Li,k + lk,l
2
From the FOC, we obtain
2
∑
j∈N
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j
pi = 2 tMCi+
∑
j∈N
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j
pj+
∑
j∈N
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j
ci+
∑
j∈N
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j
t (Lj,l−3Li,k+lk,l)
Let ki =
∑
j∈N
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j denote the number of markets shared by firm Fi
and let Ni denote the set of firms that share a market with Fi. Hence
2 ki pi = 2 tMCi +
∑
j∈Ni
pj ](Si,j) + ki ci + t
∑
j∈Ni
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j
(Lj,l − 3Li,k + lk,l)
Let Bi =
∑
j∈Ni
∑
(k,l)∈Si,j(Lj,l − 3Li,k + lk,l). Then
2 ki pi =
∑
j∈Ni
pj ](Si,j) + ki ci + t (2MCi +Bi)
and
pi =
1
2 ki
∑
j∈Ni
pj ](Si,j) +
ci
2
+
t
2 ki
(2MCi +Bi)
Let K be the matrix defined by
ki,j =
](Si,j)
ki
and M˜ and B˜ the vectors whose coordinates are
M˜i =
MCi
ki
and
B˜i =
Bi
ki
.
204
Hence, (
1− 1
2
K
)
P =
1
2
(
C + t (2 M˜ + B˜)
)
.
Since K is a stochastic matrix,
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1
exists, and
P =
1
2
(
1− 1
2
K
)−1 (
C + t (2 M˜ + B˜)
)
.
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Conclusions
In the first part of this work, we studied the linear and quadratic Hotelling
model with uncertainty on the production costs. We introduced a new con-
dition on the exogenous variables that we called the BUC1 (BUCL1, in the
quadratic transportation cost case) condition. We proved that there is a
local optimum price strategy if and only if the BUC1 (BUCL1) condition is
satisfied. We gave the explicit formula for the local optimum price strategy
and we observed that the formula does not depend on the distributions of
the production costs of the firms, except on their first moments. Further-
more, the local optimum price strategy determines prices for both firms that
are affine with respect to the expected costs of both firms and to its own
costs. The corresponding expected profits are quadratic in the expected cost
of both firms, in its own cost and in the transportation cost. We did the
ex-ante versus ex-post analysis of the profits. We proved that, under the
A − BUC and B − BUC conditions, the ex-post profit of a firm is smaller
than its ex-ante profit if and only if the production cost of the competitor
firm is greater than its expected cost. Then, we proved that the A − BUC
and B − BUC conditions are implied by the BUC1 (BUCL1) condition,
if the distribution of the production costs of both firms coincide (symmet-
ric Hotelling). We introduced a new condition on the exogenous variables
that we called the BUC2 (BUCL2) condition and we proved that under the
BUC1 (BUCL1) and BUC2 (BUCL2) conditions, the local optimum price
strategy is a Bayesian-Nash price strategy.
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With quadratic transportation costs, assuming that the firms choose the
Bayesian-Nash price strategy, we showed in which conditions the maximal
differentiation is a local optimum for the localization strategy of both firms.
In the second part of this work, we presented a model of price competition
in a network, extending the linear city presented by Hotelling with linear
and quadratic transportation costs to a network where firms are located at
the neighbourhood of the nodes and consumers distributed along the edges.
Under a condition on lengths and costs (WB condition), we found the local
optimum price strategy PL for which the Hotelling town has a local market
structure, i.e. the consumers prefer to buy at the local firms. Under a
condition on lengths and costs and maximum node degree (SB condition),
we proved that under the SB condition, the Nash equilibrium price strategy
P∗ exists and that P∗ = PL. We gave an explicit series expansion formula
for the Nash price equilibrium that shows explicitly how the Nash price
equilibrium of a firm depends on the production costs, road market sizes
and firm locations. Furthermore, the influence of a firm in the Nash price
equilibrium of other firm decreases exponentially with the distance between
the firms. We introduced the notion of space bounded information in the
Hotelling town and we showed that firms that only have local knowledge
of network are still able to compute good approximations of local optimum
prices. All this results were obtained for linear and quadratic transportation
costs.
With linear transportation costs, we presented additional results: (a)
we proved that, if the firms are located at the neighbourhood of the nodes
of degree greater than 2, the local optimal localization of the firms is at
the vertices of the network; (b) we determined the Nash equilibrium price
strategy for a Hotelling network where each firm has associated a different
transportation cost; (c) we determined the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium price
strategy with uncertainty on the production costs in the hotelling model;
and (d) under a condition on lengths and costs, we showed that the local
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optimum profits of the firms increases with the degree of the nodes in which
they are located.
Further, research work can consist (i) on finding sufficient and necessary
conditions for the local optimum price strategy to be a Nash equilibrium; (ii)
to solve the localization problem by studying the cases where the firms are
not located at the ends of the segment line; (iii) extend the Hotelling town
model to general case, without a local market structure.
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